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SUMMARY 
 
In this dissertation I argue that Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of human nature, of human 
flourishing and of virtue can fill the gap, identified by Elizabeth Anscombe in 1958, between 
Aristotle’s account of the virtuous life and contemporary sceptical moral philosophy, which is 
variously described as subjectivism (Lewis 1967), consequentialism (Anscombe 1958), 
emotivism (MacIntyre 1985), and sophistry (Pieper 1992). Furthermore, I argue that a Thomist 
account of the practicably lived virtuous life is both relevant and applicable to officers and 
soldiers serving in the British Army of today, because it offers a complete account of the human 
moral life, as opposed to the consequentialist, emotivist and deontological approaches to ethical 
judgement and reasoning currently prevalent in Western societies, which inform the worldview 
of both officers and soldiers. These approaches, however, offer only partial accounts of ethics 
based on impoverished understandings of human nature and, thus, inevitably have a 
detrimental effect on both the articulation of British military doctrine and on the actual moral 
conduct of officers and soldiers. I further argue, therefore, that the British Army needs to 
consciously return to the traditional Western approach to moral education based on the idea of 
the deliberate formation of virtuous character, which is very different from contemporary 
Western educational approaches, but which will better prepare British Army officers and 
soldiers for “the violent school of war”, as Thucydides calls it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this dissertation I argue that the traditional Western understanding of virtue is both relevant 
and applicable to today’s British Army officers and soldiers. In the first chapter I analyse the 
place of virtue in traditional Western moral philosophy, especially as it was articulated by 
Thomas Aquinas. In the second chapter I propose that in the contemporary West much of this 
traditional moral understanding has been undermined by what I call ‘sophistry’; a misuse of 
language and consequent manipulation of others rooted in philosophical scepticism and 
subjectivism. Sophistry obscures the centrality of virtue in the practicable moral life and replaces 
it with emotivist, deontological, and consequentialist moral ideas, based on impoverished 
understandings of human nature and of moral agency. In the third chapter I show how sophistry 
has had a deleterious effect on the British Army through confusing our understanding of the 
centrality of virtue in the military vocation to bear arms. In the final chapter I suggest that the 
British Army can counter this sophistic confusion and improve its operational effectiveness by a 
return to the ancient conception of moral education as the formation of virtuous character. 
 
I have, therefore, attempted to cover a wide range of subjects in fairly short compass. This 
inevitably means that in some subjects I have had to give abbreviated accounts of the arguments 
under discussion. I argue for the continuing relevance of traditional Western moral philosophy 
as the central proposition of my thesis and, thus, base my argument predominantly on 
philosophical authorities. I have, therefore, had to be selective in the use which I make of 
authorities in other disciplines, specifically the modern social sciences. The worldview implicit in 
the modern social sciences is largely opposed to the worldview underlying traditional Western 
moral philosophy, and, given the constraints of the dissertation, I have chosen not to explore 
this opposition in detail when philosophers like Josef Pieper (1952), Alasdair MacIntyre (1985), 
Roger Scruton (2005), and John Gray (2004) have already done so, albeit from widely different 
perspectives. 
 
My approach to the question of virtue and the British Army has naturally been informed by my 
own background and experiences. My father’s family has a long history of military service to the 
Crown: my great-grandfather was awarded the DCM in the 2nd Anglo-Boer War; my grandfather 
served in East Africa during the First World War; and my father served in Special Forces in the 
Second World War. A great-uncle was killed on the Somme in 1916 and an uncle in Italy in 1944. 
I grew up in Rhodesia during its civil war in the 1970s and went to university in apartheid-era 
South Africa in the early 1980s. I returned to Zimbabwe in the mid-1980s at a time of inter-tribal 
fighting, when thousands of Ndebele were killed by Mugabe’s notorious 5th Brigade, trained by 
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the North Koreans, and witnessed Zimbabwean security forces’ violence against civilians. In 
1998 I joined the British Army as a Chaplain and have deployed operationally in Mozambique, 
Northern Ireland, the Balkans and Afghanistan. In many ways, therefore, my whole life has been 
dominated by armed conflict, and I have had ample opportunity to ponder the British tradition 
of the vocation to bear arms and the moral character of the British soldier, as compared with 
the way these are realised in other nations. I have, nonetheless, chosen not to illustrate my 
arguments with specific examples drawn from the recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan: I 
have not the detachment necessary to judge these campaigns dispassionately and I have no 
desire to add to the pain of those who were wounded or who had loved ones killed in these 
campaigns by questioning the prudence or justness of British policy, strategy, operations or 
tactics. 
 
Being raised as a ‘colonial’ in sub-Saharan Africa meant that I have always had a consciousness 
of - what might be called - ‘the Western cultural tradition’ as distinct from other cultures around 
the world. Growing up away from the European ‘homelands’ of the West naturally gave me an 
interest in, and appreciation of, this venerable cultural tradition; an appreciation which grew 
into love while reading Classics at university. It has been a constant source of sorrow to me, 
since moving to the United Kingdom, that there is such widespread ignorance of the Western 
cultural tradition in the very place which Solzhenitsyn (1976) called “the pearl of the West”. 
Consequently, I have started each chapter with a quote taken from Old English texts, as a way 
of affirming that the Western tradition for which I argue, is not something alien or novel, but 
lies at the very root of our national life; half-forgotten, obscured, in part obliterated, but still the 
source of all that which is good and true and beautiful in the heritage bequeathed to us by our 
forebears. 
 
Over the years, when I have found myself suspended between the glory and harshness of armed 
conflict and the love of a good and noble heritage, I take counsel from the words spoken by the 
learnèd warrior, Faramir, in J.R.R. Tolkien’s book, The Lord of the Rings: 
War must be, while we defend our lives against a destroyer who would devour all; 
but I do not love the bright sword for its sharpness, nor the arrow for its swiftness, 
nor the warrior for his glory. I love only that which they defend: the city of the Men 
of [the West]; and I would have her loved for her memory, her ancientry, her beauty, 
and her present wisdom. Not feared, save as men may fear the dignity of a man, 
old and wise. 
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THE WESTERN TRADITION OF VIRTUE 
 
Wisdom is the highest virtue, and it has within it four other virtues: there is prudence, then 
temperance, third is courage, fourth justice. Wisdom makes its lovers wise and worthy and 
temperate and patient and just, and with every one of the good moral virtues it fills him who 
loves it.1 
Æ lfred the Great (c. AD 880) Translation of Boethius’ De Consolatione Philosphiæ  27.2.24-29. 
 
Introduction 
In 1958 Elizabeth Anscombe published a paper arguing that there is an unbridgeable gap 
between modern moral philosophy, which she named ‘consequentialism’, and Aristotle’s 
understanding of virtue because modern philosophers have inherited from Christianity the 
concept of a divine moral law which ought to be obeyed, but have discarded the idea of a divine 
law giver, thus discarding the philosophical framework of Natural Law which makes moral 
obligation intelligible. Anscombe concluded, therefore, that modern moral philosophy is 
fundamentally flawed as it cannot bridge the gap between what a person is or does and what 
one ought to do as a moral agent. She claimed, therefore, that consequentialism can be 
distorted to argue that an intrinsically immoral act can become morally justifiable in certain 
circumstances; i.e., that it is vulnerable to sophistic corruption, a topic we shall examine in the 
next chapter. She urged, therefore, that all attempts at articulating moral philosophy and all use 
of the language of moral obligation should be abandoned until a suitable account of human 
nature had been formulated: 
it can be seen that philosophically there is a large gap, at present unfillable as far 
as we [modern moral philosophers] are concerned, which needs to be filled by an 
account of human nature, human action, the type of characteristic a virtue is, and 
above all of human ‘flourishing’. 
(Anscombe 1958:18). 
 
Anscombe’s argument that there is an unfillable gap between the ancient concept of virtue and 
modern moral philosophy notably omits any reference to the medieval synthesis of Thomas 
Aquinas (c. AD 1225-1274), which was the last great articulation of the Western tradition of 
virtue prior to the disintegration of Christendom in the Fifteenth Century. In this chapter, 
therefore, to fill the gaps identified by Anscombe, I present Thomist accounts of human nature, 
human action and flourishing, and human virtue, based on primary texts, in order to show the 
continuity of the Western moral tradition from Antiquity to Aquinas and to demonstrate how it 
provides a lens which, even now, gives clarity and coherence to a vision of the moral life. 
                                                          
1 Sƿa sƿa Ƿisdom is se hehsta cræft, ⁊ se hæfð on him feoƿer oðre cræftas; þara is an ƿærscipe, oðer 
ʓemetʓunʓ, þridde is ellen, feorðe rihtƿisnes. Se Ƿisdom ʓedeð his lufiendas ƿise ⁊ ƿeorðe ⁊ ʓemetfæste ⁊ 
ʓeðyldiʓe ⁊ rihtƿise, ⁊ ælces ʓodes þeaƿes he ʓefyllð þone þe hine lufað.               (adp. Sedgefield 1899:62) 
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Thomas Aquinas 
The scholastic philosophy of Aquinas, a medieval Dominican friar who entered a monastery at 
the age of five, might seem irrelevant or inapplicable to contemporary soldiers. For example, it 
has been claimed,  
His scholarly and uneventful life was spent in the comparative seclusion of 
monastery and classroom…… Unlike many of his contemporaries, he kept aloof 
from the strife of a turbulent age. 
(D’Entrèves 1959:vii) 
This view of Aquinas’s life as one of “comparative seclusion” and aloofness from conflict is, 
however, now generally acknowledged to be false. He was directly involved in the political and 
military conflicts of the 13th Century between the Papacy and Holy Roman Empire, as well as the 
philosophical and theological disputes of his time (Pieper 1963; Kenny 1980; Finnis 1998): 
That the thirteenth century in Europe was a time of extended conflict and debate 
does not differentiate it from other times and places. But the character and 
intensity of some of its conflicts and debates are worth remarking, if only because 
they gave what turned out to be enduring definition to some rival and alternative 
modes of moral and political thought and action. So if we begin by situating the 
moral and social thought of Aquinas in the context of such conflicts and debates, 
rather than – as is usually done – by abstracting it from and ignoring those contexts, 
we will perhaps be better able to understand its continuing and distinctive 
relevance. 
(MacIntyre 2006:41) 
 
Nonetheless, the belief that Aquinas kept aloof from contemporary conflicts is not altogether 
surprising, as “the dealings of his era’s kings, popes, and emperors leave almost no palpable 
trace in Thomas’s writings.” (Finnis 1998:3). Pieper (1999:3) has also remarked that Aquinas’s 
writings are curiously impersonal and dispassionate, reading like the thoughts of a purely 
rational being. It is, perhaps, because Aquinas’s work is simultaneously so wide-ranging in scope 
and encyclopaedic in knowledge, but also so dispassionate and disinterested in approach and 
logical and objective in method that it has the “continuing and distinctive relevance” ascribed 
to it by MacIntyre above. It is the continuing relevance to 21st-Century British soldiers of 
Aquinas’s understanding of the practicably lived moral life which I shall examine in this 
dissertation. 
 
Aquinas on Human Nature2 
It appears to be a peculiarly human conundrum that each person has consciousness, an 
awareness of being a distinct, individual self, but a self who can only relate to the world and to 
                                                          
2 In this section I greatly expand on information and ideas I first explored in a dissertation, ‘Soul Wound 
and Resilience: Combat Trauma and Character in Classical Athens. What were the Effects of Combat on 
Aeschylus and Xenophon?’, which I submitted in 2015 as part of the requirement for completing an MA 
in Classical Studies with the Open University. 
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other persons by means of the body. This conundrum is the root of the perennial ‘mind-body 
problem’ in philosophy (Steele 2015). The traditional Western philosophical answer to this 
conundrum is that humans are comprised of both matter and spirit, in that we are, or have, both 
a body and a soul. 
These two dimensions are found inseparably in the mystery of the single human 
person in a way that is not clearly distinguishable: I, a self who exists only as a body 
but refuses to be reduced simply to body. Language and ordinary experience bear 
this out. We say ‘I am (some)body’ and ‘I have a body.’ My body is ‘me’ but it is ‘my’ 
body. Who says ‘my’ to the body? 
(Sachs 1991:56) 
 
Having agreed that humans are/have both body and soul, Western philosophers have tended to 
explain the connection between body and soul in one of three ways. Grossly simplifying, these 
three ways are: Firstly, idealism, the view posited by Plato (c. 427-348 BC), that we are spiritual 
souls imprisoned in material bodies, from which the immortal soul escapes at death. Second, 
materialism, the view that we are nothing more than a body, the material processes of which 
constitute all we understand by the soul and its functions, posited in the atomic theory of 
Democritus (fl. c. 430 BC) and Epicurus (341-270 BC). The third explanation is the view that we 
are each an integrated, irreducible unity of both body and soul, which is the view posited by 
Aristotle (384-322 BC) and Aquinas, who described the human being as a composite creature 
“composed of a spiritual and a bodily substance”3 (ST Ia 75), and as “a union of a soul with a 
body”4 (ST Ia 76). This view seems to me to best account for the fact that humans can perceive 
their souls as somehow distinct from their bodies, but can only actually experience their very 
being as lived bodily. Disembodied being is inconceivable, as becomes apparent if we try to 
imagine life without bodily sense perception or without a body simply to give our consciousness 
a sense of being-in-location. Indeed, our everyday language, experience and existence are 
predicated on the embodied being of the soul (Lakoff & Johnson 1999). 
 
Aquinas’s understanding of humans as a body-soul unity is fundamental to his understanding of 
how we can develop a practicable moral life. Both body and soul, the material and the spiritual 
parts of the human organism, can be understood in terms of structure, i.e. the different parts of 
which they are composed, and function, i.e. how the component parts work and what they do 
(Steele 2015). I shall not discuss the body, but must describe the structure and functions of the 
soul as understood by Aquinas. Following Plato (Timaeus 69c-87b) and Aristotle (De Anima), 
Aquinas (ST Ia 77.4) affirmed that the human soul is comprised of three parts: (1) the sustentative 
                                                          
3 de homine, qui ex spirituali et corporali substantia componitur.  
4 The title of ST Ia 76 is “De unione animae ad corpus” 
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(pars animae vegetabilis); (2) the affective (pars animae sensibilis); and (3) the rational (pars 
animae rationalis). Each part has its own faculties and functions, which Aquinas described in 
detail in the ST Ia 75-90, and IaIIae 22-48, but which I shall briefly summarise. 
 
The ‘sustentative’ part of the soul, was called ‘appetitive’ (ἐπιθυμία) by Plato, but Aristotle 
argued that, as all three parts of the soul had appetites appropriate to each, this part should 
more properly be called ‘nutritive’ (θρεπτικόν) or ‘vegetative’ (ϕυτικόν), as the souls of all living 
organisms, including plants, share the same basic powers of sexual reproduction, assimilating 
nourishment, and organic growth. Following Aristotle, Aquinas variously calls this the vegetative, 
nutritive, or generative soul (anima vegetativa, nutritiva, or generativa), and affirms that it has 
the potential for procreation (generatio), nourishment (nutritio), and growth (augmentum) (ST Ia 
78.2). This part of the soul is concerned with the faculties and appetites which sustain both the 
individual organism and the species, hence my naming it ‘sustentative’. The sustentative 
faculties and appetites are expressed in and through the body, in eating and drinking, bodily 
growth, and sexual intercourse. It is noteworthy that a great deal of contemporary Western life 
is based on stimulating and gratifying the sustentative appetites. A topic to which we shall return. 
It is also worth noting that in the past it was believed that to live morally these sustentative 
faculties and appetites should be disciplined, not gratified, which has a bearing on how one 
approaches moral education, as we shall see later (Steele 2015). 
 
Second, the ‘affective’ part of the soul, which Plato called ‘spirited’ (θυμός), but Aristotle 
‘sensitive’ (αἰσθητικόν) or ‘mobile’ (κινητικόν), because all animals have these faculties and 
react to information derived from their senses by being moved to action. Again following 
Aristotle, Aquinas called this the sensitive or mobile soul (anima sensitiva or motiva). The 
affective part of the soul is the seat of our emotions, intuitions, imagination and instincts. As the 
name pars animae sensibilis implies, it is stimulated through sense perception of the material 
world (ST Ia 75.3). There are two basic types of senses (ST Ia 78.4): the five bodily senses of touch, 
taste, smell, sight and hearing; and the four mental senses of memory (memoria), imagination 
(phantasia), instinct (vis aestimativa), and the co-ordinating sense (sensus communis). 
 
Memoria, or memory, in animals is the faculty of preserving images and information relating to 
these images from past perception of them, but in humans it also includes the power of 
recollection (reminiscentia); the ability to deliberately bring to mind past images, events or 
information. Vis phantastica, or the imaginative faculty, is the faculty in humans of representing 
in the mind an image of something which is not actually present to sense perception. It is also 
the faculty of creating images of things which may not really exist, such as ‘winged feet’, but 
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which may serve as metaphors of true insights which cannot be better expressed in any other 
way; ‘he flew round the running track’. Vis phantastica is, thus, the faculty which imparts 
meaning to the disparate episodes of human life by allowing us to make sense of them. 
meaning… is the antecedent condition both of truth and falsehood, whose 
antithesis is not error but nonsense… reason is the natural organ of truth; but 
imagination is the organ of meaning. Imagination, producing new metaphors or 
revivifying old, is not the cause of truth, but its condition. 
(Lewis 1969:265) 
Aristotle (Anim. 431a) notes, therefore, that abstract thought is impossible without images being 
present to the mind5. Vis aestimativa, or the estimating or instinctive faculty, is the faculty which 
allows an animal to recognise intuitively what is beneficial or harmful to it and to act accordingly. 
In humans the vis aestimativa is supplemented by the vis cogitativa, which is the faculty enabling 
humans to think (cogitare). It is important to note that ‘thinking’ in this sense is more akin to 
our popular understanding of thinking as ‘considering’ or ‘mulling things over’ than to rational 
deduction or induction. The sensus communis, or co-ordinating sense, allows the person to 
collate and interpret the information received from all the other senses, both bodily and mental 
(Deferrari 1960; Lewis 1964:156-165; Borruso 1996:13-17). 
 
An illustration of the function of these various faculties in an animal and a human is to think of 
a horse and rider in the act of riding. The horse remembers that saddle and bridle means that it 
will be ridden and, if it has been trained in dressage, it will remember that it must adopt a 
particular, high-stepping gait, but it will not be able to conceive why it does so, nor understand 
the meaning of its actions. The human rider has memories similar to those of the horse from 
when he was learning to ride, but by reminiscentia can also recall seeing other riders adopt the 
correct riding posture, and by the vis phantastica can combine the memories of his training and 
the recollection of other riders with mental images of how he himself must appear to onlookers 
while he is mounted on the prancing horse in order to imagine the total effect of stately 
progression achieved by these in combination. It is his imagination, therefore, which gives 
meaning to the various evolutions of dressage which would otherwise be senseless. 
 
Our emotions (passiones) are an arousal reaction to the environmental stimuli received through 
our senses, hence in English we commonly call them ‘feelings’ or ‘sentiments’. We react to these 
stimuli by feelings of desire (passio concupiscibilis) and feelings of irritation (passio irascibilis). 
The concupiscent feelings of desire are expressed as feelings of attraction or of aversion. The 
feelings of attraction are:  (1) ‘love’ (amor), which is the general desire one feels for perceived 
goods; (2) ‘desire’ (desiderium or concupiscentia proper), which is the particular desire for some 
                                                          
5 διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ ϕαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή – “for this reason the soul never thinks without an image.” 
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immediate good; and (3) ‘delight’ (delectatio), which is the pleasure one experiences when the 
object of one’s desire is attained. The feelings of aversion are the opposites of the feelings of 
attraction: (1) ‘dislike’ (odium), which is the general abhorrence one feels at perceived evils; (2) 
‘aversion’ or ‘abomination’ (fuga or abominatio), which is one’s withdrawal from or rejection of 
an immediate evil; and (3) ‘sadness’ or ‘sorrow’ (tristitia or dolor), which is the feeling one 
experiences when some evil is realised (Borruso 1996:32-35; Deferrari 1986:196a & 760a). The 
irritable feelings are the emotions aroused when the attainment of some perceived good is 
difficult to achieve due to various obstacles. They are: (1) ‘anger’ (ira), which is the marshalling 
of one’s aggression to overcome an immediate obstacle obstructing one’s attainment of the 
desired end, and which is, in this general sense, amoral; (2) ‘hope’ (spes), which is the feeling 
that the obstacles preventing one attaining the desired end can be overcome, even if the 
attainment of the end will, thus, be difficult; (3) hope’s opposite, ‘despair’, (desperatio) which is 
the feeling that the obstacles are insurmountable; (4) ‘daring’ (audacia), which is the feeling of 
resolve that encourages one to attempt the attainment of the end however difficult the 
obstacles; and its opposite (5) ‘fear’ (timor), which is discouragement in the face of obstructions 
(Borruso 1986:36; Deferrari 1960:196a & 760a). 
 
Finally, there is the ‘rational’ part of the soul, called νοῦς by both Plato and Aristotle, and pars 
animae rationalis by Aquinas. It is the part of the soul which is uniquely human and distinguishes 
us from other animals. The pars animae rationalis consists of our consciousness (conscientia), 
intellect (intellectus), reason (ratio), and will (voluntas). Consciousness is that part of the soul by 
which we not only know, but know that we know, and know ourselves as distinct, individual 
persons (Borruso 1996:16). According to Aquinas (ST Ia 79.8) the distinction between intellectus 
and ratio is that the former understands and judges the truth from self-evident first principles, 
such as that the sum is always greater than its parts, while the latter progresses to an 
understanding and judgement of the truth by deductive reasoning. In terms of moral 
understanding the difference between them is that the inherent natural moral law is simply 
understood by the intellect, while the reason works out how to apply it in each particular case 
(Lewis 1964:157)6 . This is relevant to understanding Aquinas’s description of the virtue of 
prudence. The intellect is capable of abstract understanding, and, thus, is not dependent on 
bodily sense organs for its functioning (ST Ia 77.5), but it does, then, require mental images to 
replace sensory data, as Aristotle says (De Anima 431a). 
 
                                                          
6 I have previously discussed νοῦς and cited both of these references from Borruso and Lewis in my 2015 
MA dissertation for the Open University. 
 
 
9 
 
The will is the faculty which, desiring the good, directs the person to act in order to realise the 
good. Hence it can misdirect the person towards subordinate goods, which, while not wrong in 
themselves necessarily, are always only secondary goods which should not be inordinately 
preferred to the ultimate good of the person. This relates to Aquinas’s understanding of the 
virtue of temperance. The difficulty in practicable moral life of a person inordinately loving a 
subordinate good through disordered emotions, and of disordered will thereby directing the 
person astray, will be apparent. The ordering of the will, reason, and emotions, therefore, is 
central to moral education, as we shall see. 
 
The interaction of all these faculties of the soul may be summarised as follows: The objectively 
existing reality of the material world is known to us through our bodily senses, which transmit 
sensations of environmental stimuli to the soul. These sensations are collated by the sensus 
communis, and the reason (ratio) analyses them, also calling to mind by recollection 
(reminiscentia) from the memory (memoria), information which is relevant to the environmental 
situation, as well as picturing other relevant information, which may not be actually present in 
the environment, by use of the imagination (phantasia), thus giving meaning to the world 
experienced through our sense perception. While thinking about this (cogitare), one is 
simultaneously feeling irritation at (passio irascibilis), and attraction to or aversion from (passio 
concupiscibilis) the environmental situation. These feelings may be congruent with the reality 
of the situation or incongruent with it; but either way, they will be generating an emotional 
response (passio), which will necessarily be irrational in the strict sense of the word, in that the 
intellect (intellectus) and reason (ratio) have not been involved in the arousal of these feelings. 
The emotions may be in conflict with the intellect and reason regarding the appropriate action 
to take in the situation, and it is the will (voluntas), independently of sense perceptions, which 
directs one to act in one way or another, according to what it perceives to be the truth or good 
in the situation, as discerned in principle by the intellect (intellectus) and in particular by the 
reason (ratio). 
 
For Aquinas truth (veritas) is the end towards which the intellect (intellectus) and reason (ratio) 
are directed, just as good (bonum) is the end of the will (voluntas) and of the appetites (appetiti) 
of all parts of the soul; quoting Aristotle he notes: 
And just as the good… describes order with regard to appetite, so [does] the true 
with regard to intellect. Whence the Philosopher says in [Book] 6 of Metaphysics 
that good and bad are in things, but true and false are in the mind.7 
(Ver. 1.2 resp.) 
                                                          
7 Et quia bonum… dicit ordinem ad appetitum, verum autem ad intellectum: inde est quod Philosophus 
dicit VI Metaph., quod bonum et malum sunt in rebus, verum et falsum sunt in mente. 
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As is implicit in his description of humans as a body-soul composite, Aquinas, like Aristotle, 
affirmed the actual existence of material reality: 
Note that something can have the potential to be although it may not really be, 
while another thing truly exists. That which has the potential to be is said to 
potentially be, while that which does now exist is said to actually be.8 
(Aquinas, Princ. Nat. 1) 9 
If we accept that there is an existing material reality which is separate and distinct from the 
human mind, the question arises of how the immaterial soul can actually know material reality. 
The obvious answer is that we derive knowledge of material reality through our bodily sense 
organs. The ancient Greek Sophists, however, queried how sense perception works and some 
denied that our senses can tell us anything about reality. Aquinas, however, agreed with 
Aristotle (Anim. 418af.; Metaphysica. 980a-b) that material reality does actually exist and is 
perceptible to us through our sense organs and is, thus, knowable by us: 
Now the proper object of the human intellect, which is joined to a body, is an 
essence or a nature existing in physical matter… Furthermore, it is evident that such 
a nature exists as an individual, which it cannot be apart from physical matter: just 
as it is evident that the nature of stone is in this specific stone… Hence the nature 
of stone, or of any material thing whatsoever, cannot be completely and truly 
known, except by being known as existing in a particular individual. Moreover, we 
perceive the particular individual through the senses and the imagination.10 
(ST Ia 84.7) 
 
Aquinas, therefore, affirmed that objective truth both exists and is knowable by humans. For 
him “truth is a relationship between the mind and reality: the conformity of a thought to what 
it is a thought about.” (Kenny 1980:6). But this basic concept has several inter-related 
connotations: (1) Truth-in-being (veritas divina), in which all things which exist do so because 
they are conceived in the mind of God; they derive their being true or real from God’s conception 
of them. (2) The truth-of-things-in-themselves (veritas rerum), which is derived from their truth-
in-being, that is, from God’s conception of them they became things which truly exist in reality. 
(3) Truth-in-knowing (veritas rationum or veritas intellectuum), which is derived from the truth-
of-things-in-themselves, in which our ideas and judgements about existing things conform truly 
to what that thing is in reality. (4) Truth-in-signifying (veritas significationis), which is derived 
                                                          
8 Nota quod quoddam potest esse licet non sit, quoddam vero est. Illud quod potest esse, dicitur potentia 
esse; illud quod iam est, dicitur esse actu. 
9 Aquinas derived the distinction drawn between potentia and actus in the quote above from Aristotle, 
who used the terms δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια which were translated into Latin as potentia and actus 
respectively (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica 1017b and Anim. 417aff.). Somewhat oversimplifying, it may be 
said that potentia is the latent power in a thing to become, to be or to do, while actus is the state of having 
realised whatever becoming, being or doing is proper to a thing (cf. the full definitions in Deferrari 1960). 
10 Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in 
materia corporali existens… De ratione autem huius naturae est quod in aliquot individuo existat, quod 
non est absque materia corporali: sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide… Unde natura 
lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod 
cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. 
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from our truth-in-knowing, in which the means by which we signify an existing thing conforms 
truly to what that thing really is (Ver. 1.1-4; McKeon 1931:504; Deferrari 1960:1075b-1078a). 
The importance of truth-in-signifying is made clear in Aquinas’s affirmation that human language, 
which underlies all thought, dialogue, debate and teaching, is central in the pursuit of truth: 
“Hence, just as a wise man is to ponder truth, especially concerning the first principle, and 
disseminate it to others, so, too, he is to oppose contrary falsehood.”11 (ScG 1.1) 
 
Aquinas, however, does not just affirm that truth exists and, therefore, that we can simply know 
it and disseminate it; he acknowledges that knowledge and truth are not necessarily easy to 
arrive at and that there may be occasions when the conformity of thought to reality is uncertain 
or unattainable. He thus conceives a range of ways in which the human mind may relate to 
reality in affirming truth: ‘conjecture’ (suspicio) is affirmation that something is true on the basis 
of pure guesswork, where there is no knowledge of reality; ‘opinion’ or ‘supposition’ (opinio) is 
affirmation that something is true where there is not complete certainty about reality; ‘doubt’ 
(dubitatio) is hesitation to affirm a truth where there is not complete certainty about reality; 
‘knowledge’ (scientia) is affirmation of a truth arrived at by deductive reasoning from experience 
(experimentum) or the first principles of reality (principia prima); ‘understanding’ (intellectus) is 
affirmation of truth on the basis of discernment of the self-evident first principles of reality; and 
‘belief’ (fides) is affirmation of a truth on the basis of authoritative testimony about reality 
(Kenny 1980:64-65; Deferrari 1960).  
 
It is worth stressing that fides does not imply affirming something as true in the face of the 
evidence or when there is no evidence to support the affirmation, as some modern atheists 
would try to define religious belief. Instead, it is affirming something as true on the basis of 
trusting someone else’s authority (auctoritas). For example, in this chapter I have confidently 
given information about Aquinas’s life, but I do not know that this information is true on the 
basis of my own experience, instead, I have trusted the authority of historians, so my 
affirmations are examples of fides. Hence, for the Scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages 
there was no such thing as ‘blind faith’ opposed to reason; Bonaventura (AD 1221-1274), for 
example, affirmed “the necessity to grasp by reason, per rationem, what has been believed on 
authority, in so far as that is possible,” (Pieper 1961:38). Likewise, Aquinas, while distinguishing 
between the credence to be given to human and divine auctoritas, acknowledged that the 
weakest form of argument is that based on human authority (ST Ia 1.8)12. 
                                                          
11 Unde sicut sapientis est veritatem praecipue de primo principio meditari et de aliis disserere, ita eius est 
falsitatem contrariam impugnare. 
12 Nam, licet locus ab auctoritate quae fundatur super ratione humana sit infirmissimus, locus tamen ab 
auctoritate quae fundatur super revelation divina est efficacissimus. 
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One final point needs to be made about human nature: Aquinas (Reg. Princ. 1), like Aristotle 
(Politica 1253a), affirmed that humans are social and political animals which live in organised 
communities and that all theories of ethics are integral to theories about the organisation and 
functioning of the ideal human society. Hence, for Aquinas all discussions of ethics are based on 
the assumptions that the individual human agent is acting as part of a wider community and 
that judgement about the morality or otherwise of his actions, therefore, is never made simply 
with regard to the effect of his actions on himself, but also with regard to the effect of his actions 
on the community as a whole. There can, therefore, be no such thing as private morality, just as 
there can be no such thing as a private law, because all persons are subject to the natural moral 
law. 
 
Since antiquity there has been a legally articulated concept of a natural moral law which was 
believed to be binding on all peoples, irrespective of their particular cultural, social or legal 
norms: “That [law] which, in fact, natural reason establishes for all men, is observed among all 
peoples equally and is called the law of nations, as it is used in law by all nations,”13 (Institutiones 
Iustiniani 1.2.1) and; “The law of nations is common to the whole human race.”14 (Institutiones 
Iustiniani 1.2.2). Further on in the Institutiones Iustiniani (2.1.11) Natural Law (ius naturale) is 
plainly equated with the Law of Nations (ius gentium), which, incidentally, is not at all the same 
thing as contemporary International Law. Those philosophers who, like the ancient Greek 
Sophists, adopt a position of scepticism, however, do not agree that any such thing as a universal 
and unchanging natural moral law exists. 
 
Aquinas, however, does affirm the Natural Law, but before describing this, it is necessary to give 
the underlying concepts regarding law in general which inform his understanding of the Natural 
Law. In discussing the essence of law15 Aquinas states that law is something which pertains to 
the reason: 
Law is a certain rule and measure of acts, according to which someone is induced 
into acting or is deterred from acting… Now the rule and measure of human acts is 
the reason, which is the principle of human acts… it is, in fact, [the function] of the 
reason to regulate to an end, which is the first principle in acting…… Hence it 
remains that law is something belonging to the reason.16 
(ST IaIIae 90.1) 
                                                          
13 Quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populous peraeque custoditur 
vocaturque ius gentium, quasiquo iure omnes gentes utuntur. 
14 Ius… gentium omni humano generi commune est. 
15 essentia legis 
16 lex quaedam regula est et mensura actuum, secundum quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel ab agende 
retrahitur… Regula autem et mensura humanorum actuum est ratio; quae est principium actuum 
humanorum… rationis enim est ordinare ad finem, qui est primum principium in agendis…… Unde 
relinquitur quod lex sit aliquid pertinens ad rationem. 
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Aquinas further affirms that the end towards which the law is regulated is always the common 
good17 (ST IaIIae 90.2). Hence, for Aquinas, law is essentially the regulation by reason (ratio) of 
the acts of rational creatures in order to attain the common good. It will be seen from this that, 
in his view, there can be no separation of law and morality; law is always fundamentally moral 
law and, as it is directed towards the common good, it is intimately connected with the moral 
virtue of justice. 
 
According to Aquinas there are four kinds of moral law: (1) the Eternal Law (lex aeterna), which 
is the absolutely fundamental and eternal governance of the universe by the divine reason of 
God (ST IaIIae 91.1); (2) the Natural Law (lex naturalis), which “is nothing other than the 
participation of the Eternal Law in the rational creature.”18 (ST IaIIae 91.2); (3) Human Law (lex 
humana), which is equivalent to the Law of Nations (ius gentium) in the Roman Law Codes (ST 
IaIIae 91.3 and 95.4), thus Aquinas says that despite variations of detail in different systems of 
Human Law, its fundamental principles are derived from the Natural Law in the same way that, 
by reason, one can make true deductions in any branch of knowledge from indemonstrable first 
principles (ST IaIIae 91.3 and 94.4); and (4) Divine Law (lex divina), which God has specially 
revealed to humans and is found in the Bible (ST IaIIae 91.4-5). 
 
It is well to ask what Aquinas means when he says that the Natural Law is “nothing other than 
the participation of the Eternal Law in the rational creature.” He starts his argument by 
maintaining that the Eternal Law is imprinted on all creatures and directs them towards their 
proper acts and ends19 (ST IaIIae 91.2). By this Aquinas means much the same thing as that which 
the Roman Law Codes mean when they say that Natural Right, which is the right to choose a 
mate, procreate and rear young, applies to all animals, not just humans20 (Institutiones Iustiniani 
1.2; Aquinas, ST IaIIae 94.2). It will be noticed that Natural Right correlates to the powers and 
appetites of the sustentative soul. Rational creatures, however, are more excellently imprinted 
with the Eternal Law because, by their greater share in God’s eternal reason, by which they are 
able to discriminate between good and evil, they are better able to participate in the rational 
regulation of their acts in order to attain the common good; in other words, they are better able 
to participate in the Eternal Law, and this “participation of the Eternal Law in the rational 
creature” is called the Natural Law (ST IaIIae 91.2). 
                                                          
17 bonum commune 
18 lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura. 
19 ex impressione eius  habent inclinationes in proprios actus et fines. 
20 Ius naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Nam ius istud non humani generis proprium est, 
sed omnium animalium, quae in caelo, quae in terra, quae in mari nascuntur. – “Natural Right is that which 
Nature teaches to all animals. For this right is not the property solely of the human race, but of all animals, 
whether found in the sky or on earth or in the sea.” 
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It might be wondered if the Natural Law cannot be articulated more clearly in precepts. For 
example, the Roman Law Codes stated: “The precepts of the law are these: to live worthily; to 
harm no-one; to give to everyone his due.”21 (Institutiones Iustiniani 1.1.3). These precepts, 
especially the last, will be relevant to our discussion of the virtue of justice, but do not constitute 
for Aquinas the fundamental precepts found in the Natural Law. Hence, he states: “This is, 
therefore, the first precept of the law; that good is to be done and pursued and evil shunned. 
And all the other precepts of Natural Law are founded upon this,”22 (ST IaIIae 94.2). The other 
precepts, which practical reason naturally grasps to be human goods23, are listed in ascending 
order as, firstly, self-preservation; second, the natural right, shared with other animals, to 
reproduce and rear young; and third, unique to humans as rational creatures, the natural 
inclination of the reason to the truth and the good (ST IaIIae 94.2). 
 
I shall not pursue Aquinas’s account of Natural Law24 as I wish to focus on his understanding of 
the lived moral life of the human person; on virtue and vice. As noted in a recent textbook on 
moral theology: 
Some readers may wonder at the lack of emphasis on natural law in a work meant 
to represent Thomistic ethics…… [A] reason for resisting natural law comes from 
my study of its position and role in the ethical section of the Summa Theologiae… 
Natural law is dealt with in one question only (ST I-II, q. 94). It is brilliant and 
important, but it is far removed from the section on ethical reasoning where 
Aquinas demonstrates how intellect, will and emotion combine to choose our 
actions, a description that has little or nothing to do with natural law, or law in 
general, for that matter. 
(Westberg 2015:10-11) 
Where Aquinas’s understanding of Natural law is helpful in interpreting his understanding of the 
human moral life, I shall elucidate the connections, but, for now, all that is necessary is to note 
that Aquinas affirmed that there was an innate moral law within all persons so that we all 
naturally desire the good and the true, but, this desire remains only a latent potential unless it 
is actually realised in human acts, being and flourishing. 
 
Aquinas on Human Action and Human Flourishing 
When describing human action, Aquinas first discusses what constitutes good and bad human 
acts in general25  (ST IaIIae 18). In describing a human act as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, Aquinas is not 
                                                          
21 Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere. 
22 Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. 
Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis naturae. 
23 quae ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana. 
24 Over the last fifty-odd years there has been scholarly debate about Natural Law in Aquinas. Kerr 
(2002:97-113) has provided a helpful summary of this ongoing debate. 
25 The title of Quaestio 18 is “De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum in generali”. 
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necessarily making a moral judgement; rather the judgement of goodness or badness refers to 
the act’s efficacy, the manner in which it is done, and so forth, and also to the agent’s efficiency, 
skill, attitude, intentions, etc. Aquinas says that there are four criteria in determining an act’s 
goodness (ST IaIIae 18.4; cf. the glossaries in McKeon 1931 and Regan 2003a). All four must be 
present for an act to be considered good; a deficiency of even one of the elements will make 
the act bad. The four criteria are: 
 
Firstly, the act simply as activity (actio). The actualisation of the potential to act perfects the 
person who acts because to be actually is better than to be potentially, so the blacksmith is 
perfected as a smith when he realises both his power of manufacturing (factio) and his learned 
skill (disciplina or ars) at metal-working in the actual making of ironmongery (McKeon 1931). 
Second, an appropriate object (obiectum) of the action. An object is defined as “that concerning 
which any power or discipline is exercised” (McKeon 1931:474). Thus a blacksmith’s power of 
manufacturing may be exercised in making, say, a sword-blade for a warrior. The material object 
is the iron sword-blade itself, while the formal object consists in the blade’s shape, sheen, 
sharpness, strength, etc. A good object of the blacksmith’s act of manufacturing, therefore, is to 
make a sword-blade of the appropriate material (e.g. iron) rather than inappropriate material 
(e.g. tin) and of the appropriate form. The object of the action becomes bad where even one 
aspect of its matter or form is inappropriate: the warrior cannot use an iron implement shaped 
like an axe as a sword, no matter how strong or sharp the axe-head may be. 
 
Third, the end or purpose (finis) of the action, i.e. the end for which the agent acts. The objective 
end for the blacksmith is to make a sword, but the subjective end may be to make money by 
selling it (Regan 2003a:209). Were the blacksmith to make a sword for someone who may not 
bear arms, such as a monk or a child, the end for which he acts would be wrong and the act, 
therefore, bad. The fourth and final criterion relates to the circumstances (circumstantiae) 
surrounding the act. Circumstances are accidental factors connected with a human act, but not 
intrinsic to the act in itself. Circumstances relate to the agent in two ways: Firstly, in regard to 
his general circumstances as a human being, such as his social status, trade or profession, the 
locality in which he lives, etc.; and, second, in regard to the circumstances of the particular act, 
such as the way in which the agent performs the act (ST IaIIae 7.1). Aquinas lists eight 
circumstances: “who, what, where, by what means, why, how, when… about what”26 (ST IaIIae 
7.3). 
                                                          
26 Aquinas quotes Cicero: “Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando… circa quid.” One is 
reminded of Kipling’s poem: “I keep six honest serving-men | (They taught me all I knew); | Their names 
are What and Why and When | And How and Where and Who.” (Kipling 1940:605). 
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Hence, in terms of general circumstances, a blacksmith is the appropriate craftsman to make a 
sword blade, not a goldsmith or a tinker, but the goldsmith is the proper craftsman to make 
jewellery and the tinker to make pots and pans. The sword blade can only properly be fashioned 
in a smithy with all the necessary appurtenances for heating and shaping iron: anvil; hammer; 
tongs; forge; etc. In terms of particular circumstances, the blacksmith may appropriately make 
a sword blade for a warrior to use in defence of his home or to guarantee justice, but if he 
knowingly makes a sword to equip a man planning murder or for a butcher who wants a cleaver, 
then these inappropriate circumstances make the action of manufacture a bad one. 
 
Asking whether or not theologians should be interested in the circumstances surrounding 
human acts, Aquinas makes a number of very pertinent observations, which help to clarify the 
place of circumstances both in human life in general and specifically in the moral life: 
Circumstances come under the consideration of the theologian for a threefold 
reason. First, because the theologian considers human acts, inasmuch as man is 
thereby directed to Happiness. Now, everything that is directed to an end should 
be proportionate to that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end by means 
of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due circumstances. Hence 
the theologian has to consider the circumstances. – Secondly, because the 
theologian considers human acts according as they are found to be good or evil, 
better or worse: and this diversity depends upon circumstances… Thirdly, because 
the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit or demerit, which 
is proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary. Now a 
human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary, according to knowledge or 
ignorance of circumstances… Therefore the theologian has to consider 
circumstances…… The consideration of circumstances belongs to the moralist, the 
politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far as with respect to circumstances 
we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts and passions. To the politician and 
to the orator, in so far as circumstances makes acts to be worthy of praise or blame, 
of excuse or indictment. In different ways, however, because where the orator 
persuades, the politician judges.27 
(ST IaIIae 7.2 – translation of the English Dominican Province) 
 
                                                          
27 circumstantiae pertinent ad considerationem theologi triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia theologus 
considerat actus humanos secundum quod per eos homo ad beatitudinem ordinatur. Omne autem quod 
ordinatur ad finem, oportet esse proportionatum fini. Actus autem proportionantur fini secundum 
commensurationem quandam, quae fit per debitas circumstantias. Unde consideratio circumstantiarum ad 
theologum pertinet. Secundo, quia theologus considerat actus humanos secundum quod in eis invenitur 
bonum et malum, et melius et peius, et hoc diversificatur secundum circumstantias, ut infra patebit. Tertio, 
quia theologus considerat actus humanos secundum quod sunt meritorii vel demeritorii, quod convenit 
actibus humanis; ad quod requiritur quod sint voluntarii. Actus autem humanus iudicatur voluntarius vel 
involuntarius, secundum cognitionem vel ignorantiam circumstantiarum… Et ideo consideratio 
circumstantiarum pertinet ad theologum…… consideratio circumstantiarum pertinet ad moralem, et 
politicum, et ad rhetorem. Ad moralem quidem, prout secundum eas invenitur vel praetermittitur medium 
virtutis in humanis actibus et passionibus. Ad politicum autem et rhetorem, secundum quod ex 
circumstantiis actus redduntur laudabiles vel vituperabiles, excusabiles vel accusabiles. Diversimode 
tamen, nam quod rhetor persuadet, politicus diiudicat. 
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These four criteria of good action are equally applicable to Aquinas’s understanding of human 
flourishing, which is the perfection of human being and acting. For Aquinas human flourishing is 
predicated on the fact that humans are rational creatures, as he says, “In human acts, therefore, 
good and bad are determined through [their] relation with reason… Human good is to be in 
accordance with reason; bad, thus, is that which is contrary to reason.”28 (ST IaIIae 18.5). Human 
flourishing, therefore, may be said to consist in living a life in accordance with reason, in which 
the four criteria of good action are realised. 
 
Firstly, one actualises one’s fullest potential, i.e. one becomes virtuous. Aquinas (Virt. Comm. 
9.15; 11.15) defined virtue as a person’s ultimum potentiae. Second, one’s innate powers and 
faculties and acquired knowledge and skills are aimed at objects appropriate to each in itself 
and to oneself as an individual and as a member of society; hence the appropriate objects of 
truly flourishing human living will vary with each individual within the general limitations 
imposed by human nature itself. Third, that one lives appropriately within the various 
circumstances surrounding one’s life, including those over which one has little or no control, 
such as social status or wealth or innate ability or accidental disability. Finally, the end or 
purpose for which one lives one’s life. We have already seen that the end of the human intellect 
is to apprehend truth and the end of the human will is to realise the good. In addition, as Aquinas 
makes clear (Sent. Eth. 1, lect. 9.2-3), the end of each practical human act is to realise the good 
specific to that act, so the end of war is victory, and each sub-branch of the art of war, such as 
weapon-handling, tactics, etc., is directed towards the ultimate end of victory. This raises the 
question of what is the ultimate end or purpose of a truly flourishing human life. Aquinas’s 
answer, following Aristotle, is that for humans the ultimate end has to be complete in itself and 
desired for its own sake, not for the sake of anything else, and that this is happiness (felicitas or 
beatitudo29): “Hence, it remains that happiness is the most complete of goods and consequently, 
the best and ultimate end.”30 (Sent. Eth. 1, lect. 9.9). 
 
To say that the end of human life is ‘happiness’, or ‘well-being’ as it might be better translated 
(Martin 1988), does not clarify in what this happiness consists. Aquinas, thus, goes on to 
demonstrate that, according to Aristotle, “happiness is activity proper to Man [performed] 
according to virtue in the complete life.”31 (Sent. Eth. 1, lect. 10.13). Activity proper to humans 
                                                          
28 In actibus autem humanis, bonum et malum dicitur per comparationem ad rationem… bonum hominis 
est secundum rationem esse, malum autem quod est praeter rationem. 
29 In his commentary on Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea Aquinas uses felicitas to translate Aristotle’s term 
εὐδαιμονία, in the Summa Theologica he tends to use beatitudo. 
30 Unde relinquitur quod felicitas sit perfectissimum bonorum et per consequens optimus et ultimus finis. 
31 Sic ergo patet, quod felicitas est operatio propria hominis secundum virtutem in vita perfecta. 
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is, as we have seen, activity directed by the rational part of the soul, which is that part of the 
soul which is distinctively human. Hence fully human activity entails the right use of our intellect, 
reason and will to realise the true and the good and to act virtuously. This is the end or purpose 
of ordinary human action, but the ultimate end at which all human acts are directed, according 
to Aquinas, is to behold God: “final and complete happiness is not possible if it is not in the 
seeing of the Divine Being.”32 (ST IaIIae 3.8). To realise the profundity of the Beatific Vision, see 
Dante Alighieri’s Paradiso, Canto 33.43-145. Aquinas acknowledges that a person can, 
nonetheless, attain a great deal of happiness simply in living the life of virtue according to reason, 
without achieving that blessed happiness which he says awaits the Christian. 
 
Aquinas on Habit and Virtue in General 
The final point raised by Anscombe (1958) is that it is necessary to describe virtue and its key 
characteristics. The English word ‘virtue’ is the anglicised form of the Latin word virtus, which in 
turn, is a translation of the Greek ἀρετή.  Both virtus and ἀρετή have the basic meaning of 
‘excellence in action’ or ‘excellence in execution’, and essentially refer to the specific excellence 
relevant to any particular activity. Indeed, in English we still use the word ‘virtue’ in this sense 
when we say, for example, that a sprinter runs fast by virtue of his acceleration or that a 
marathon runner wins by virtue of her stamina. Since the 5th Century BC, however, primarily due 
to the influence of Socrates in his conflict with the Sophists, the Greek word ἀρετή and hence its 
Latin equivalent virtus, have referred to moral excellence as well as functional excellence; i.e. to 
the distinctive excellence of being a good or complete human being, thus Aristotle said: “The 
excellence of man will be the disposition which makes him a good man and which allows him to 
make a good work of himself.”33 (EN 1106a24). 
 
For Aquinas, following Aristotle, the key characteristic of virtue is that it is an intentional, willed 
good habit, just as a vice is an intentional, willed bad habit. He starts with a simple definition of 
habit (habitus) taken from Aristotle’s Metaphysica 1022b: “Habit is said to be a disposition 
according to which that which is disposed is either well or ill disposed, either with regard to itself 
or to something else.”34 (ST IaIIae 49.1). Aquinas expands on this simple definition by explaining 
that there are two kinds of qualities regarding the human powers of acting; those qualities which 
by their very nature are part of one’s powers of acting, and those which are adventitious, being 
caused by something beyond one’s powers. These adventitious qualities are dispositions, to 
                                                          
32 ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae. 
33 ἡ τοῦ ἄνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ ἕξις ἀϕ’ ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀϕ’ ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον 
ἀποδώσει. 
34 habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum et aut secundum se aut ad 
aliud. 
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which in general habits belong. A disposition is an adventitious quality which has multiple and 
variable causes. So, for example, sickness or health of body are dispositions, as they are caused 
by a wide variety of factors, such as diet, exercise, profession, accidental injury, age, etc., change 
in any of which will cause the disposition to change. A habit, on the other hand, is a disposition 
which is difficult to change due to being more completely established in one’s powers of acting 
as it arises from a singular or invariable or long-enduring cause (ST IaIIae 49.2). 
 
Habits are qualities which can be either appropriate or inappropriate to human acts, either in 
their very nature as acts or in the end to which the acting is directed. If the habit is appropriate 
it is termed a good habit and, conversely, a bad habit is one which is inappropriate to the act in 
itself or the end at which the act is aimed (ST IaIIae 49.3). There are three conditions necessary 
for a thing to be disposed to an act or end: First, it must be distinct from that to which it is 
disposed, as potentiality is distinct from actuality. Secondly, it must be able to be actualised in 
several different acts or in several different ends, otherwise there is no need of habit (or free 
will) as it will simply actualise its potential if it is disposed only to a singular end or act. Thirdly, 
several factors, capable of being proportionately adjusted to each other, must concur in order 
to dispose it to any one of its potential ends or acts, so as to dispose it well or ill to such ends or 
acts. Habit is, thus, necessary for the moral life to ensure that the proportionate concurrence of 
these factors is well disposed to the act or end (ST IaIIae 49.4). Finally, habits are caused and 
ingrained by repeated acts: “And therefore a habit of virtue is not able to be effected by one act, 
but by many,”35 (ST IaIIae 51.3), hence virtue is a habit formed by the willed repetition of acts. 
 
Aquinas goes on to demonstrate that habits can reside in the body, the soul, the sentiments, the 
will, the appetites, the intellect, and in the four internal senses (ST IaIIae 50). This again has wide-
ranging implications for both moral decision-making and moral behaviour, as habits may be 
expressed in practically any of a person’s bodily organs, faculties, powers, or functions. Habits, 
as noted above, may be either good or bad: “thus acts of virtue appropriate to human nature 
are those which are according to reason; while acts of vice, as being against reason, are 
incompatible with human nature. And, so, it is manifest that habits are distinguished in kind 
according to the difference in good and bad.”36 (ST IaIIae 54.3). It will be seen, however, that just 
one bad habit in just one part of human nature may have a disproportionate effect in corrupting 
virtue:  “Again, to do amiss is possible in many ways… but to do right is possible in only one way, 
                                                          
35 Et ideo habitus virtutis non potest causari per unum actum; sed per multos. 
36 sicut actus virtutum naturae humanae convenient, eo quod sunt secundum rationem; actus vero vitiorum, 
cum sint contra rationem, a natura humana discordant. Et, sic, manifestum est quod, secundum differentiam 
boni et mali, habitus specie distinguuntur. 
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hence the one is easy and the other difficult.” 37  (Aristotle, EN 1106b30); or, “By sinning, 
furthermore, one loses a habit of virtue: and from contrary acts virtues are generated and 
corrupted.”38 (Aquinas, ST IaIIae 53.1). Good habits need to be habitually exercised in opposing 
vice to become fixed qualities of character, so contrary acts may in this way help to generate 
virtue, but good habits need to be present concurrently and proportionately in all the parts of 
human nature to lead to virtue, which is why the path to virtue is difficult and arduous: 
Virtue, very toilsome for the race of mortals, 
Most beautiful trophy in life.39  
(Aristotle, ‘Hymn to Virtue’ cited in Diogenes Laërtius, Vitae 5.1.7). 
 
In short, Aquinas is saying that a habit is a firmly established and perduring behaviour or attitude 
which resides in the body and the soul and is nurtured by repeated acts. A habit which disposes 
the agent to act well and realise the good in accordance with reason is called a virtue, while a 
habit which disposes the agent to act ill and negate the good is termed a vice. C.S. Lewis 
describes the characteristic of virtue as a habit rather well: 
There is one further point about the Virtues that ought to be noted. There is a 
difference between doing some particular just or temperate action and being a just 
or temperate man. Someone who is not a good tennis player may now and then 
make a good shot. What you mean by a good player is the man whose eye and 
muscles and nerves have been so trained by making innumerable good shots that 
they can now be relied on. They have a certain tone or quality which is there even 
when he is not playing, just as a mathematician’s mind has a certain habit and 
outlook which is there even when he is not doing mathematics. In the same way a 
man who perseveres in doing just actions gets in the end a certain quality of 
character. Now it is that quality rather than the particular actions which we mean 
when we talk of the ‘virtue’ of justice. 
(Lewis 1943:14-15) 
 
According to Aristotle (EN 1106a-1109b) the virtue of a specific human moral quality is the ‘mean’ 
(μέσον) between a vice of excess and a vice of deficiency, in which the lack of the quality is bad, 
but excess of the quality is also bad. For example, if the virtue is courage, its deficiency is 
cowardice, its excess is recklessness. Lack of temperance is profligacy, excess is abnegation. 
There are, however, difficulties with describing certain virtues as a mean between two vices, as 
Aristotle acknowledged (EN 1107a). Thus, it is difficult to describe justice as a μέσον, if by justice 
we mean ‘fairness’, because unfairness – i.e., a deficiency in fairness - can take a variety of forms, 
but it is difficult to conceive of an excess of fairness. If by justice we mean ‘law’, however, then 
                                                          
37 ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν… τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς, διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥᾴδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπόν. 
38  Peccando etiam aliquis habitum virtutis amittit. Et ex contrariis actibus virtutes generantur et 
corrumpuntur. 
39 ἀρετά, πολύμοχθε γένει βροτείῳ, | θήραμα κάλλιστον βίῳ. 
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it is possible to describe the vice of deficiency as ‘lawlessness’ and the vice of excess as ‘legalism’, 
that is; rigidly applying the letter of the law without understanding its spirit.  
 
The Roman poet, Horace (65-8 BC), praising Aristotle’s doctrine of the ‘mean’, called it aurea 
mediocritas - “the golden mean” (Carmina 2.10). The English word ‘mediocrity’ is derived from 
the Latin mediocritas, and it is a reflection of how much Western moral philosophy has altered 
since antiquity that while, in Latin, mediocritas had a positive moral connotation, ‘mediocrity’ 
has a negative connotation in contemporary English usage. Moral virtue, however, has nothing 
to do with mediocrity in our modern sense, but has everything to do with excellence; in fact, 
with realising one’s potential to become the most excellent person one can be. Hence, Aquinas’s 
definition of virtue as a person’s “ultimum potentiae,” (Virt. Comm. 9.15; 11.15). It is important 
to note at this stage that the doctrine of the mean can only be applied to the moral virtues, but 
not to the intellectual virtues such as prudence, because it is prudence which rationally 
determines the mean of the moral virtues (Westberg 2015:152), as will become clear below. 
 
Even though it does not accurately convey Aristotle’s point that the mean and the two extremes 
of vice are each opposed to the other two (EN 1108b10), the doctrine of the mean has been 
represented in tabular form since antiquity (cf. EE 122b37), thus: 
Emotion Vice of Deficiency Mean Vice of Excess 
Regard for Others Lawlessness Justice Legalism 
Passio Irascibilis Cowardice Courage Recklessness 
Passio Concupiscibilis Profligacy Temperance Abnegation 
 
Diagram 1. A Table of Virtues and Vices 
 
 This simple representation may be improved by making it a ‘traffic-light’ table (McCormack 
2014, pers. comm.), thus: 
Emotion Vice of Deficiency  Mean  Vice of Excess 
Regard for Others Lawlessness  Justice  Legalism 
Passio Irascibilis Cowardice  Courage  Recklessness 
Passio Concupiscibilis Profligacy  Temperance  Abnegation 
 
Diagram 2. A ‘Traffic-Light’ Table of Virtues and Vices 
 
The advantage of representing the idea of virtue as the mean between vices of excess and 
deficiency in a ‘traffic-light table’ is that it emphasizes the point that there is no sudden 
transition from being virtuous to being vicious, but that moral behaviour falls somewhere on a 
spectrum and it is a matter for judgement when courage, say, has become recklessness. Indeed, 
Aristotle defined moral virtue (or those excellences which relate to emotions and actions), as 
having the right feelings or doing the right actions at the right time, for the right object, towards 
the right persons, for the right purpose, in the right way (EN 1106b20). 
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Aquinas on the Four Cardinal Virtues40 
Having described habits and virtue in general, Aquinas proceeds to discuss the seven capital 
virtues in detail. He inherited the list of the seven capital virtues from the early Church Fathers, 
who, in turn, derived the four cardinal virtues of prudence (ϕρόνησις, prudentia), justice 
(δικαιοσύνη, iustitia), courage (ἀνδρεία, fortitudo), and temperance (σωϕροσύνη, temperantia), 
and their subsidiary virtues from the Graeco-Roman philosophical schools. The three theological 
virtues of faith (πίστις, fides), hope (ἐλπίς, spes) and love (ἀγάπη, caritas) were derived from St 
Paul (1 Corinthians 12 & 13). I shall not discuss the three theological virtues, which belong 
specifically to the Christian, being infused by God (ST IaIIae 62.1), and are not, therefore, universal. 
I shall, however, examine the four cardinal virtues, as these are the ones which are ultimately 
derived from pagan Greek philosophy and are, thus, accessible to all humans, irrespective of 
whether or not they are Christians. Nonetheless, in my discussion of Aquinas’s moral philosophy 
I shall refer to the peculiarly Christian concept of the seven ‘capital vices’ or ‘deadly sins’, 
because these gave Christian moral theologians and spiritual directors a more perceptive way 
of articulating and understanding the practicable moral life. It is worth stressing, therefore, that 
by contrasting each of the four cardinal virtues with those of the seven capital vices which 
specifically oppose its realisation, Aquinas was able to bring a more profound insight to bear on 
the question of the practicable moral life than Aristotle could do with a more limited 
understanding of vice. 
 
Prudence 
Aquinas, following Aristotle, divided the virtues into two broad types: intellectual and moral. 
The three cardinal moral virtues are justice, courage and temperance, and relate to one’s 
appetites and emotions and, hence, to one’s consequent behaviour. The intellectual virtues 
relate to one’s reason and number five: three virtues of the speculative intellect – ‘wisdom’ 
(sapiens), ‘understanding’ (intellectus), and ‘empirical knowledge’ (scientia); and two virtues of 
practical intellect – ‘art’ (ars) and ‘prudence’ (prudentia). McInerny (1997:97) states: 
The end of the speculative use of intellect is the perfection of thinking as such, 
namely, truth. When we use our mind practically, we seek a truth for the guidance 
of activities other than thinking, e.g., the true good that the will should seek, the 
good in actions that involve the emotions, the good in activities in which we relate 
to other people. Generally speaking, Thomas recognises two virtues of practical 
intellect – art and prudence. Art is correct reasoning about things to be made and 
aims at good in the artefact. Prudence is correct reasoning about things to be done 
and aims at the good of the agent as such, taken either singly (ethical prudence), as 
a member of a domestic community (economic prudence), or as a member of a 
polity (political prudence). 
                                                          
40 My discussion of Aquinas’s understanding of the four cardinal virtues draws heavily on the works of 
Josef Pieper (1955; 1957; 1960) and Silvano Borruso (1996). 
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It is important to note that prudence, as an intellectual virtue, is distinct from the specifically 
moral virtues of justice, courage, and temperance, and that the doctrine of the mean does not 
apply to it. As an intellectual virtue, prudence provides the necessary and essential liaison 
between the truth ascertained by the intellect, the good desired by the will, and the moral acts 
of the human agent exemplified in justice, courage and temperance: 
It is certain that conformity with right reason is itself the proper end of every moral 
virtue….. But in what way and by which [means] Man attains the mean of reason in 
his deeds falls under the direction of prudence. Although to attain the mean is the 
end of moral virtue, yet only by the right direction of these [virtues], which are 
aiming towards the end, is the mean found.41 
(ST IIaIIae 47.7) 
Prudence, therefore, may be described as the accurate perception of reality, of the actual truth 
of a given situation, and a judgement of how best to respond to that situation as it truly is in 
order to realise the good. C.S. Lewis (1943:12) says, “Prudence means practical commonsense, 
taking the trouble to think out what you are doing and what is likely to come of it.” But the 
practical common sense mentioned by Lewis is founded on insight into and understanding of 
objective reality: “The meaning of the virtue of prudence, however, is primarily this: that not 
only the end of human action but also the means for its realisation shall be in keeping with the 
truth of real things.” (Pieper 1960:35). In this regard, it is worthwhile remembering that 
prudence is applicable not just at the personal level, but in the household and in the body politic, 
too (ST IIaIIae 50). Prudence in military affairs is one of the branches of political prudence and we 
shall return to this subject in the third chapter. 
 
Pieper (1960:20-21), following Aquinas (ST IIaIIae 47.6), says that prudent decision is derived from 
two sources: the mental faculty, called synderesis in Medieval Latin, of knowing the universal 
moral principles of the Natural Law or what might be called ‘natural conscience’; and the mental 
faculty of knowing how to apply the universal principles to actual, concrete, singular, specific 
situations – prudentia simpliciter. Hence, Aquinas can state, “natural conscience sets prudence 
in motion”42 (ST IIaIIae 47.6). 
Prudence, however, is not concerned directly with the ultimate – natural and 
supernatural – ends of human life, but with the means to these ends. The special 
nature of prudence is not presence in the mind of ‘universal principles’ (although it 
is necessary for those principles to be present if one is to make prudent decisions: 
synderesis movet prudentiam...). The special nature of prudence is its concern with 
the realm of ‘ways and means’ and down-to-earth realities.  
(Pieper 1960:20-21) 
                                                          
41 Dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod est conformari rationi rectae, est finis proprius cuiuslibet virtutis 
moralis...... Sed qualiter et per quae homo in operando attingat medium rationis, pertinet ad dispositionem 
prudentiae. Licet enim attingere medium sit finis virtutis moralis: tamen per rectam dispositionem eorum 
quae sunt ad finem, medium invenitur. 
42 synderesis movet prudentiam 
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As prudence entails understanding the actual reality or truth of any given situation and 
determining how best to realise the good in that situation, it has two aspects, the ‘cognitive’ and 
‘imperative’ (Pieper 1960). The cognitive aspect entails, first, ‘discernment’, which is the 
intellectual insight into the objective reality of the world and an understanding of any specific 
contingent situation as it actually is, not as one wants or wishes it to be, nor an understanding 
clouded by personal sentiment, opinion, or ideals. Discernment, therefore, implies a still and 
silent receptiveness before reality on the part of the human agent. The person who is full of 
chatter, ‘internal dialogue’, and incorrect, irrelevant or incoherent information will be unable to 
discern truly. Secondly, it entails ‘deliberation’, which is the rational weighing up one’s options 
and knowing how to respond in a morally appropriate manner given the contingencies of the 
particular situation. Deliberation implies also that the agent is willing to seek and receive counsel 
regarding the situation and the appropriate response to it. The imperative aspect entails 
‘decision’, which is the will, on the basis of one’s prior discernment and deliberation, selecting 
which course of action one should pursue in order to realise the good in that particular 
contingent situation; and ‘direction’, which is the will putting one’s decision into immediate 
effect (Pieper 1960). Prudence, thus, involves the reason (ratio) and the will (voluntas) of the 
human agent. 
 
As prudence is an intellectual rather than a moral virtue, it is not possible to describe it as the 
mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency, as it is difficult to conceive what 
a vice of excessive prudence could be, while it is possible to conceive several vices arising from 
deficiencies in prudence. It will be helpful, therefore, to briefly consider the parts of imprudence, 
as described by Aquinas (ST IIaIIae 53-55) and interpreted by Pieper (1960). These various forms 
of imprudence are vices of deficiency relating to either the cognitive aspect or the imperative 
aspect of prudence. The vices of cognitive imprudence are: First, thoughtlessness, consisting of 
either lack of deliberation (praecipitatio) or lack of discernment (inconsideratio) leading to 
“blindness to the concrete realities which surround our actions.” (Pieper 1960:32); secondly, 
irresoluteness (inconstantia), where deliberation reaches no resolution and so is rendered 
ineffective, what nowadays some might call ‘analysis paralysis’; and thirdly, negligence 
(negligentia), which is carelessness or idleness in discernment or deliberation. 
 
The vices of imperative imprudence are less obvious than those of cognitive imprudence, as they 
are vices in which the will imprudently directs one’s acts to egotistical ends. These forms of 
volitional imprudence can, thus, have the appearance of prudence, and, in fact, in contemporary 
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parlance it is usually these “vices opposed to prudence, which have a resemblance to it,”43 as 
Aquinas calls them (ST IIaIIae 55), which most people have in mind when they think of prudence 
at all. This idea of prudence implies a devious self-preservation, so that, 
To the contemporary mind, then, the concept of the good excludes rather than 
includes prudence. Modern man cannot conceive of a good act which might not be 
imprudent, nor of a bad act which might not be prudent. He will often call lies and 
cowardice prudent, truthfulness and courageous sacrifice imprudent. Classical 
Christian ethics, on the contrary, maintains that a man can be prudent and good 
only simultaneously; that prudence is part and parcel of the definition of goodness; 
that there is no sort of justice or fortitude which runs counter to the virtue of 
prudence; and that the unjust man has been imprudent before and is imprudent at 
the moment he is unjust. Omnis virtus moralis debet esse prudens – All virtue is 
necessarily prudent.44 
(Pieper 1960:10-11) 
Aristotle, too, affirms that all moral virtue must of necessity be prudent when he offers the 
following definition: “Virtue then is a habit of choosing the mean, relative to us, determined by 
a rational principle, as the prudent man determines it.”45 (EN 1106b35 – 1107a2). 
 
The vices of imperative imprudence are: Firstly, excessive consideration of the body (prudentia 
carnis), which “instead of serving the true end of all human life... is directed solely toward the 
goods of the body,” (Pieper 1960:33). Second, deviousness (astutia), the attitude of scheming 
dissimulation (fraus) and deceit (dolus) which motivates the person who tries to manipulate 
others and situations for his own ends, but as Pieper (1960:33) observes, “The meaning of the 
virtue of prudence, however, is primarily this: that not only the end of human action but also 
the means for its realisation shall be in keeping with the truth of real things.” Third, 
preoccupation with transient things (sollicitudo temporalium rerum et futurorum), which is 
excessive anxiety about one’s material or social goods, thus diverting one’s attention to oneself 
and away from being receptive to reality, which is the prerequisite of discernment of truth. 
 
According to Aquinas the origin of the vices of cognitive imprudence arise ultimately from a 
single source, lust (luxuria), which here specifically means unchasteness or impurity of heart (ST 
IIaIIae 53.6). “Thomas Aquinas discovers that these imprudences of ‘omission’ have their origin 
in unchastity, in that surrender to the goods of the sensual world which splits the power of 
decision in two.” (Pieper 1960:32). The association of sexual chasteness with clarity of 
perception is ancient (Aristotle, EN 1140b15; Matthew 5:8), but may not command much 
                                                          
43 Quaestio 55 is titled, ‘De vitiis oppositis prudentiae, quae habent similitudinem cum ipsa’ 
44 Thomas Aquinas, Virt. Comm. 12 ad 23 
45 Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ὡς* ἂν 
ὁϕρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. (*I have followed Bekker’s reading of the text as ὡς rather than Bywater’s of ᾡ, but 
the variation in reading does not change the sense of the passage that the rational principle of choosing 
the mean is prudence.) 
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support or understanding nowadays. Nonetheless, we should take seriously the possibility that 
such an ancient and unanimous tradition is correct, especially as contemporary Western culture 
is so highly sexualised that we are likely to have a blind spot in this area of moral understanding. 
Likewise, Aquinas ascribes the origin of the vices of imperative imprudence to a single source, 
avarice (avaritia), also known as covetousness (ST IIaIIae 55.8).  
Covetousness here means more than the disorderly love of money and property. 
Covetousness here means... immoderate straining for all the possessions which 
man thinks are needed to assure his own importance and status... Covetousness 
means an anxious senility, desperate self-preservation, over-riding concern for 
confirmation and security... the virtue of prudence is dependent upon the constant 
readiness to ignore the self. 
(Pieper 1960:35).  
Once again, this insight of Aquinas’s runs counter to much of the West’s current neoliberal 
economic philosophy of consumerism but requires considered appraisal precisely for that 
reason. We will consider these questions further in the next chapter. 
 
From this discussion of imprudence it will be seen that a simple tabulation is inadequate to 
accurately represent the relationship of prudence with the variety of vices opposed to it. A 
better representation is that of a target, in which the ‘bull’s eye’ represents prudence and the 
outer rings the graduated transition into the various vices of imprudence. Indeed, Aristotle 
himself uses the image of aiming for a target (EN 1106b30), when discussing the idea of the mean. 
There are two advantages in representing the relationship between the virtue of prudence and 
the various vices of imprudence in a ‘target chart’. First, it helps us to understand why the 
ancient Greeks used a term from archery, ἁμαρτία, which literally means ‘missing the mark’, to 
denote ‘sin’. To sin is to fail to hit the ‘bull’s eye’ and, thus, to fall into one or other of the vices 
associated with any particular virtue, and this image, in a way that the ‘traffic-light table’ does 
not, drives home the points that virtue is difficult to attain while sin is easy to fall into, but that 
virtue becomes easier to attain with habitual practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 3: A Target Chart of Prudence and the Vices of Imprudence 
PRUDENTIA 
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stu
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Secondly, this image helps us to understand the Socratic argument equating virtue with 
knowledge and sin with ignorance (Plato, Protagoras; Meno; Respublica). If we accept the two 
propositions that (1) prudence is knowledge of reality and knowledge of how to act 
appropriately in any situation on the basis of understanding the truth of that situation, and (2) 
that all virtue is necessarily prudent as it is based on a true perception of reality, then the way 
in which virtue can be described as knowledge and sin ignorance becomes clearer. 
 
Justice 
The second cardinal virtue, but the first specifically moral virtue, is justice. Aquinas defines 
justice as: “a habit by which someone, with firm and enduring will, renders to each individual 
his due.”46 (ST IIaIIae 58.1). It will be noted that this definition is derived from that of Institutiones 
Iutiniani 1.1: “Justice is the firm and enduring will to render to everyone his due,”47 but, also, 
that Aquinas has modified it to stress that justice is a habit, i.e. a virtue. It will be noted that this 
definition is also completely outward looking towards other persons, a point to which we shall 
return below. In discussing Aquinas’s definition, Pieper (1957:11-14) acknowledges that 
nowadays there are very many different ways of defining justice, but claims that these can all 
be reduced to the simple idea that justice is the willed intent to assign to each person their 
rightful and proper due. He goes on, however, to note: 
I have just said that the idea is an extremely simple one. But that does not imply 
that its meaning is easily grasped… For what, in fact, is each man’s due? And above 
all, what is, generally speaking, the basis for a ‘suum’48? How, indeed, does anything 
come to belong to a person? And how does it so truly belong to him that every man 
and every human authority has to grant it to him and allow him to keep it? 
(Pieper 1957:14-15) 
Pieper (1957:15) answers his own questions by quoting Aquinas: 
‘If the act of justice is to give each man his due, then the act of justice is preceded 
by the act whereby something becomes his due.’ [ScG 2.28]. This text expresses 
with supreme simplicity a circumstance that is utterly fundamental. Justice is 
something that comes second: Right comes before justice. If something is due to a 
man as his own, the fact of its being due to him has not come into existence through 
justice. ‘That act, by virtue of which something comes for the first time to be due 
to a man as his, cannot be an act of justice.’ [ScG 2.28]. 
                                                          
46 iustitia est habitus secundum quem aliquis constanti et perpetua voluntate ius suum unicuique tribuit. 
47 Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens. 
48 Suum is the genitive plural of the 3rd person reflexive pronoun, and emphatically indicates something 
as one’s own possession, whether material, as in ‘one’s own property’, or abstract, as in ‘master of oneself’ 
(Lewis 1891:838b-840a). Pieper (1957:18) puts it thus: “Whatever is due to a person, the suum, is 
something that one man may demand of another as owing to him, and him only. And what is thus owing 
can just as well be a thing, perhaps a possession, as an action [such as the freedom which allows the 
person to carry out his own acts]… but it can also be an act performed by another, or even the cessation 
of such an act – anything, for instance, that might be annoying, embarrassing or compromising to a 
person’s good name.” 
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This fundamentally important point, that rendering to each person their due is predicated on 
each person having certain inalienable rights, is ultimately based on the Judaeo-Christian 
concept that humans have worth simply because they are created in the image of God 
(Siedentop 2014). Aquinas expresses this point by stating that a creature only has rights because 
it is created; the rights it enjoys arise from the act of creation by God49 (ScG 2.28). Pieper 
(1957:23) explains it thus: 
Man has inalienable rights because he is created a person by the act of God, that is, 
an act beyond all human discussion. In the ultimate analysis, then, something is 
inalienably due to man because he is creatura. Moreover, as creatura, man has the 
absolute duty to give another his due. 
 
The key implication of this definition is that justice entails at least two parties; the just person 
who renders to another their due and the other person or persons to whom this due is rendered. 
Implicit in this, too, is the acknowledgement that the ‘other’ is distinct and different from the 
person who renders to them their due and that justice is the fulfilment of an obligation to render 
this due, regardless of whether the ‘other’ is a friend, a fellow-citizen, an alien, a competitor, or 
an enemy. (The acknowledgement that even an enemy has a right to be rendered his due simply 
because he, too, is a human person, contributed to the development of Christian just war 
doctrine, which will be discussed in the third chapter.) So, justice is realised in human acts 
irrespective of the attitude of the person who renders to the other their due: 
‘The other person’ is not affected by my subjective disposition, by what I intend, 
think, feel, or will, but only by what I do. Only by an external act will the other 
receive what is his, his due…… in the realm of justice good and evil are judged purely 
on the basis of the deed itself, regardless of the inner disposition of the doer; the 
point is not how the deed accords with the doer, but rather, how it affects ‘the 
other person’. The reverse of this statement is also valid. Not only is the act of 
justice an external act, but every external act belongs to the field of justice. 
Whatever external act a person performs, it is either just or unjust. 
(Pieper 1957:36) 
 
Justice, therefore, unlike the other two moral virtues of temperance and courage, may be judged 
objectively by its actualisation in human deeds, whereas temperance and courage depend on a 
subjective disposition for their realisation. Nonetheless, the virtue of justice, as a habit of the 
will, entails a disposition to be just not only in external acts, but also to have an inner attitude 
of affirming that the other person does, indeed, have inherent dignity and worth in his own right 
and a confirmation, therefore, that he is entitled to that which is his due irrespective of what 
one thinks or feels about him. The vice which specifically hinders justice, therefore, is envy, 
which according to Chaucer (The Canterbury Tales, ‘The Parson’s Tale’ §30), is “sorrow at 
                                                          
49 Sed per creationem res creata primo incipit aliquid suum habere. “It is through creation that the created 
thing first begins to have the right to something.” 
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another man’s well-being, and joy at other men’s harm.”50 While justice may be articulated in 
law, therefore, it “means much more than the sort of thing that goes on in law courts. It is the 
old name for everything we should now call ‘fairness’; it includes honesty, give and take, 
truthfulness, keeping promises, and all that side of life,” (Lewis 1943:14). This brings out an 
important point about justice as a virtue; it entails respect for and protection of the other 
person’s dignity and worth. There is a distinction 
between a demand of justice that is legally binding and a demand of justice that is 
(only) morally binding. I can be compelled to fulfil the first obligation; carrying out 
the second depends only on my own sense of decency. Moreover, there is a further 
distinction to be made between demands of justice that are only morally binding: 
a violation can mean that the person who commits it has done something 
dishonourable (if he lies, for example); but it may also mean that without being 
strictly dishonourable, an action has still been ‘unseemly’ (in that it is unkind or 
unfriendly, for example). 
(Pieper 1957:31) 
 
In other words, to use somewhat archaic language, justice is intimately bound up with honour. 
Traditionally, there were terms which aptly denoted both the forms of justice relating to honour; 
religio, pietas, gratia, vindicatio, observantia, and veritas (ST IIaIIae 80), and the various injustices 
regarding dishonour which thereby shame others or injure their reputations; contumelia, 
detractio, susurratio, derisio, maledictio. Aquinas discusses these injustices in a series of five 
Quaestiones (ST IIaIIae 72-76), in contrast, he devotes only two Quaestiones (ST IIaIIae 77-78) to 
financial injustice, which consists of fraud - cheating people out of their money in various ways, 
and usury - lending money at interest. This gives an indication of the importance he attaches to 
delineating injustices against the honour and dignity of persons; something we hardly consider 
under justice nowadays. It is also noteworthy that we no longer consider usury to be a form of 
injustice and that our entire economic system is based on it, which is another indication of how 
far contemporary notions of justice and injustice differ from those of the Western moral 
tradition as a whole. Indeed, Pieper observes that many of the terms Aquinas uses to express 
forms of justice and injustice relating to honour are no longer understood and the contemporary 
Western understanding of the full extent of justice and injustice is, thus, diminished: 
The fact that current adult speech has not maintained such a usage, that we actually 
do not have words for such things and many others like them, seems to me most 
disturbing and thought-provoking. What term shall we use to properly render 
derisio, the act that violates justice by bringing shame to another through mockery? 
How designate the special form of justice that goes with it and consists in sparing 
another man shame? 
(Pieper 1957:29) 
                                                          
50 Envye… is sorwe of other mannes wele, and joye of othere mennes harm. Chaucer is paraphrasing St 
Augustine, Commentary on Psalm 104:25. 
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This loss of the understanding of the inextricable link between justice and honour has very 
profound implications for contemporary British soldiers deploying on operations amongst 
nations which do still retain a culture based on the concepts of honour and shame, as will 
become clear in the third chapter. 
 
Courage51 
The third cardinal virtue is courage, which may be actualised either positively or negatively: 
Positively it entails being willing to endure harm in order to realise the good, while negatively it 
entails not allowing the fear of harm to prevent one from realising the good (Pieper 1955). As 
Aquinas put it: 
it belongs to the virtue of courage to ward man’s will so that it does not hold back 
from the good of reason through fear of bodily evil… And, therefore, it is necessary 
that moral courage be appointed as that which firmly fixes man’s will to the good 
of reason in the face of the greatest evils…… Moreover, the most frightful amongst 
all bodily evils is death, which takes away all bodily goods.52 
(ST IIaIIae 123.4) 
Aquinas stresses, however, that courage is not just passive endurance, but also requires daring 
(audacia) and aggression (ira)53 to actively realise the good (ST IIaIIae 123.3 & 10). “Fortitude 
includes both kinds of courage – the kind that faces danger as well as the kind that ‘sticks it’ 
under pain. ‘Guts’ is perhaps the nearest modern English.” (Lewis 1943:14). 
 
The virtue of courage, therefore, is the habit which equips one to withstand danger, fear and 
evil, either through patient endurance or persistent, even aggressive, opposition, in order to 
preserve or to realise the true, the good and the just. As Aristotle (EN 1115b17) said, 
The courageous man, then, is the one who endures or fears the right things for the 
right purpose in the right manner at the right time, and who shows confidence in a 
similar way. (For the courageous man feels and acts as the circumstances merit, 
and as principle may dictate.)54 
  
In other words, courage is the disposition of a rational and disciplined soul, and cannot arise 
simply from a spontaneous ‘fight or flight’ instinct. Implicit in this definition, however, is the 
recognition that courage is subordinate to both prudence and justice: 
                                                          
51 Much of my discussion in this section is based on Steele (2014) ‘Courage: Cardinal Virtue or Core Value?’, 
a paper I delivered at the 2014 Amport House Conference and was subsequently published in the 2014 
Defence Academy Yearbook:249-255. 
52 ad virtutem fortitudinis pertinet ut voluntatem hominis tueatur, ne retrahatur a bono rationis propter 
timorem mali corporalis… Et ideo oportet quod fortitudo animi dicatur quae firmiter retinet voluntatem 
hominis in bono rationi contra maxima mala…… Maxime autem terribile, inter omnia corporalia mala, est 
mors, quae tollit omnia corporalia bona. 
53 Ira can also be translated ‘anger’ or ‘wrath’; I translate it as ‘aggression’ to distinguish its place in the 
virtue of courage from the vice of wrath, which is disordered ira. 
54 ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ ϕοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, 
ἀνδρεῖος (κατ’ ἀξίαν γάρ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος). 
 
 
31 
 
Under the direction of prudence, the good of man becomes compellingly evident. 
Justice primarily brings about the actual realisation of this good. Fortitude, 
therefore, by itself, is not the primary realisation of the good. But fortitude protects 
this realisation or clears the road for it. 
(Pieper 1955:27) 
 
Aquinas affirmed that courage is not the first of the virtues and specifically made the point that 
“a man does not expose his person to mortal dangers except in order to preserve justice. And, 
therefore, the praise of courage depends to a certain extent on justice.”55 (ST IIaIIae 123.12.3). It 
must be stressed that this is not just a naïve Christian ideal, but is also the view expressed by the 
pagan Graeco-Roman philosophers. For example, Aristotle said, “It is for a noble end that the 
courageous man endures and acts in accordance with courage.”56 (EN 1115b22), and Cicero, 
discussing courage, noted: 
But if the elation of soul, which is shown in danger and toil, is devoid of justice and 
fights not for the common weal, but for its own advantage, it is a vice; and it not 
only has no measure of virtue, but, rather, is monstrous and repulsive to all 
humaneness.57  
(Cicero, Off. 1.19) 
This concept has far-reaching implications for military personnel, because it implies that a 
soldier cannot be truly courageous if fighting for an unjust cause, a topic to which we shall return 
in the third chapter. 
 
Two final points need to be made about courage: Firstly, it is the virtue which specifically 
perfects the feelings of irritation (passiones irascibilis): aggression, hope, despair, daring, and 
fear, by disciplining them in endurance and ordering them, so that one fears or dares or hopes 
or hesitates ordinately in regard to the reality of the situation in which one finds oneself. The 
vices which specifically hinder courage, therefore, are sloth, a dispirited and uninterested 
lassitude, which cannot be bothered to strive to realise the good; and wrath, uncontrolled, 
misdirected and disordered aggression. Second, the exercise of courage is partly predicated on 
a healthy and ordered body and mind, as a disordered, unhealthy body and soul is considerably 
weakened and its ability to resist evil in the face of fear of harm or death is thereby much 
lessened. Hence the advice of the Roman poet, Juvenal: “You should pray for a wholesome mind 
in a healthy body,”58 (Satura 10.356), which brings us naturally to the consideration of the fourth 
cardinal virtue, temperance, which “fosters the health of body and soul.” (Borruso 1996:66). 
                                                          
55 homo non exponit personam suam mortis periculis nisi propter iustitiam conservandam. Et ideo laus 
fortitudinis dependet quodammodo ex iustitia. 
56 καλοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν. 
57 Sed ea animi elatio, quae cernitur in periculis et laboribus, si iustitia vacat pugnatque non pro salute 
communi, sed pro suis commodis, in vitio est; non modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est potius immanitatis 
omnem humanitatem repellentis. 
58 Orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano. 
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Temperance 
Temperance is primarily concerned with realising the good for the individual person. Its meaning, 
however, is quite likely to be misconstrued nowadays: 
Temperance is, unfortunately, one of those words that has changed its meaning. It 
now usually means teetotalism. But [originally]… it meant nothing of the sort. 
Temperance referred not specially to drink, but to all pleasures; and it meant not 
abstaining, but going the right length and no further…… Of course it may be the 
duty of a particular [person]… at a particular time, to abstain from [some good]… 
But the whole point is that he is abstaining, for a good reason, from something 
which he does not condemn and which he likes to see other people enjoying. 
(Lewis 1943:13) 
Temperance is based on self-knowledge, and is the self-disciplined ordering of one’s 
sustentative appetites by not giving in to self-gratification or self-indulgence. It entails being self-
controlled and moderate in one’s enjoyment of all secondary goods, even though they are 
legitimate, as the inordinate pursuit of even a legitimate good is inimical to living a fully 
flourishing life because one becomes enslaved to bad habits and one’s behaviour then becomes 
harmful both to oneself or the wider community. Legitimate goods are, thus, pursued ordinately, 
i.e. only in the right manner to the right degree for the right ends, which may mean abstaining 
from them on occasion. “The primary and essential meaning of temperare, therefore, is this: to 
dispose various parts into one unified and ordered whole.” (Pieper 1955:54).  
 
One’s sustentative appetites and faculties are disciplined by the habit of temperance so that 
they are controlled by one’s reason and will, rather than controlling one’s behaviour, hence this 
apparently constraining discipline, far from being restrictive, results in greater freedom. 
Discussing Aristotle’s description of σωϕροσύνη, Williamson (1949:16-17), observes that it 
is concerned primarily with the instincts and desires which men possess in common 
with animals and it is by the use of it that man shows himself a rational being, able 
to exercise a free choice. One who is a slave of his appetites is not free to choose 
the Mean in any matter. 
 
Or, as Pieper (1955:125) more succinctly put it, “Temperance… is liberating and purifying. This 
above all: temperance effects purification.” And this directly relates to that purity of heart and 
consequent clarity of vision which undergirds prudence. 
 
The connection between purity of heart and prudence naturally raises the question of how 
temperance relates to the other cardinal virtues. Referring to Aquinas’s discussion of this point 
in the ST IIaIIae 141.8, Pieper (1955:54-55) says, 
Temperantia is distinguished from the other cardinal virtues by the fact that it refers 
exclusively to the active man himself. Prudence looks to all existent reality; justice 
to the fellow man; the man of fortitude relinquishes, in self-forgetfulness, his own 
possessions and his life. Temperance, on the other hand, aims at each man himself. 
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As temperance is the virtue which is exclusively aimed at oneself and one’s consequent actions 
and attitudes, it will be helpful to briefly consider the various subordinate virtues of temperance 
and their opposing vices as discussed at some length by Aquinas (ST IIaIIae 143-169). According 
to Aquinas the subordinate virtues consist in the following: shame (verecundia); self-control or 
self-restraint (continentia); honesty (honestum); purity (castitas); abstinence (abstinentia); 
soberness (sobrietas); gentleness (clementia); mildness (mansuetudo); modesty (modestia); 
humility (humilitas); and mental diligence (studiositas). The vices opposing temperance are 
gluttony (gula), drunkenness (ebrietas), lust (luxuria), profligacy (incontinentia), wrath (ira), 
cruelty (crudelitas), pride (superbia), and mental inquisitiveness (curiositas). It will be noticed 
from this much abbreviated list that several of the subordinate virtues of temperance and their 
opposing vices are ones which nowadays we would not think to be primarily or obviously 
connected with the faculties of the sustentative part of the soul - sexual reproduction, nutrition, 
and bodily augmentation - with which temperance is most closely concerned. Two of these in 
particular require a little further explanation: studiositas and curiositas. Perhaps the best way to 
explain the difference between them is to liken studiositas to the mental discipline which allows 
a person to claim acquaintance with another country and its culture only when he has spent 
several years studying its language and living amongst its people learning its customs and history, 
while curiositas may be likened to the person on a coach tour who spends twenty-four hours in 
Vienna and then claims to have ‘done’ Austria and subsequently feels entitled to talk 
‘authoritatively’ about the Austrians. 
 
The fact that we would not nowadays associate modesty, mildness or mental diligence with 
temperance indicates the extent to which our contemporary understanding of the unity of 
human nature and the place of the virtues has been impoverished. Aquinas (ST IIaIIae 141.1 ad 1) 
explains that qualities such as modesty, mildness, and mental diligence are, indeed, parts of 
temperance because they are habits of self-control and self-discipline which are appropriate to 
humans specifically as rational beings. 
It is certain that nature inclines each thing to that which is appropriate to it. Whence 
Man naturally desires pleasures that are appropriate to him. Since, truly, Man as 
such is rational, it follows that those pleasures are appropriate to Man which are in 
accordance with reason. And from these temperance does not hold him back, but 
rather from those which are contrary to reason. Whence it is apparent that 
temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is appropriate 
to it. Yet it is contrary to the inclination of animal nature not subject to reason.59 
                                                          
59 Dicendum quod natura inclinat in id quod est conveniens unicuique. Unde homo naturaliter appetit 
delectationem sibi convenientam. Quia vero homo, inquantum huiusmodi, est rationalis: consequens est 
quod delectationes sint homini convenientes, quae sunt secundum rationem. Et ab his non retrahit 
temperantia: sed potius ab his quae sunt contra rationem. Unde patet quod temperantia non contrariatur 
inclinationi naturae humanae, sed convenit cum ea. Contrariatur tamen inclinationi naturae bestialis non 
subiectae rationi. 
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Remarking on the fact that humans are rational creatures, requiring order and moderation 
mentally as well as bodily, Pieper (1955) notes that not only a person’s bodily well-being but 
their mental health is intimately tied up with the virtues of courage and temperance because 
where they are absent and where the irascible and concupiscent emotions are disordered there 
is fertile ground for phobias, neuroses and addictions to develop. When once one sees this point, 
it is surprisingly self-evident, but it is not at all obvious to those of us raised with a post-Freudian 
understanding of the human psyche and its illnesses. Aquinas points out that this connection 
between temperance and mental health exists precisely because the sustentative appetites and 
faculties are those which actually sustain our being in the most fundamental sense. Of course, 
the reverse of psychological illness is the mental health and wholeness which derive from 
habitually exercising courage and temperance to order and discipline the voracious appetites of 
one’s affective and sustentative being, which is why Aquinas describes the particular excellence 
of  temperantia as ‘serenity of soul’60 (ST IIaIIae 141.2 ad 2, cited in Pieper 1955:54). 
 
The Hierarchy and Unity of Virtue 
The question of whether all virtue is one or if there is a hierarchy of virtues goes back to Socrates 
(Plato, Respublica 445c). Aquinas asserts that there is a hierarchy of virtue, but also that the 
virtues are intimately connected with each other: 
Rational good, moreover, is human good… Now, prudence certainly has this good 
essentially, which is the perfection of reason. Justice, however, is certainly the 
maker of this good, in as much as it belongs to it to establish the order of reason in 
all human affairs. But the other virtues are the preservers of this good, in as much 
as they clearly moderate the emotions lest they lead Man away from the rational 
good. And, in the order of these [other virtues], fortitude holds the first place, 
because fear of the dangers of death has the greatest [negative] effect in that it 
makes Man turn back from the rational good. After this is placed temperance, 
because the pleasures of touch more than the others hinder the rational good. Now 
being is placed before efficacy, which, in turn, is placed before maintenance in 
terms of the removal of hindrances. Whence, among the cardinal virtues prudence 
is preeminent; justice second, fortitude third, temperance fourth, and, after these, 
the rest of the virtues.61 
(ST IIaIIae 123.12) 
                                                          
60 quies animi 
61 Bonum autem rationis est hominis bonum… Hoc autem bonum essentialiter quidem habet prudentia, 
quae est perfectio rationis. Iustitia autem est huius boni factiva: inquantum scilicet ad ipsam pertinet 
ordinem rationis ponere in omnibus rebus humanis. Aliae autem virtutes sunt conservativae huius boni: 
inquantum scilicet moderantur passions, ne abducant hominem a bono rationis. Et, in ordine harum, 
fortitudo tenet locum praecipuum: quia timor periculorum mortis maxime est efficax ad hoc quod hominem 
faciat recedere a bono rationis. Post quam ordinatur temperantia: quia etiam delectationes tactus maxime 
inter caetera impediunt bonum rationis. Id autem quod essentialiter dicitur potius est eo quod dicitur 
effective; et hoc etiam potius est eo quod dicitur conservative, secundum remotionem impedimenti. Unde, 
inter virtutes cardinals, est potior prudentia, secunda, iustitia; tertia, fortitudo; quarta, temperantia. Et 
post has, caeterae virtutes. 
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On the other hand, Aquinas also assets that “all moral virtue is necessarily prudent,”62 (Virt. 
Comm. 12 ad 23), implying the underlying unity of virtue.  Likewise, C.S. Lewis, in talking of 
courage, said, “You will notice, of course, that you cannot practise any of the other virtues very 
long without bringing this one into play.” (Lewis 1943:14). The same might be said of 
temperance, which, as we saw above, by purifying the soul contributes to that clarity of vision 
which, alone, allows the discernment upon which prudence depends. The virtues, therefore, 
might be said to be one. Gilbert Meilaender (1984:26) in discussing this issue concluded with 
“the fundamental paradox” that: 
One must do what prudence requires in order to be virtuous. But one must be 
virtuous in order to do what prudence requires. Put more simply: doing what is 
right requires being good, but we can become good only by doing what is right. 
 
Nowadays, we find this “fundamental paradox” of the unity and hierarchy of the cardinal virtues 
either incomprehensible or irresolvable. Our incomprehension comes from the “unfillable gap” 
between the concept of virtue and contemporary moral philosophy identified by Anscombe 
(1958), and our inability to resolve the paradox comes from the fact that contemporary moral 
philosophy is dominated by deontological and consequentialist understandings of ethics. 
Contemporary moral philosophy focuses on interpreting human moral acts and on ways in 
which a person’s understanding of reality may be made to conform to subjective human values, 
while virtue focuses on developing human moral character by training the intellect to conform 
to objective reality through the intellectual virtues, and training the appetites and emotions to 
respond ordinately to reality by the habitual practice of the moral virtues. Without prudence it 
is not possible to conform the soul to objective reality, but the habitual practice of moral virtue, 
supports and sustains prudence. Holmer (1976:54) gives a very clear explanation of the unity in 
diversity of the virtues: 
The complexity of the virtues becomes clear here too. To take one example, 
courage is not, after all has been seen with some clarity, only ‘one’ among several 
virtues. Rather, it is the very form itself of any and every virtue at its testing point. 
A person who was chaste or trustworthy only when there were no dangers or 
temptations involved would not miss courage very much. Add the testing context 
and it takes the habit of a courageous response even to keep one’s chastity. 
 
Holmer uses courage as his example, but the same could be said of any of the cardinal virtues; 
they are the very form of virtue in toto in that aspect of human moral life which is their particular 
province. 
 
Another way of understanding the unity of virtue may be to recall St. Augustine’s definition of 
virtue as ordo amoris - “the ordering of love” (Civ. Dei 15.22), in which every good is accorded 
                                                          
62 Omnis virtus moralis debet esse prudens. 
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just that love which is appropriate to it (Lewis 1946:15). In other words, every good is loved 
ordinately. Such an understanding of the moral life is predicated on absolute truth perceived by 
the reason through prudence, and an objective hierarchy of goods to which one’s appetites are 
rationally ordered by justice, courage and temperance, otherwise it would not be possible for a 
person to love ordinately as there would be no objective way of ordering one’s affections 
towards the appropriate goods (Steele 2014). 
 
Conclusion 
Human moral life according to Aquinas may be summarised thus: A person is a composite of 
body and soul. As explained above, the soul has three parts: the sustentative which consists of 
the powers of reproduction, nutrition and growth. The affective part is the seat of the emotions, 
imagination, memory, and intuition or instinct. Both the affective and sustentative parts of the 
soul are dependent on the bodily sense organs for perception of reality, and both aim at the 
perceived good as their final end. The rational part is the seat of intellect, reason, will and 
consciousness. The intellect and will are capable of abstraction and are, thus, not dependent on 
the bodily sense organs for perception of reality. The intellect and reason aim at truth, while the 
will and consciousness aim at the good, so an intellectual virtue, prudence, is necessary to liaise 
between those rational faculties aiming at truth and those rational, affective and sustentative 
faculties aiming at the good. 
 
Prudence, which is the clear-sighted discernment of truth by the intellect and deliberation about 
it by the reason, fulfils its rôle of liaison by a decision of the will which directs the person to carry 
out the act appropriate to the truth of reality in the right way at the right time with the right 
means in order to realise the good in that specific situation. The vices which specifically blur 
one’s perception of truth and will to the good are lust and avarice. Even though the will may 
direct the person to act in a certain way, this direction may be resisted by ill-disciplined emotions 
and imaginings, so the virtues of justice and courage are required to cultivate the appropriate 
response in the emotions and imagination, so that they are congruent with the truth of reality 
as perceived by the reason, and empowered to strive to realise the good. The vices of envy and 
sloth oppose the exercise of justice and courage and, so, hinder the realisation of the good by 
the affective faculties.  
 
Finally, the human person, being a unity of body and soul, requires a healthy and disciplined 
body and mind to enable the good to be realised rather than hindered by weakened or unruly 
sustentative faculties. This part is empowered and disciplined by the virtue of temperance, but 
is harmed and distracted by the vices of pride, which is more concerned with itself than with the 
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good, wrath, which is uncontrolled aggression leading to ill-disciplined action, and gluttony, 
which simply is to harm the body through lack of self-restraint. 
 
It might be helpful at this point to bring together the different but connected ways in which we 
have described virtue thus far: Firstly, as potentia, virtue is the latent power to attain the highest 
fulfilment of truly human being within a person. Second, as actus, virtue is that potential realised 
in the distinctive excellence of human being. Third, as habitus, virtue is habitually to live 
according to reason in order to perceive the truth and realise the good. Fourth, as bonum, virtue 
is the end which the person desires, but it is also the rational means to the end. Fifth, as ordo, 
virtue is the ordinate love of things, by according to each thing just that love appropriate to it.  
Sixth, as mediocritas, virtue is the mean between vices of deficiency and excess and, because 
humans are rational creatures, the mean is doing the right thing at the right time in the right 
way for the right reasons to achieve the right end. What this means practically has been very 
well summed up by Holmer (1976:52-53): 
The virtues do not predict behaviour, nor do they formalise and standardise human 
beings. On the contrary, they lead to a life in which genuine individuality is 
encouraged. For when courageousness and fortitude become a habit – and all 
virtues have to be customary rather than single occurrences – the individual 
becomes strengthened and qualified to do all sorts of things that were otherwise 
inconceivable. An entire range of behaviour becomes open to such a person, and 
so, too, with the other virtues. They are enabling, disposing, and authorising. Such 
an ethically sensitized person no longer simply fulfils a rule or law, except as a part 
of moral pedagogy or where circumstances require it. The moral life becomes the 
arena where adventure, individuality, and tasks are continually brought together. 
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THE CONTEMPORARY WESTERN WORLDVIEW 
 
Master: And what would you [be educated for]? Pupils: We would be wise. M: With what 
manner of wisdom? Will you be manifold in deceit or a thousand-form in lies; cunning in speech, 
clever, crafty, well-speaking and evil-thinking; given over to sweet words, nurturing deceit within, 
like a tombstone with a painted memorial, but full of stench inside? P: We would not be wise in 
this manner, for he is not wise who deceives himself with dissimulation. M: But how would you 
[be wise]? P: We would be straightforward without hypocrisy, and wise, so that we may turn 
away from evil and do good.63 
Æ lfric (c. AD 980) Colloquy ll. 252-263. 
 
Introduction 
In the first chapter I discussed the comprehensive articulation of traditional Western moral 
philosophy by Thomas Aquinas. For over a century, however, there has been a widely held belief 
that contemporary Western society has lost touch with this moral tradition and no longer has a 
coherent moral vision. Some commentators have expressed the belief that the West is suffering 
from a decline in moral understanding and behaviour, but not all agree on the precise causes of 
the West’s moral decline, and some would deny that it is experiencing any moral decline at all. 
There is, nonetheless, a consensus that the concepts underlying contemporary Western morality 
are very different from the foundations of traditional Western morality.  
 
The nature of the foundations which underpin the West’s current moral understanding and 
conduct is of some importance for the British Army because it aspires to be an ethical military 
force conducting military operations according to internationally recognised moral and legal 
standards, yet it recruits its officers and soldiers from Western societies, in which nowadays a 
multiplicity of moral opinions are expressed, and the members of which are no longer raised in 
the ancient tradition of Western moral education. In this chapter, therefore, I shall briefly 
explore some of the assumptions which underlie the contemporary Western moral worldviews 
and discuss how they differ from the traditional articulation of moral philosophy described in 
the previous chapter. I shall argue that we in the West are, indeed, adrift from our own 
traditional moral foundations, and that the current popular moral worldviews of the West are 
permeated by the sceptical philosophical theories which are traditionally known as ‘sophistry’. 
 
 
                                                          
63 Magister: ⁊ hƿæt ƿille ʓe? Discipuli: Ƿyllað ƿesan ƿise. M: On hƿilcon ƿisdome? Ƿille ʓe beon prættiʓe 
oððe þusenthiƿe on leasunʓum, lytiʓe on spræcum, onʓlæƿlice, hinderʓepe, ƿel sprecende ⁊ yfele þencende, 
spæsum pordum underðeodde, facn piðinnan tyddriende, sƿa sƿa berʓyls metton oferʓeƿeorke, ƿiðinnan 
full stence? D: Ƿe nellað sƿa ƿesan ƿise, forðam he nys ƿis, þe mid dydrunʓe hyne sylfne besƿicð. M: Ac 
hu ƿille ʓe? D: Ƿe ƿyllaþ beon byleƿite butan licetunʓe, ⁊ ƿise þæt ƿe buʓon fram yfele ⁊ don ʓoda. 
(adp. Garmonsway 1947:42-43) 
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Sophistry 
In Athens in the late 5th Century BC, an altercation occurred between Socrates (469-399 BC) and 
Antiphon (c. 480-411 BC), a Sophist, one of the self-appointed teachers who, claiming to teach 
wisdom (σοϕία) and virtue (ἀρετή), charged their pupils fees. Socrates consistently opposed the 
Sophists, accusing them of teaching instead the art of dissimulation (Guthrie 1978). Antiphon, 
while acknowledging that Socrates was just, denied that he was truly wise because he did not 
charge fees for his teaching and, therefore, what he taught must be worthless. Antiphon, here, 
commits the fallacy of equivocation because a thing may have worth in ways other than 
monetary. It is noteworthy that in this altercation Socrates did not follow his usual practice of 
exposing Antiphon’s fallacy by insisting on more precise definition of the terms being debated, 
instead he simply rebuked Antiphon by contrasting his own practice with that of the Sophists: 
Antiphon, amongst us it is considered that the prime of bodily beauty and wisdom 
can alike be disposed of either worthily or shamefully. For if someone in his prime 
sells his body for money to anyone who wishes for it, we call him a prostitute. But 
if someone has made for himself a friend of one whom he knows to be a lover of 
the admirable and good, he is considered prudent. And likewise those selling 
wisdom for money to anyone who wishes for it, we call ‘sophists’ - prostitutes of 
wisdom. But whoever has made a friend of someone whom he knows to be 
naturally talented, teaching him all the good he knows, is considered to act like an 
admirable and good citizen. As for me, therefore, Antiphon, just as another man 
takes pleasure in a good horse or a hound or a bird, I take even greater pleasure in 
good friends, and if I know anything good, I teach it to them, and I introduce them 
to others from whom I believe they will derive some benefit in cultivating virtue. 
And the treasures of the wise men of old, which they have bequeathed in the books 
they have written, I open these and go through them together with my friends, and 
if we read anything good, we select it for ourselves. And we consider it a great gain 
if we, thus, become beneficial to one another.64 
(Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.6.13-14) 
This short altercation highlights a perennial and fundamental conflict in human thought 
between those who, like Socrates, believe that humans can have objective knowledge of reality 
and those who, like the Sophists, are sceptical about it. A number of philosophical debates 
regarding language, truth and goodness, human nature, moral agency, and human community 
arise from this fundamental dispute. Everyone, whether or not they are aware of it, takes one 
side or the other in this perennial conflict, which directly affects every aspect of their lives. 
                                                          
64  ὦ Ἀντιϕῶν, παρ᾽ ἡμῖν νομίζεται τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοϕίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν 
διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. τήν τε γὰρ ὥραν ἐὰν μέν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῇ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρνον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν, 
ἐὰν δέ τις, ὃν ἂν γνῷ καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὄντα, τοῦτον ϕίλον ἑαυτῷ ποιῆται, σώϕρονα νομίζομεν: 
καὶ τὴν σοϕίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοϕιστὰς ὥσπερ πόρνους 
ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ὅστις δὲ ὃν ἂν γνῷ εὐϕυᾶ ὄντα διδάσκων ὅ τι ἂν ἔχῃ ἀγαθὸν ϕίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, 
ἃ τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν. ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Ἀντιϕῶν, ὥσπερ ἄλλος τις ἢ 
ἵππῳ ἀγαθῷ ἢ κυνὶ ἢ ὄρνιθι ἥδεται, οὕτω καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἥδομαι ϕίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἐάν τι ἔχω ἀγαθόν, 
διδάσκω, καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι παρ᾽ ὧν ἂν ἡγῶμαι ὠϕελήσεσθαί τι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀρετήν: καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς 
τῶν πάλαι σοϕῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίττων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς ϕίλοις 
διέρχομαι, καὶ ἄν τι ὁρῶμεν ἀγαθὸν ἐκλεγόμεθα: καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος, ἐὰν ἀλλήλοις ϕίλοι γιγνώμεθα. 
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‘Sophist’ had already become a term of opprobrium in Antiquity, even though the Sophists 
themselves did not constitute a single school of thought and some, even, were admired by 
Socrates and Plato (Guthrie 1971; Kenny 2004). Nonetheless, as Guthrie (1950:66-67) notes,  
[T]he Sophists shared… a common scepticism, a mistrust of the possibility of 
absolute knowledge…… Knowledge depends on two things: the possession of 
faculties capable of bringing us into touch with reality, and the existence of a stable 
reality to be known. 
 
Sophistic scepticism, therefore, denies both the idea of reality itself and the idea that, even if 
anything is real, humans are capable of objectively knowing or communicating any truth about 
it. This scepticism about objective truth inevitably leads to subjectivism, relativism and, at its 
logical extreme, nihilism. Protagoras (c. 490-420 BC) serves as the exemplar of relativism and 
subjectivism with his statements: “There are two opposing arguments on every matter”; “All 
opinions are true;” and “Man is the measure of all things.”65 Gorgias (c. 485-380 BC) serves as 
the exemplar of nihilism with his threefold affirmation in his treatise De Natura: (1) “Nothing 
exists”; (2) “even if something exists, it is incomprehensible to Man”; and (3) “even if it is 
comprehensible, it is inexpressible and inexplicable to one’s fellows.”66 
 
Sophistic Corruption of Language 
Plato, like Socrates, was implacably opposed to the Sophists because he recognised in sophistry 
a fundamental threat to human intellectual and social life, which was that the Sophists corrupted 
language and, in so doing, corrupted the very roots of human existence because verbal 
communication is the most basic form of inter-personal interaction, which underlies and 
sustains all other human interaction (Pieper 1992:7-9). 
Word and language, in essence, do not constitute a specific or specialised area; they 
are not a particular discipline or field. No, word and language form the medium that 
sustains the common existence of the human spirit as such… And so, if the word 
becomes corrupted, human existence itself will not remain unaffected and 
untainted. 
(Pieper 1992:15) 
Pieper argues that there is sophistic corruption of language in every era, and that whenever 
someone adopts a sceptical view of reality they are inevitably forced to adopt a sophistic abuse 
of language as a consequence. The sophistic corruption of language is disastrous to human life 
as a whole because language serves two inextricably linked purposes. Firstly, to describe what 
is real, i.e., to affirm what is true: “To be true means, indeed, to be determined in speech and 
thought by what is real,” (Pieper 1992:17), and second, to communicate this truth with others. 
                                                          
65 (1) δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις; (2) πάντα εἶναι ἀληθῆ; and (3) 
πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, (all cited in Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 9.51). 
66  (1) οὐδὲν ἔστιν; (2) εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπῳ; and (3) εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἀλλὰ τοί γε 
ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῳ πέλας (all cited in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.65). 
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According to Pieper (1992) sophistic corruption of language undermines these two purposes in 
three ways: by distorting or denying truth and reality; by corrupting the meaning of words so 
that their original connotation becomes ambiguous or even meaningless; and by corrupting 
inter-personal communication through manipulating others and thereby denying them 
participation in reality and truth. Dag Hammarskjöld (1964:101) recognised this when he wrote, 
Respect for the word is the first commandment in the discipline by which a man 
can be educated to maturity – intellectual, emotional and moral. Respect for the 
word – to employ it with scrupulous care and an incorruptible heart-felt love of 
truth – is essential if there is to be any growth in a society or in the human race. To 
misuse the word is to show contempt for man. It undermines the bridges and 
poisons the wells. It causes Man to regress down the long path of his evolution. 
 
 
Pieper (1992), interpreting Plato, argued that sophistry corrupts inter-personal communication 
in two ways: Firstly, through ‘flattery’ (κολακεία), which is not merely sycophancy but a 
calculated manipulation and domination of other persons, treating them no longer as human 
beings, but as objects. Based on sophistic scepticism about truth, flattery is not an attempt at 
communication with other persons, rather it is a deliberate attempt to control their perception 
of truth and, therefore, their participation in reality. MacIntyre (1985:23) makes the same point 
in his claim that emotivism67 - which I shall argue below is the dominant expression of sophistry 
in the contemporary West - undermines genuine human community by obliterating the 
“distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations.” He goes on to say, 
If emotivism is true, this distinction is illusory. For evaluative utterance can in the 
end have no point or use but the expression of my own feelings or attitudes and 
the transformation of the feelings and attitudes of others. I cannot genuinely 
appeal to impersonal criteria, for there are no impersonal criteria. I may think that 
I so appeal and others may think that I so appeal, but these thoughts will always be 
mistakes. The sole reality of distinctly moral discourse is the attempt of one will to 
align the attitudes, feelings, preference and choice of another with its own. Others 
are always means never ends. 
(MacIntyre 1985:24) 
 
Sophistic ‘flattery’ (κολακεία) entails the use of ‘persuasion’ (πειθώ), by which Plato meant the 
attempt to change the mind of other persons, not through rational argument, but through 
obfuscating their understanding of truth by dissimulation, what nowadays we call ‘spin’. Plato, 
in his depiction of the aggressive ‘Real Politik’ espoused by Thrasymachus (Respublica 343a-345b), 
portrays injustice (ἀδικία) as characterised by a blend of persuasion (πειθώ) and force (βία). 
Pieper argues that in sophistic ‘flattery’ and ‘persuasion’ there is always an implicit threat to 
                                                          
67 Emotivism is the theory that moral judgements and acts are the expression of a person’s feelings or 
attitudes, not of rational judgements; hence acts and persons have no objectively true moral properties 
(Grenz & Smith 2003:32). 
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those who dissent; yet the threat is disguised, so that people are subtly intimidated into 
acquiescing in their own coercion and simultaneously into believing that this acquiescence is 
entirely reasonable because they are persuaded that what they are coerced into doing is the 
very thing they want to do, in any case (Pieper 1992:22-31). The widespread acceptance by the 
British populace of political ‘spin’ and other forms of psycho-political manipulation, such as so-
called ‘libertarian paternalism’ and ‘behavioural economics’, by the organs of government 
(Thaler & Sunstein 2008; Halpern 2015), or the ongoing emotivist public campaigns surrounding 
the UK’s 2016 referendum on EU membership, provide anecdotal evidence that sophistic 
‘persuasion’ is unquestioningly fully integrated into contemporary British social and political life. 
 
The second way in which inter-personal communication is corrupted by sophistry is less obvious 
and, thus, more insidious: it is the seemingly negative point that to truly perceive reality and, 
hence, to truly hear the words of others and communicate with them, one must be receptive 
and silent. Pieper (1952:52) convincingly argues that: 
silence… is the prerequisite of the apprehension of reality: only the silent hear and 
those who do not remain silent do not hear…… [It] is a receptive attitude of mind, 
a contemplative attitude, and it is not only the occasion but also the capacity for 
steeping oneself in the whole of creation. 
 
In the contemporary West the obliteration of silence and, thus, of communication is seen in the 
encroachment of all-pervasive visual and aural stimuli, so that no area of human life, whether 
public or private, is free from them. Prior to the invention of the mass media, the ubiquitous 
projection and reach of such incessant visual and aural stimulation was inconceivable, but in the 
last hundred-odd years, following the invention of mass media, this intrusive stimulation has 
been rapidly extending its reach around the world. Nowadays, with the creation of the internet, 
Worldwide Web, and hand-held personal computers which are permanently connected to the 
Web, this inescapable visual and aural stimulation has become truly ubiquitous and global (cf. 
Kagge 2017). 
 
Such incessant, all-pervading over-stimulation destroys silence and prevents communication in 
three ways: By invading every quiet space in both the home and the public square; by jading the 
intellectual faculties necessary for attentive contemplation while stimulating the sustentative 
and affective appetites which oppose it; and by implicitly denying that silence and stillness and 
solitude are not abnormal, but are necessary conditions for true inter-personal communication 
and, hence, for true human flourishing. Patrick Leigh Fermor, a self-described sceptic, related 
with obvious perplexity the effects he experienced in himself of taking silent retreats in Catholic 
monasteries in France: 
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I was profoundly affected by the places I have described. I am not sure what these 
feelings amount to…… The kindness of the monks has something to do with this. 
But more important was the discovery of a capacity for solitude and… for the 
recollectedness and clarity of spirit that accompany the silent monastic life. For, in 
the seclusion of a cell – an existence whose quietness is only varied by the silent 
meals, the solemnity of ritual and long solitary walks in the woods – the troubled 
waters of the mind grow still and clear, and much that is hidden away and all that 
clouds it floats to the surface and can be skimmed away; and after a time one 
reaches a state of peace that is unthought of in the ordinary world. 
(Leigh Fermor 1988:7-8). 
Not only do mass- and digital media invade the quiet space necessary for silence and 
contemplation, but they also facilitate the sophistic manipulation of whole communities by 
those who control the media; something we shall consider in more detail below. Arguably, the 
sophistic corruption of inter-personal communication is now so widespread in the contemporary 
West that it is no longer perceived as pathological and destructive. 
 
Intimately connected with our inability to perceive that contemporary inter-personal 
communication has been undermined, is the idea that: 
the language of morality is in… [a] state of grave disorder… What we possess… are 
the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from 
which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we 
continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have – very largely, if not 
entirely – lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality. 
(MacIntyre 1985:2) 
One of the causes of this disorder has been the progressive confusion and disintegration of 
moral vocabulary in the West over the last five hundred years. A number of scholars have traced 
the history of this disintegration and of the consequent changes it has effected in Western moral 
philosophy and moral education (Anscombe 1958, Bossy 1985, MacIntyre 1985, Painter 1999). 
At this point I shall not repeat their arguments, but shall simply stress the point made by 
MacIntyre (1985:6f.), that the final result of this disintegration of moral vocabulary and 
confusion of moral thought is that contemporary moral philosophy has become a jumble of 
different mutually contradictory and sometimes mutually incomprehensible theories, with the 
result that contemporary moral debate cannot ever reach a resolution. Some examples may 
help to illustrate the disorder of Western moral vocabulary and the way in which this sophistic 
corruption of language obstructs rational moral thought and debate. 
 
In 1956 Peter Geach published a paper, ‘Good and Evil’, in which he discussed the impasse in 
the use of terms expressing moral value such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’ and the failure 
of different Twentieth Century British schools of moral philosophy to draw a clear distinction 
between the attributive and predicative use of words expressing moral value. Hence, while an 
adjective can be used attributively (“the new £5 note”) or predicatively (“the £5 note is new”), 
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it is not logically or semantically valid to use words expressing moral value in a similar way, as 
one can use terms of moral value only in an attributive way, e.g. “this forged £5 note”, but not 
predicatively, because “this £5 note is forged” is logically or semantically invalid as the banknote 
is not, in fact, a real £5 note and what is actually meant is “this is a forgery of a £5 note”. Likewise, 
Geach argues that in moral discussion one can legitimately say “the good man” but not “the man 
is good”, as the predicative sense always implies some unspecified qualifying term, such as “the 
man is good at running”. To say “the good man” means he is morally good simpliciter, but to say 
“the man is good” means he is functionally good in some way and a functionally good man may 
be morally bad, as when a man is good at burglary (Geach 1956). 
 
This understanding of good as an attribute and not a predicate implies, therefore, that there is 
an objective good, which, in turn, requires a re-assessment of what constitutes good human 
action. Hence, Geach rejected Sir David Ross’s 
distinction between the Right and the Good. In Aquinas there is no such distinction. 
He finds it sufficient to talk of good and bad human acts. When Ross would say that 
there is a morally good action but not a right act, Aquinas would say that a good 
human intention had issued in what was, in fact, a bad action; and when Ross would 
say that there was a right act but not a morally good action, Aquinas would say that 
there was a bad human act performed in circumstances in which a similar act with 
a different intention would have been a good one (e.g. giving money to a beggar 
for the praise of men rather than for the relief of his misery). 
 Since the English word ‘right’ has idiomatic predilection for the definite article – 
we speak of a good chess move but of the right move – people who think that doing 
right is something other than doing good will regard virtuous behaviour as 
consisting, not just in doing good and eschewing evil, but in doing, on every 
occasion, the right act for the occasion. This speciously strict doctrine leads in fact 
to quite laxist consequences. A man who just keeps on doing good and eschewing 
evil, if he knows that adultery is an evil act, will decide that (as Aristotle says) there 
can be no deliberating when or how or with whom to commit adultery [E.N. 1107a 
16]. But a man who believes in discerning, on each occasion, the right act for the 
occasion, may well decide that on this occasion, all things considered, adultery is 
the right action. 
(Geach 1956:41) 
In this paper Geach succeeded in demonstrating that confusion in the use of moral vocabulary 
may result in the sophistic justification of immoral acts, which is precisely the point reiterated 
two years later by his wife, Elizabeth Anscombe  (1958:19). 
 
Implicit in the attributive use of terms of moral value, such as ‘good’, is, moreover, “at least one 
central functional concept, the concept of man understood as having an essential nature and an 
essential purpose or function,” (MacIntyre 1985:58). The idea that human life has an ‘end’ or 
‘purpose’ is intimately connected with the imaginative concept of ‘the meaning of life’. Where 
there is no overarching purpose to life, it ceases to have any meaning and persons, thus, must 
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try to find their own meaning, or to construct it, as the existentialists claimed. MacIntyre (1985) 
argued that it is the loss of the traditional understanding of human nature and of persons having 
an ultimate end to which moral virtue directs them, as I described in the first chapter, which has 
resulted in the current disorder in our moral discourse and in the rise of the ‘emotivist self’, to 
whom “Moral judgements lose any clear status and the sentences which express them… lose 
any undebatable meaning,” (MacIntyre 1985:60). 
 
The disorder in the vocabulary of moral philosophy is also seen in the fact that since the late 
Middle Ages the meaning of several moral terms has changed, often almost imperceptibly, so 
that a word comes to have a connotation opposite to its original usage or the connotation 
becomes more and more restricted or generalised till it ceases to have useful meaning at all 
(Barfield 1954; Lewis 1960a; 2000a; Pieper 2011:9f.). In discussing the semantic range of the 
word ‘nature’, C.S. Lewis (1960a:61-2) gives an informative illustration of such a change when 
he draws a distinction between the meaning of Natural Law for Aquinas and its meaning for 
Enlightenment thinkers like Hobbes: 
On the one hand, if nature is thought of mainly as the real (opposed to convention 
and legal fiction) and the laws of nature as those which enjoin what is really good 
and forbid what is really bad (as opposed to the pseudo-duties which bad 
governments praise and reward or the real virtues which they forbid and punish), 
then of course ‘the law of nature’ is conceived as an absolute moral standard 
against which the laws of all nations must be judged and to which they ought to 
conform…… This is the conception of Natural Law that underlies the work of 
Thomas Aquinas, Hooker and Grotius. 
On the other hand nature may mean nature (d.s.)68, and even with a special 
emphasis on the non-human parts of it… or, within man, on those motives and 
modes of behaviour which are least specifically human. The ‘laws of Nature’ on this 
view are inferred from the way in which non-human agents always behave, and 
human agents behave until they are trained not to. Thus what Aquinas or Hooker 
would call ‘the law of Nature’ now becomes in its turn the convention; it is 
something artificially imposed, in opposition to the true law of nature, the way we 
all spontaneously behave if we dare (or don’t interfere with ourselves), the way all 
the other creatures behave, the way that comes ‘naturally’ to us. The prime law of 
nature, thus conceived, is self-preservation and self-aggrandisement, pursued by 
whatever trickeries or cruelties may prove to be advisable. This is Hobbes’s Natural 
Law. 
 
It is noteworthy that we find in Lewis’s discussion independent echoes of the arguments Pieper 
had been making about virtue, Natural Law, and acquiescence in sophistic pseudo-reality. 
                                                          
68 By “nature (d.s.)” Lewis means ‘Nature’ in its semantically dangerous sense; a connotation introduced 
by the Sophists, of “taking all the things they knew or believed in – gods, men, animals, plants, minerals, 
what you will – and impounding them under a single name; in fact, of regarding Everything as a thing, 
turning this amorphous and heterogeneous collection into an object or pseudo-object.” (Lewis 1960a:35). 
This sense is semantically dangerous because it is the one a modern person is most likely to impose on 
the word ‘nature’, to the exclusion of other connotations in its semantic range (Lewis 1960a:37). 
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Another example of the disorder of the vocabulary of Western moral philosophy is that, by the 
late 19th Century the understanding and connotation of the word ‘virtue’ had so diminished, 
even among Catholic Neo-Thomist theologians (Pieper 2011:4), that it became replaced in moral 
discussion, almost without notice, by the word ‘values’. ‘Values’ was first used as a moral term 
in the 1880s by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), who wished to do away with what he saw as 
the “slave morality”69 of Judaeo-Christian culture, with its emphasis on objective, universally 
applicable virtues which were binding on all – masters and slaves alike, and to introduce the 
“revaluation of all values”,70 as he put it (Himmelfarb 1994:10). Nietzsche’s intent, however, was 
not to replace Judaeo-Christian morality with another form of morals, but “to call into question 
the value of morality itself.” (Warburton 2001:194). He was successful in this project to 
undermine the already weakened Western moral tradition by transforming the meaning of the 
words used in moral philosophy; i.e. by attacking the very basis of any possible moral debate. 
The historian, Gertrude Himmelfarb, has described the effect of Nietzsche’s transformation of 
our moral vocabulary and, hence, of our moral debate: 
‘Values’ brought with it the assumptions that all moral ideas are subjective and 
relative, that they are mere customs and conventions, that they have a purely 
instrumental, utilitarian purpose, and that they are peculiar to specific individuals 
and societies. (And, in the current intellectual climate, to specific classes, races, and 
sexes.) So long as morality was couched in the language of ‘virtue’, it had a firm, 
resolute character…… Values, as we now understand that word, do not have to be 
virtues; they can be beliefs, opinions, attitudes, feelings, habits, conventions, 
preferences, prejudices, even idiosyncrasies – whatever any individual, group, or 
society happens to value, at any time, for whatever reason. One cannot say of 
virtues, as one can of values, that anyone’s virtues are as good as anyone else’s, or 
that everyone has a right to his own virtues. 
(Himmelfarb 1994:11-12) 
 
MacIntyre (1985:6f.) argues that contemporary moral discussion is interminable and disordered. 
One reason for this disorder is the very language of ‘values’ itself. Values are, as the name makes 
clear, based on a personal evaluation of morality, which leads to the disintegration of a 
community’s moral consensus, because one’s values are based on one’s personal, subjective 
evaluations, which cannot be applied to anyone else, so values can never be universal or 
objective. Furthermore, anything to which a value has been subjectively ascribed can equally 
well be subjectively devalued. In other words, the language of values implicitly denies the idea 
that persons can know objective truth about reality and so opens the way for persons like the 
Sophists to claim that right is wrong and good is bad and vice versa as all value judgements are 
merely subjective. 
                                                          
69 Sklavenmoral 
70 Die Umwertung aller Werte 
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Sophistic Scepticism about Truth and Reality 
Describing Aquinas’s understanding of truth as a correct relation between a real entity and the 
intellect of rational beings (Aquinas, Ver. 1), Pieper (1989:92-93) noted, 
The knowing mind’s ‘being-in-relation’ with what is real constitutes, in fact, the 
conceptual content of ‘truth’. Truth is conformitas, ‘being-one-form’, and 
adaequatio, ‘being-the-same’ – both terms taken in their literal meaning – between 
reality and knowing… Truth is nothing else but the relation of identity between the 
mind and reality. 
 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), however, in the ‘Preface to the Second Edition’ of Critique of Pure 
Reason, reversed the traditional understanding of truth as the conformity of human knowledge 
to reality by asserting that truth is the conformity of real objects to human knowledge. He 
claimed that we cannot truly know objects as they actually are in themselves, but that we can 
only know a conception of objects as shaped by the innate a priori principles of reason. Kant 
made this reversal in order to try to protect morality against the prevalent idealist philosophy 
of his day and to support it rationally, by setting boundaries to its claims to absolute truth; claims 
which could not be empirically proven. One effect of Kant’s reversal of the understanding of 
truth, however, was to create a gap between the world of real objects and human knowledge of 
these objects. This opened the way for subjectivism, as human knowledge became understood 
to be based upon a subjective judgement. Kant himself acknowledged this in Critique of 
Judgement §1, when stating that the basis of judgements of beauty “cannot be other than 
subjective” (Maurer 1983:25). Later philosophers extended this subjectivity from judgements of 
beauty to judgements of truth, ultimately leading to contemporary emotivism: 
Until modern times no thinker of the first rank ever doubted that our judgements 
of value were rational judgements or that what they discovered was objective. It 
was taken for granted that in temptation passion was opposed, not to some 
sentiment, but to reason… The modern view is very different. It does not believe 
that value judgements are really judgements at all. They are sentiments, or 
complexes, or attitudes, produced in a community by the pressure of its 
environment and its traditions, and differing from one community to another. To 
say that a thing is good is merely to express our feeling about it; and our feeling 
about it is the feeling we have been socially conditioned to have. 
(Lewis 1967:73) 
 
The effect of such subjectivism on Western moral philosophy becomes clearer in the writings of 
20th-Century existentialist thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre, who argued: 
there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which 
exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man… What do 
we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all 
exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards. 
If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he 
is nothing. He will not be anything till later, and then he will be what he makes of 
himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a 
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conception of it. Man simply is……. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of 
himself. That is the first principle of existentialism. 
(Sartre 1948:28) 
He, thus, explicitly rejects Aquinas’s conception of truth-as-being originating in the mind of God 
and instead argues that if no conception of human nature exists in the mind of God (because 
there is no God), there can be no true conception of human nature at all. This means that ‘true’ 
human nature becomes the subjective construction of the individual, who makes of himself 
whatsoever he wills. Existential subjectivism means not simply that a person chooses for himself 
what kind of human being he will be, but that he can also choose what kind of morality he will 
follow. So Sartre (1948:31) asserts, “If I regard a certain course of action as good, it is only I who 
choose to say that it is good and not bad.” 
 
Sartre, however, goes on to make two further statements, which appear to me at least to limit 
his idea of subjective individual moral autonomy, if not to reveal contradictions inherent in it. 
Firstly, he advocates some sort of moral connection between all human beings in terms the 
meaning of which, I confess, I find ambiguous: 
[W]hen we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is 
responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men… 
Subjectivism means, on the one hand, the freedom of the individual subject and, 
on the other, that man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity. It is the latter which 
is the deeper meaning of existentialism. When we say that man chooses himself, 
we do mean that every one of us must choose himself; but by that we also mean 
that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men. For in effect, of all the actions 
a man may take in order to create himself as he wills to be, there is not one which 
is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man such as he believes he ought 
to be. To choose between this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of that 
which is chosen; for we are unable ever to choose the worse. What we choose is 
always the better; and nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all. If, 
moreover, existence precedes essence and we will to exist at the same time as we 
fashion our image, that image is valid for all and for the entire epoch in which we 
find ourselves. 
(Sartre 1948:29) 
It is not clear to me what Sartre means by saying that each individual, while being free to choose 
what to create of himself, is simultaneously responsible for and, in fact, chooses for all other 
persons, and that his self-created image is valid for all persons and for the whole era in which 
he lives. 
 
Second, Sartre advocates some sort of moral obligation similar to Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ 
by stating that, even though moral choice is entirely subjective, the individual ought only to will 
to act in such a way that all of humanity may regulate itself by such an act (Sartre 1948:32). It is 
not clear whence the human individual derives the overarching moral obligation to choose to 
act in this way, especially as Sartre’s position denies not only human nature but also the Natural 
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Law upon which any conception of moral obligation must rest, as Anscombe (1958) has argued. 
In discussing Kant and Sartre I am not attempting a refutation of their respective views, nor am 
I trying to offer a defence of the idea of objective truth. I merely wish to demonstrate that 
scepticism about knowledge of truth and reality and consequent subjectivism underpin much of 
Modern philosophy. As MacIntyre (1985:22) has argued, this scepticism and subjectivism, 
expressed as emotivism, are embodied in the contemporary Western popular worldview, so that 
we now live in what has been called the ‘post-truth’ era. 
 
Pieper (1992) argued that by their corruption of language the Sophists deny truth in two ways: 
Firstly, by their scepticism, which, in denying that humans can know objective reality, denies the 
possibility of truth, as we have already noted. Consequent on such scepticism are the 
subjectivism of a Protagoras and the nihilism of a Gorgias. Humans, however, cannot practicably 
live in a permanent state of scepticism and subjective uncertainty about reality, so the second 
way in which sophists deny the truth is by the creation of pseudo-realities, a fantasy which is 
false but which meets the innate human need for a reality which gives context and meaning to 
their lives. Indeed, both Plato (Sophista 254a) and Aristotle (Metaphysica 1026b; 1064b) state 
that what the Sophists actually deal with is the ‘non-existent’ or ‘the unreal’ (τὸ μὴ ὂν). Sophistic 
obscuration of truth, therefore, brings about corruption of the imagination, which, as noted in 
the previous chapter, is the faculty of meaning for persons, both as individuals and parts of a 
community. This has profound implications for moral education, as we shall see. Pieper 
(1992:34-35), in his discussion of the sophistic abuse of language and power, noted, 
That the existential realm of man could be taken over by pseudo-realities whose 
fictitious nature threatens to become indiscernible is truly a depressing thought. 
And yet this Platonic nightmare, I hold, possesses an alarming contemporary 
relevance. For the general public is being reduced to a state where people not only 
are unable to find out about the truth but also become unable even to search for 
the truth because they are satisfied with deception and trickery that have 
determined their convictions, satisfied with a fictitious reality created by design 
through the abuse of language. This, says Plato, is the worst thing the sophists are 
capable of wreaking upon mankind by their corruption of the word. 
(Pieper 1992:34-35).  
 
In the twenty-five years since the introduction of the internet and Web a number of academics 
have studied how the internet has rapidly changed several areas of human life, both private and 
social. Mark Slouka expressed concerns about the creation of digital pseudo-realities, which 
seamlessly merge with ‘real life’ so that they become indistinguishable from reality, which echo 
Pieper’s concerns penned twenty-five years before. He identified three fundamental areas of 
human life which he believed are assaulted by the internet and ‘virtual reality’ (VR) technology: 
personal identity; one’s sense of place; and human community. He argued that the assault on 
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these three is, ultimately, an assault on reality itself (Slouka 1995). Sherry Turkle (1995:9-10) 
agreed that the internet is modifying our whole understanding of human nature and what it 
means to be human. She said the internet is: 
changing the way we think, the nature of our sexuality, the form of our 
communities, our very identities…… a nascent culture of simulation is affecting our 
ideas about mind, body, self, and machine…… eroding boundaries between the real 
and the virtual, the animate and the inanimate, the unitary and the multiple self, 
which is occurring both in advanced scientific fields of research and in the patterns 
of everyday life. 
 
What is noteworthy is that both Turkle and Slouka were writing a mere five years after the 
creation of the Web. The points they made about ‘virtual reality’ merging into ‘real life’ and the 
way in which regular use of digital technologies changes the way humans relate to reality, are 
even more pertinent nowadays with, for example, the development of so-called ‘augmented 
reality’, as witnessed in 2016 by the craze around the globe that followed the digitally-generated 
‘spawning’ of Pokémon characters which people could ‘see’ in real locations by means of their 
smart-phones. Another example is the manufacture in 2016 of a digital computerised headset 
“that transports you into a 3D, 360-degree, virtual world – a rich, stereoscopic and responsive 
environment that tricks your visual cortex into believing what it sees.” (O’Grady and Law 
2016a:13). It is predicted that, in addition to those sectors - pornographic, entertainment, and 
gaming - which already exploit VR technology to make money, there will be other users of VR 
technology who will utilise it beneficially: psychologists to treat mental illnesses and pressure 
groups to generate support by changing persons’ perceptions about the world: 
Charities have made VR fundraising documentaries that make viewers feel they’re 
witnessing the action in real life. One, for example, enabled potential donors to 
walk around Nepal’s capital, Kathmandu, just after it had suffered the recent 
earthquake; another gave an immersive experience of life inside a Syrian refugee 
camp. 
(O’Grady & Law 2016a:13) 
 
This last use of VR technology raises a question about whether the perceived need to provide 
potential donors with a vicarious, immersive, ‘virtual’ experience of a disastrous situation as a 
means of persuading them to give monetary support, is not, itself, symptomatic of an atrophy 
of imagination and empathy in Western persons who have been de-sensitized, in part, by 
recurrent exposure to mass media and digital technology. In the past, people needed only to be 
told of a disaster and their imagination visualised what this must mean for the persons caught 
up in the situation, i.e. they felt ordinate empathy for those who were suffering and, thus, 
responded generously. Furthermore, a vicarious ‘virtual’ experience of a disaster cannot ever be 
truly immersive or really replicate the actual experience of suffering; it cannot artificially 
simulate the real feelings of helplessness, fear, confusion, anger and sorrow, or even thirst and 
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hunger, which are the actual experience of those caught up in a disaster. Arguably, one does not 
need ‘virtual immersion’ in suffering, one simply needs an untarnished vis phantastica and 
passiones disciplined by the virtues to be able to truly empathise and respond congruently and 
appropriately to the reality of such a situation. 
 
The final point to make regarding the all-pervasive presence of pseudo-realities, is to recall the 
connection made by Aquinas between purity of heart, clarity of vision, and the virtue of 
prudence. Where purity of heart is corrupted by what the medieval theologians called 
‘concupiscence of the eyes’ there can be no loving contemplation of truth and goodness. Rather 
there is the creation of an empty pseudo-reality which initially draws one away from the fullness 
of reality and ends up by denying one access to reality altogether. Psychologist, Philip Zimbardo, 
has recently studied the impact of online pornography on young men and one phrase that 
repeatedly occurs in the answers to the surveys he carried out is “unrealistic expectations” 
regarding, for example, the nature and duration of sexual intercourse and how the average 
human body, whether male or female, should look (Zimbardo & Coulombe 2015:99f.). The 
connection between concupiscence of the eyes and lust is fairly clear; what seems to be less 
clear to contemporary Western policy-makers is why the medieval theologians used the Latin 
word luxuria to signify lust, rather than any more specifically sexual word. Concupiscence of the 
eyes, the primary vehicle of stimulating sexual lust, is fundamentally about stimulating excessive 
desire in both the sustentative and affective appetites in general, and surrendering one’s will to 
luxuria entails surrendering to other desires, in addition to sexual lust, till one becomes enslaved 
to these appetites. We shall explore the relevance of this to moral education in the last chapter. 
A booklet on virtue, published in 1941, aptly and perceptively described the stultifying effect of 
the sophistic creation of pseudo-realities in which persons willingly acquiesce in their own 
delusion and manipulation: 
The ‘concupiscence of the eyes’ reaches its utmost destructive and extirpative 
power at the point where it has constructed for itself a world in its own image and 
likeness, where it has surrounded itself with the restlessness of a ceaseless film of 
meaningless objects for show and with a literally deafening noise of nothing more 
than impressions and sensations that roar in an uninterrupted chase around every 
window of the senses. Behind their papery façade of ostentation lies absolute 
nothingness, a ‘world’ of at most one-day constructs that often become insipid 
after just one-quarter of an hour and are thrown out like a newspaper that has been 
read or a magazine that has been paged through; a world which, before the 
revealing gaze of a sound spirit uninfected by its contagion, shows itself to be like 
a metropolitan entertainment district in the harsh clarity of a winter morning: 
barren, bleak, and ghostly to the point of pushing one to despair. 
(Pieper 1991:40) 
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Contemporary Moral Philosophy 
Connected with the disorder of contemporary moral language is the disorder in contemporary 
moral philosophy, which recognises four mutually contradictory approaches to ethics: 
emotivism; deontology; consequentialism; and so-called ‘virtue ethics’. We have already 
discussed the traditional Western understanding of virtue in the first chapter, but it may be 
helpful to briefly describe these contemporary ethical approaches in order to emphasize, firstly, 
the diversity of contemporary ethical understanding, and second, the differences between the 
way in which Aquinas understood the practicable moral life and the variety of ways it has been 
understood in the post-Enlightenment West. ‘Emotivism’ is the name coined by MacIntyre 
(1985:11-12) for: 
the doctrine that all evaluative judgements and more specifically all moral 
judgements are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or 
feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character. Particular judgements 
may of course unite moral and factual elements… But the moral element in such a 
judgement is always to be sharply distinguished from the factual. Factual 
judgements are true or false... But moral judgements, being expressions of attitude 
or feeling, are neither true nor false; and agreement in moral judgement is not to 
be secured by any rational method, for there are none. It is to be secured, if at all, 
by producing certain non-rational effects on the emotions or attitudes of those who 
disagree with one. We use moral judgements not only to express our own feelings 
and attitudes, but also precisely to produce such effects in others. Emotivism is thus 
a theory which professes to give an account of all value judgements whatever. 
 
Simplistically described, emotivism may be expressed as (a) hedonism, according to which moral 
agents may do whatever will make them ‘feel good’; (b) sentimentalism, in which moral decision-
making arises from excessive, uncontrolled emotion or sentiment; and (c) callousness, which is 
moral decision-making arising out of lack of empathy for other persons. Arguably, emotivism is 
the primary way in which sophistic scepticism and subjectivism are expressed in the 
contemporary West: “to a large extent people now think, talk and act as if emotivism were true, 
no matter what their avowed theoretical viewpoint may be. Emotivism has become embodied 
in our culture,” (MacIntyre 1985:22). Some of the ways in which emotivism is expressed in the 
contemporary British Army will be explored in the next chapter. 
 
MacIntyre (1985:28) argues that every society has its specific stock of characters, which are: 
the moral representatives of their culture and they are so because of the way in 
which moral and metaphysical ideas and theories assume through them an 
embodied existence in the social world. Characters are the masks worn by moral 
philosophies. 
A character, in the way in which MacIntyre (1985:27f.) uses the term71, is a person fulfilling not 
just any social rôle, but a very specific one in which individual personality and social rôle are 
                                                          
71  I follow MacIntyre’s practice of italicising the word ‘character’ whenever it is used in the special 
connotation which he gives to it in his argument. 
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merged so that others in the society are able to recognise the character portrayed by the person 
and, thus, to interpret the actions and behaviour of the person as those of that particular 
character. From their relationship to the character, others are given a frame of reference by 
which to understand and define their own moral opinions, actions and choices. A key feature of 
emotivism is its moral embodiment in certain stock characters of contemporary Western society, 
such as the ‘manager’ or ‘therapist’: 
In our own time emotivism is a theory embodied in characters who all share the 
emotivist view of the distinction between rational and non-rational discourse, but 
who represent the embodiment of that distinction in very different social 
contexts…... The manager represents in his character the obliteration of the 
distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations, the 
therapist represents the same distinction in the sphere of personal life. The 
manager treats ends as given, as outside his scope; his concern is with technique, 
with effectiveness in transforming raw materials into final products, unskilled 
labour into skilled labour, investments into profits. The therapist also treats ends 
as given, as outside his scope; his concern also is with technique, with effectiveness 
in transforming neurotic symptoms into directed energy, maladjusted individuals 
into well-adjusted ones. Neither manager nor therapist, in their [respective] roles… 
do or are able to engage in moral debate. They are seen by themselves, and by 
those who see them with the same eyes as their own, as uncontested figures, who 
purport to restrict themselves to the realms in which rational agreement is possible 
– that is, of course from their point of view to the realm of fact, the realm of means, 
the realm of measurable effectiveness. 
(MacIntyre 1985:30) 
 
This description of the emotivist characters of the manager and the therapist highlights two 
fundamental contrasts between the contemporary Western moral worldview and that of the 
traditional Western understanding of the practicably lived moral life. Firstly, the contrast 
between Aquinas’s articulation of mental health in terms of the place of the virtues, specifically 
temperance, in the traditional organic conception of human nature and the end of truly human 
life, as described in Chapter One, and that of the contemporary emotivist therapist should be 
clear. Emotivism understands human nature in mechanistic terms – as we shall see - and therapy, 
thus, may become a means of manipulating others. Furthermore, as C.S. Lewis (1955:46) noted, 
if therapists have no moral inhibition from manipulating others, especially if this is justified as 
being for the patient’s own good, then therapeutic “treatment… need have no limit; it could go 
on till it had effected a cure, and those who were carrying it out would decide when that was.” 
 
Second, is the contrast, which we have already noted in the altercation between Socrates and 
Antiphon, between the emotivist conception, embodied in the manager, that every sphere of 
human activity and endeavour can be reduced to meaning in terms of cost effectiveness and 
measured in terms of its monetary value; that ‘every man has his price’ and that ‘time is money’, 
which are peculiarly sophistic assertions that underlie much of current Western neo-liberal 
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theorising (Harvey 2005). Socrates made it very clear that there are many things in human life 
which are not commensurable in this way, but have an intrinsic worth in their own right. The 
relevance of Socrates’ view for us today, in the face of the all-encompassing demands of the 
globalised market economy, is also obvious. 
 
‘Consequentialism’ (cf. Frey 2013:221-237; Hooker 2013:238-260; McNaughton & Rawling 
2013:287) is the term coined by Anscombe (1958) in her discussion of contemporary Western 
moral philosophy, and is often used as a synonym for utilitarianism. Grossly simplifying, it could 
be said that consequentialist moral decision-making focuses on the utility or consequences of 
human acts. Some consequentialists are ‘monist’ in that they believe there is only one criterion 
in deciding whether an act is good. The 18th and 19th Century Utilitarians, such as Bentham 
(1748-1832) and Mill (1806-1873), made this criterion ‘happiness’ or ‘pleasure’, and based moral 
decision-making on achieving “the greatest happiness for the greatest number,” or “the least 
amount of suffering for the greatest number.” Other consequentialists are ‘pluralist’ in that they 
believe there are several criteria which are relevant in deciding whether or not an act is good, 
such as how fairly distributed happiness is across the population (Hooker 2013:240f.). In addition, 
there are various ways in which one can understand what the best possible consequences of 
human actions might be, and for whose benefit the outcome is chosen, leading to conflicting 
consequentialist approaches to ethical decision-making. 
 
On the one hand, ethical egoism asserts that achieving the well-being or the greatest amount of 
good for the individual person himself is the fundamental ethical principal directing how one 
should make moral decisions regarding the best possible outcomes of one’s actions. This rather 
selfish approach to ethical decision-making may be ameliorated by adding the proviso that the 
person can do whatever action brings about the greatest good for himself so long as it doesn’t 
harm others. Utilitarianism asserts that the benefit of the action’s outcome should be of utility 
to the community at large, rather than simply for the personal well-being of the individual. There 
are two approaches to making moral decisions in utilitarianism: Act-utilitarianism approaches 
ethical decision-making positively by asking, “What action achieves the greatest good for the 
greatest number?” Rule-utilitarianism approaches ethical decision-making negatively by asking, 
“Is my action in accordance with the cultural or societal rules which aim to produce the greatest 
good for the greatest number?” (Hooker 2013:238). 
 
Deontologists claim that the rightness of a moral act is intrinsic in the act itself, regardless of the 
motives or intent of the human agent and regardless of the consequences of his or her action 
(Grenz & Smith 2003:27). There are different views on what constitutes the foundation from 
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which the intrinsic rightness of an act and, therefore, from which the decision about how one 
ought to act are derived. This leads, as with consequentialist ethics, to a variety of deontological 
approaches to moral decision-making, which I have, once again, had to grossly simplify. Firstly, 
Divine Law theory asserts that God lays down absolute commands, such as the Ten 
Commandments, which direct how humans should act. Second, ‘contractarianism’ (Sayre-
McCord 2013:332-353), or ‘social contract theory’ (Barker 1971) was most ably expounded by 
Hobbes (1588-1679), Locke (1632-1704), and Rousseau (1712-1778). They maintained that 
duties, such as obedience to the State, are derived from the social contract which binds the 
community together. In 1651 Hobbes described this social contract as “That a man be willing, 
when others are so too,… for Peace… to lay down his right to all things; and be contented with 
so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe.” (Hobbes 
1909:100) In other words: “Morality consists in the set of rules, governing how people are to 
treat one another, that rational people will agree to accept, for their mutual benefit, on the 
condition that others follow those rules as well.” (Rachels 1995:143). Third, ‘intuitionism’ asserts 
that humans intuitively know the intrinsic foundation of moral law, without recourse to God or 
social contracts. The fullest expression of intuitionism is the ‘categorical imperative’ of Kant 
articulated in 1785 in the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (Ellington 1994:30): “Act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
law.” In other words, humans intuitively know that we should treat others as we would wish to 
be treated ourselves. It is a further indication of the confusion of Western moral language that 
some philosophers call Kantian deontology ‘intuitionism’ (Sahakian & Sahakian 1966:45), while 
others deny this (McNaughton & Rawling 2013:288). 
 
As already noted, Elizabeth Anscombe first articulated for Anglophone philosophers the limits 
of deontological and consequentialist approaches to ethics and stressed the need for a renewed 
understanding of virtue (Anscombe 1958). A new field of ethics, called ‘Virtue Ethics’, developed 
as a result of her challenge (Hursthouse 1999:1f.). The very coining of the term ‘Virtue Ethics’, 
however, reveals, to my mind, a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of virtue as 
understood by both ancient and medieval moral philosophers. The term ‘Virtue Ethics’ implies 
that virtue is just one more approach to ethical decision-making; just one more tool in an ethical 
‘toolkit’ which also includes deontology and consequentialism, but this limited understanding of 
virtue fails to express the fact that the concept of virtue encapsulates the whole of the moral 
life, not just one possible approach to ethics. I believe that virtue, because it focuses on the 
character of the human moral agent, can incorporate deontological or consequentialist ethics 
because they focus, albeit in different ways, on the morality of human decisions and acts, which, 
by their very nature, are dependent on and secondary to the moral character or virtue of the 
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moral agent. Thus, a virtuous person will recognise deontological obligations and duties 
precisely because such recognition is part of the virtue of justice, and a virtuous person will 
consider the consequences and utility of their moral decisions precisely because such 
consideration is part of the virtue of prudence. I believe, therefore, that emotivism, deontology, 
and consequentialism are only partial or incomplete accounts of ethics, albeit in quite different 
ways, largely because of their focus on moral acts or decision-making rather than on the moral 
agent as a complete human being. 
 
Human Nature and Moral Agency 
Anscombe (1958) and MacIntyre (1985) have pointed out, regarding consequentialism and 
emotivism respectively, that Modern moral philosophy is disordered because its various 
approaches are predicated upon an impoverished view of human nature, moral maturity, and 
moral agency. Likewise, Pieper (1960:49-50) has pointed out the detrimental consequences of 
deontological casuistry, which 
assumes the immaturity of human beings. Moreover, it intensifies and perpetuates 
this immaturity… The virtue of prudence, on the contrary – being the perfected 
ability to make decisions in accordance with reality – is the quintessence of ethical 
maturity…… it is impossible to educate a person to justice, fortitude, and 
temperance without first and simultaneously educating him to prudence…… The 
classical Christian doctrine of the pre-eminence of the virtue of prudence is 
essentially opposed to all falsifying, moralistic, or casuistic regimentation of the 
person who is called upon to make decisions. The first of the cardinal virtues is not 
only the quintessence of ethical maturity, but in so being is also the quintessence 
of moral freedom. 
 
This is a subject to which we shall return when discussing the British Army’s approach to moral 
education, but first I wish to discuss the ways in which scepticism affects one’s understanding 
of human nature and moral agency. 
 
Perhaps the clearest example of the current impoverished understanding of human nature is 
the mechanistic model articulated by materialist thinkers like Richard Dawkins. At the beginning 
of his famous book, The Selfish Gene, Dawkins (2006:2) notes: 
The argument of this book is that we, and all other animals, are machines created 
by our genes [which] have survived, in some cases for millions of years, in a highly 
competitive world. This entitles us to expect certain qualities of our genes. I shall 
argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless 
selfishness. This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual 
behaviour…… This brings me to the first point I want to make about what this book 
is not. I am not advocating a morality based on evolution. 
Dawkins further qualifies his argument in the course of the book, but such a mechanistic and 
materialist understanding of human nature must inevitably lead to subjectivism when he tries 
to formulate a morality because, to the materialist 
 
 
57 
 
his own reason appears to him as the epiphenomenon which accompanies chemical 
or electrical events in a cortex which is itself the by-product of a blind evolutionary 
process. His own logic, hitherto the king whom events in all possible worlds must 
obey, becomes merely subjective. There is no reason for supposing that it yields 
truth. 
(Lewis 1967:72) 
While Dawkins denies that he is advocating a morality based on the “ruthless selfishness” of our 
genes, his understanding of human nature as mechanistic must logically result in a belief that 
humans are not truly free to make moral decisions but are, to a greater or lesser extent, 
constrained in their exercise of moral agency, whether by their genes or by, what he calls, 
“memes”, i.e. by the psychological influences of their cultural upbringing and social context. 
 
Social scientists have studied the question of the extent to which one’s social and cultural 
context affects one’s moral decision-making. These studies include Milgram’s obedience 
experiment in 1961 and Zimbardo’s Stanford prison experiment in 1971. On the basis of his 
experiment Milgram (1974:205) concluded, “The social psychology of this century reveals a 
major lesson: often it is not so much the kind of person a man is as the kind of situation in which 
he finds himself that will determine how he will act.” This is a very sobering conclusion, as it 
essentially states that humans do not have true freedom to exercise moral agency, as is assumed 
in traditional Western moral philosophy. It is interesting, however, that very many persons, on 
the basis of their own personal experiences of horrendous situations, postulate a view the 
opposite to that of Milgram. Ingrid Betancourt, for example, who was held hostage by FARC 
guerrillas in the Colombian jungle for six years, noted, 
When you’re chained by the neck to a tree and deprived of everything… Well, it 
took me several years to realise, but you still have the most important freedom of 
all: that is, the freedom to choose what kind of person you want to be. 
(Betancourt 2010) 
 
Milgram (1964:851), responding to early criticisms of his experiment, acknowledged that each 
person has a capacity for choosing his own behaviour and this was borne out by his experiment 
in which between a quarter and a third of the subjects chose to reject the authority figure’s 
commands to inflict serious harm on another person. This cannot mask the fact, however, that 
between three-quarters and two-thirds chose to obey the authority figure, regardless of the 
knowledge – so far as they knew - that by doing so they were administering a lethal voltage of 
electricity to another person. Perhaps this relates to the claim made by MacIntyre (1985:22), 
that contemporary Westerners now act as if emotivism were true, regardless of what they think 
they believe about their moral worldview. 
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Once again, I am not trying to refute the ideas of Dawkins, Zimbardo or Milgram; I am simply 
trying to elucidate the implicit sophistic scepticism about the knowledge of truth, reality and 
goodness which underlies their ideas. Such scepticism leads to a mechanistic understanding of 
human nature and necessarily results in a diminished view of human freedom and moral agency, 
which may give rise to the concomitant sophistic idea that other persons may be manipulated 
and even dominated; that their attitudes and behaviour may be changed to suit the wishes of 
those with power in society. This idea has terribly negative consequences in politics, education, 
economics, and in all the other social activities which are fundamental to human community: 
True freedom requires both knowledge of the good and the will to choose the good 
when known. The denial of either is a denial of freedom, and the denial of freedom 
is the rejection of that moral agency in man which characterises his humanity…… 
The preservation of freedom demands that we recover our faith both in the ability 
of man to know the good and in his capacity, within the limitations of historical 
conditioning and the defectiveness of his will, to choose the good when known. 
(Hallowell 1963:132-133) 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate that the abuse of language and manipulation 
of persons, which I have called ‘sophistry’, permeates and informs the worldview of the 
contemporary Western liberal democracies, whether it is recognised or not. There are two 
important detrimental consequences arising from this widespread sophistry. The first 
consequence is that sophistic scepticism and subjectivism deny persons contact with truth and 
reality. Sophistic scepticism and subjectivism, thus, oppose the intellectual virtue of prudence, 
which is especially important in moral perception and decision-making. 
 
The second consequence is that sophistic subjectivism and relativism oppose the moral virtues, 
specifically justice, which is fundamental to all human communities and to all social, commercial 
and political intercourse. Sophistry, thus, fosters disordered insight and sentiment and, in so 
doing, denies persons the ability to feel true empathy with others. Contemporary moral 
education fails to cultivate trained sentiments or ordinate feelings because scepticism has 
undermined the concept that there is objective order in reality and relativism that there is 
objective good, with the consequent dominance of emotivist morality. This sceptical and 
subjective approach to morality combined with the lack of respect for the inherent worth and 
dignity of individual persons which is implicit in all sophistic manipulation, means that 
contemporary Westerners are often ill-equipped to respond to morally complex situations in a 
way that is congruent with reality. Sophistry is fundamentally opposed to the cardinal virtues of 
prudence, justice, courage and temperance and consequently results in an obscuration of moral 
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reasoning and decision-making. The detrimental effect of such sophistic obscuration on the 
contemporary British Army will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Good must be against evil; youth must be against age; life must be against death; light must be 
against darkness; army against army, one enemy against another, foe against foe, fighting over 
land, working wrongdoing. Always must the wise man ponder over war in this world.72 
Anonymous (c. AD 800) Anglo-Saxon Gnomic Verses 2 ll. 50-55a. 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued that sophistry underlies much of the contemporary Western 
worldview and described the way in which this obscures the intellectual virtue of prudence as 
well as opposing the moral virtues. In this chapter I shall examine virtue and the bearing of arms, 
ordering my discussion around the framework of the four cardinal virtues, and assess whether 
or not the traditional understanding of virtue has any relevance to today’s British Army. First, 
however, it is necessary briefly to describe the modern concept of the profession of arms, after 
which we shall consider the relationship between virtue, traditional Just War doctrine and the 
British Armed Forces. 
 
The Profession of Arms 
General Sir John Hackett, in his 1962 Lees Knowles Lectures, noted that, 
The function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force in the 
resolution of a social problem… The bearing of arms among men for the purpose of 
fighting is found as far back as we can see… It has never ceased to display a strong 
element of the vocational. 
(Hackett 1962:3) 
Hackett emphasized that the key distinguishing feature of the profession of arms is that soldiers 
are authorised legitimately to bear arms and to apply force, including lethal force on occasion, 
on behalf of the state. This force, however, is applied in a constrained, deliberate and controlled 
manner, as shall be explained shortly. Hackett, moreover, introduced the concept of “the 
unlimited liability” of the armed forces, in that soldiers not only apply lethal force on behalf of 
the state, but also risk their lives in its service, and that there is, thus, an implicit contract 
between the state and soldiers: 
The military contract demands the total and almost unconditional subordination of 
the interests of the individual if the interests of the group should require it. This can 
lead to the surrender of life itself. It not infrequently does. 
(Hackett 1962:45) 
 
Interestingly, Hackett claimed that soldiers apply force to resolve social problems, and, due to 
the destructive power of atomic weapons, rejected Clausewitz’s aphorism that war is an 
                                                          
72 Ʒod sceal ƿið yfele; ʓeoʓoð sceal ƿið yldo; | Lif sceal ƿið deaðe; leoht sceal ƿið þystrum; | fyrd ƿið fyrde, 
feond ƿið oðrum, | lað ƿið laðe ymb land sacan, | synne stælan. A sceal snotor hycʓean | ymb þisse ƿorulde 
ʓeƿinn.             (adp. Hamer 2015:116) 
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instrument of politics73 (Hackett 1962:55). This is because “we can say with equal truth – war is 
the bankruptcy of policy,” (General Hans von Seeckt, cited in Liddell Hart 1951:31), and a failure 
of policy resulting in nuclear war would be universally disastrous. Hackett, therefore, argued 
that, in terms of the military contract with society, the rôle of the modern military commander 
is not only to direct the application of force, but to contain violence, in part by restraining any 
imprudent political decision to apply force (Hackett 1962:57). 
 
In the lectures Hackett affirmed that the bearing of arms is an ancient vocation with its own 
disciplines, its special types of knowledge and training, and its own traditions, its own norms and 
narratives, all of which are important in the moral education of soldiers, as we shall see in 
Chapter Four. Nonetheless, the ancient vocation of bearing arms on behalf of the community or 
the nation-state has, in the modern era, been transformed into a profession requiring technical 
and managerial proficiency. The changes by which the military vocation has become the 
profession of arms are reflected 
not only in the wider sense of what is professed, but in the narrower sense of an 
occupation with a distinguishable corpus of specific technical knowledge and 
doctrine, a more or less exclusive group coherence, a complex of institutions 
peculiar to itself, an educational pattern adapted to its own needs, a career 
structure of its own and a distinct place in the society which has brought it forth. In 
all these respects it has strong points of resemblance to medicine and law, as well 
as to holy orders. 
(Hackett 1962:3) 
 
In 1960 Morris Janowitz identified five interconnected ways in which the American military had 
become less vocational and more professional since the end of the First World War. Firstly, the 
social class from which the military draws its officers changed “from a narrow, relatively high, 
social status base to a broader base, more representative of the population as a whole.” 
(Janowitz 1994:125). Second, the style of military command based on authoritative leadership 
changed to one based on bureaucratic management. Third, the increasing importance of 
technical knowledge of various kinds in the armed forces and the concomitant preponderance 
of technicians in positions of command, made military commanders increasingly similar in 
training and outlook to their civilian counterparts in management. Fourth, the consequent 
increasing importance to military commanders of clearly defined career stages, progress 
through which is judged according to their technical and managerial performance. The final 
change is the increasing politicisation of military officers. 
The growth of the military establishment into a vast managerial enterprise with 
increased political responsibilities has produced a strain on traditional military self-
                                                          
73 Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln - “War is merely the continuation of 
policy by other means” (Vom Kriege 1.1.24). 
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images and concepts of honour… As a result, the profession… has developed a more 
explicit political ethos. 
(Janowitz 1994:127) 
 
The British Army has undergone very similar changes. The ancient idea of military service as a 
vocation, however, fosters innovative approaches to problem solving because a vocation is 
about being called to a way of life, not merely about technical performance. In other words, 
vocation relates to an ethics of being, while profession relates to an ethics of doing. There may 
be some link between MacIntyre’s thesis that the ‘manager’ is one of the characters of modern 
emotivism (MacIntyre 1985:25f.) and the change brought about in modern military command 
from charismatic leadership to bureaucratic management. The increasing politicisation of the 
armed forces as a consequence of bureaucratisation is, moreover, of concern in contemporary 
Western liberal democracies as it may lead military commanders to regard politicians negatively 
or even to seek political power themselves (Janowitz 1994:127). The politicisation of the British 
Army, however, has not been seen in increasingly estranged relations between the military and 
the politicians, although relations between them have been very strained at times during the 
last century. Indeed, the modern British Army has successfully managed to retain its apolitical 
stance, even when deployed on internal security duties within the UK in Northern Ireland (John 
Keegan cited in Mileham 2008:44). Probably because, as Hackett (1962:48) has claimed, “in 
Britain… civilian control [of the military] has become by evolution pretty well complete.” 
 
At the same time that the bearing of arms in the liberal Western democracies has become 
professionalised and increasingly bureaucratic and technical, the nature of armed conflict has 
become less clear cut. The Enlightenment idea that war is armed conflict between discrete 
nation-states consisting of a series of combats between professional armies (Howard 1976:54f.) 
has proven inadequate to describe the armed conflicts of the last forty-odd years and the 
ambiguities of what has been called the ‘Contemporary Operating Environment’. 
 
The Contemporary Operating Environment 
In 1997, General Krulak, the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, delivered a speech 
in which he described what he called ‘Three Block War’, the new ambiguously chaotic 
environment in which Western soldiers had to operate: 
This is the landscape upon which the 21st Century battle will be fought. It will be an 
asymmetrical battlefield…… In one moment in time, our service members will be 
feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the 
next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting 
peacekeeping operations – and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-
intensity battle – all on the same day… all within three city blocks.” 
(Krulak 1997:139) 
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Subsequently, the concept of the Three Block War has been superseded because it did not 
describe adequately enough the perceived complexity of the 21st Century battlefield (US Army 
FM 3-24, § 1-37; 8-4), but it was a seminal concept which laid the foundations for what Western 
armies call ‘Stabilisation Operations’ with the framework of shape-secure-develop, in which 
troops might well be involved in carrying out all of the functions described by Krulak and more 
(LWDG 2011:7). One of the ideas stressed by Krulak was that of asymmetry between combatants. 
Krulak does not argue that asymmetric warfare is new, but acknowledges that it is as ancient as 
war itself as evidenced by the annihilation in AD 9 of three Roman legions under Varus by 
Germanic tribesmen in the Teutobergerwald. 
 
Mary Kaldor developed the argument that a novel form of warfare had manifested itself in the 
1990s, which she called simply ‘new war’. She maintained that ‘new wars’ have certain specific 
characteristics: Firstly, they are transnational, not only because the fighting may ignore 
international borders, but because the warring parties use decentralised worldwide networks 
to access funds, weapons, recruits, and mass media, 
so that the distinction between internal and external, between aggression… and 
repression…, or even between local and global, are difficult to sustain…… in practice, 
the distinction between what is private and what is public, state and non-state, 
informal and informal, between what is done for economic or political motives, 
cannot easily be applied. 
(Kaldor 2001:2) 
The transnational character of the new wars is partly the consequence, but also the cause, of 
the disintegration of nation-states, in which their models and means of authority and 
governance, and their ability to legitimately apply force through a professional military are 
eroded. The exercise of authority and the application of force are consequently ‘privatised’ by 
passing into the hands of warlords, criminals, and mercenaries. One outcome of this 
‘privatisation’ is the deliberate resort to terrorism to destabilise social, economic, and state 
structures (Kaldor 2001:2-8). It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the very idea of the nation-
state is a modern Western concept, and that the idea of professional armed forces is predicated 
on the idea of the nation-state. 
 
Second, the new wars involve the innovative use of new technologies, and conflict takes place 
not only in traditional ways, with armed forces in combat, but also digitally in cyberspace. Third, 
these wars can be understood only in the context of globalisation and the consequent myriad of 
state and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations, the media, multinational 
business corporations, intergovernmental organisations like the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation or the United Nations, and supra-governmental organisations like the European 
Union, many of which are pursuing competing agendas. 
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Professional armed forces are the product of the modern Western nation-state, which itself is 
founded on what MacIntyre (1985:36f.) called “the Enlightenment Project”. As I argued in the 
previous chapter, the Enlightenment Project is founded on an impoverished understanding of 
human nature and of what constitutes a fully flourishing human life, and much of its 
contemporary expression is based on a sophistic abuse of language and manipulation of others. 
Consequently, Western military theorists have struggled to understand and clearly define the 
nature of armed conflict in the contemporary world. Reflecting this lack of clarity is the analysis 
of what is called the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) and the postulated Future 
Character of Conflict (FCOC) by the British Ministry of Defence (MOD). The MOD has not yet 
published a definition of the COE, but whenever it is mentioned the assumption is that it is 
something new and unprecedented, and that Britain’s Armed Forces will have to be flexible and 
agile to operate in what will be a volatile, ambiguous and rapidly changing context. In 2006, in 
his post-tour debrief after commanding 16 Air Assault Brigade in Afghanistan, Brigadier Ed Butler 
gave what is one of the clearest statements of how the COE is perceived: 
We are operating in what I consider to be our new and future Contemporary 
Operating Environment (COE); non-linear, no boundaries, people operating in 
isolated groups and with all specialists forward…… ‘penny-packeted’ in old 
terminology. Assets normally used by Corps or Division were now being used at 
company level; the resource and training implications of this are immense. These 
small manoeuvre groups, with all these capabilities, will be as relevant to anywhere 
in Africa or other third world countries as they are in Afghanistan…… The historical 
domain of the Special Forces is now the COE of the Field Army. 
(ABN-1 2007:81) 
The image painted by Butler is one of small groups of British soldiers operating disparately and 
independently in a fluid, ill-defined battlespace, wielding and applying immense military force, 
and achieving strategic effect – “the historical domain of the Special Forces” – and he noted that 
this would require the training of the Field Army to be reviewed. 
 
In 2010 the MOD produced a paper titled, ‘The Future Character of Conflict – The Ministry of 
Defence Position’. In this paper it was postulated that, at the operational level, the battlespace 
in the future will be characterised by what are called ‘the five Cs’ (DCDC 2010): Firstly, it will be 
congested with multiple actors, some hostile, some friendly and some non-aligned. Second, it 
will be cluttered with material and digital infrastructure, which may have no overt military value, 
but can be exploited by the various actors for their own ends. Third, it will be contested at every 
level and in multiple ways by means of a hybrid combination of ‘normal’ combat tactics, 
asymmetric tactics, media operations, and cyberwarfare. Fourth, it will be connected by digital 
communications, mass media, globalised culture and modern transportation to the ‘global 
village’, and every action by Western military personnel will be very quickly broadcast to the 
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world in various media. Finally, the future battlespace will be constrained for Western troops by 
national policy and societal mores, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and national Rules of 
Engagement (ROE), and Human Rights legislation against potentially unconstrained foes. 
Remarkably, this fifth ‘C’ was only added as an afterthought when an unclassified version of 
Future Character of Conflict was published in February 2010 (DCDC 2010:12n). It is also 
noteworthy that no mention is made of Western troops being under ethical constraint, nor is 
there reference to the ius in bello criteria of Just War doctrine, apart from a mention that the 
criterion of ‘proportionality’ may be used as an argument by adversaries to impose further 
constraints on Western armed forces! In fact, from the context it is clear that the criterion which 
is actually meant is that of ‘discrimination’, as the context is the causing of ‘collateral damage’ 
(DCDC 2010:12-13). 
 
Ethical Confusion of the COE 
The FCOC concept has tried to describe the characteristics of the fluid, ill-defined, ambiguous 
battlespace of the COE, in which British soldiers will face an asymmetric, hybrid threat. Yet it has 
failed to recognise a sixth ‘c’, which is fundamental to understanding the COE and to preparing 
British troops for operating in this ambiguous battlespace, which is that it will also be ethically 
confused at multiple levels, which will have practical moral implications for officers and soldiers 
alike. 
 
There may be ethical confusion at the political and strategic level. The Government’s decision 
to deploy troops abroad may be difficult to justify, especially if the political decision is informed 
by sources of intelligence which are not in the public domain.  In terms of Just War Doctrine, it 
may be difficult to adequately explain the ius ad bellum criteria (legal authority, just cause, just 
objective, right intent, last resort, proportionate response, and fair prospect of success) to both 
the public and the military, especially in the new ‘sceptical’ post-Iraq age.  The Government itself 
may be confused about why it is deploying troops and may, in part, be motivated by emotivism 
or media-generated pressure rather than prudent judgement. For example, in 2012 the USA 
deployed troops to Africa to hunt down Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(Asiimwe 2012). This was largely in response to the ‘Kony 2012’ pressure campaign about child 
soldiers in Uganda by a human rights NGO called ‘Invisible Children’. Concerns have been raised, 
however, about the NGO’s apparently limited understanding of the true situation in Uganda, 
and its advocacy of US armed intervention (Finnegan 2012). Kony is undoubtedly a criminal and 
the Lord’s Resistance Army has committed numerous atrocities, but it is difficult to see how this 
deployment could satisfy all the ius ad bellum criteria of Just War Doctrine, nor how it is in US 
national interests or in accordance with LOAC. 
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At the operational level, moreover, the COE will almost certainly be confused by the presence 
of several competing actors (terrorists, child soldiers, millenarian religious armed groups, private 
military and security companies, war lords, poachers, allied military and paramilitary forces, and 
the media) some of whom will carry out apparently irrational, random, horrific and barbaric acts 
(genocide, mob-lynching, slavery, human trafficking, witchcraft, enforced drug dependency, 
rape, cannibalism, bodily mutilation, infanticide, torture, looting, etc.).  Faced with random 
horrific acts by unpredictable irrational actors, British troops may experience the feeling of a 
descent into the ‘heart of darkness’, the tangible presence of evil, and will seek ways both to 
understand it and to resist it. The relativism and emotivism of the contemporary British 
worldview may not prepare them for such moral anarchy nor give them any means by which to 
make moral judgements and decisions in the face of it. The British Army Senior Medical Officer 
who deployed on Op BARRAS, the UK’s intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, noted, “When 
confronted with ‘the abyss’ it can paralyse one and prevent one from acting.” (Beaton 
2013:lect.). Deploying Western troops to intervene in such situations raises several ethical 
dilemmas and questions for which the troops, arguably, are ill-prepared and untrained. 
 
For instance, what is an ordinate ethical response by Western peace-keepers to the scene in this 
photograph, taken in the Central African Republic in January 2014, in which a Christian civilian, 
who has just participated in the lynching of Muslim civilians, cuts flesh off the leg of one and 
eats it? 
 
 
Photograph 1. Christian-Muslim Conflict in the Central African Republic (©  BBC 2014) 
 
What is an appropriate ethical response if allied or partner military forces commit atrocities or 
act in ways utterly incompatible with current Western values, such as the practice of pederasty 
by some members of the Afghan security forces? What is the morally right action to take if the 
ROE prevent Western troops from interfering to stop atrocities or genocide, as they did in Bosnia 
and Rwanda in the 1990s? How do British soldiers decide between conflicting obligations when 
professional military discipline prevents them from doing what they judge to be morally right? 
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What is a proportionate and discriminating response when confronted by child soldiers, who 
have been reduced to their current state by abduction, systematic abuse, doping, and deliberate 
psychological manipulation? In terms of LOAC and the ROE, it might be legally permissible to 
shoot the child soldier pictured below, as, by bringing his rifle to the aim, he is a direct threat. 
But what is legally permissible and, even, militarily necessary, may be morally repugnant to the 
British soldier who shoots the child. The soldier may experience a dissonance between his act 
and his moral worldview, receiving what nowadays is called a ‘moral wound’ (Sherman 2015). 
 
 
 
Photograph 2. A child soldier with pink teddy bear pack (©  Getty Images) 
 
The ethical confusion of the COE is not confined to military operations, but is also apparent in 
situations in which British soldiers go on training exercises in other parts of the world. This 
ethical confusion arises due to the emotivism of contemporary Western soldiers. For example, 
the British Army trains in East Africa several times a year. When in Kenya on a training exercise, 
my experience is that British soldiers very often see African tribesmen through the distorting 
lens of their own emotivist worldview and understand the local peasants or pastoralists simply 
by their own Western terms of reference. The Briton sees per speculum in aenigmate, seeing in 
the African tribesman a distorted reflection of himself with his Western moral assumptions, 
lifestyle and worldview. Soldiers may then react in one of two ways: they may adopt an overly 
sentimental attitude towards the tribesmen or they may become indifferent or even hostile 
towards them. Indeed, British soldiers may move from a sentimental attitude to one of unfeeling 
indifference and then to one of disdain and dislike during the six weeks they are on exercise in 
Africa. ‘Andy MacNab’, the nom de plume of a Special Air Service (SAS) trooper, has described 
just such an occurrence when his SAS squadron were training in Botswana in the late 1980s. The 
SAS troopers, feeling sorry for the dusty children who crowded round to see the novelty of 
British soldiers camping out in the bush, started out by giving them boiled sweets and biscuits 
and jam from the Army rations. Inevitably, the news spread and more and more Botswanan 
children would gather to ask for sweets. Pestered by repeated begging, which they themselves 
had caused, all sentimentality amongst the SAS troopers evaporated and they decided to get rid 
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of the ‘pesky’ children once and for all. They did this by taking blocks of hexamine, the waxy 
solid fuel used by the British Army for cooking in the field, chopping the blocks into little squares, 
coating the squares with jam, and giving these out to the children, who trustingly popped the 
jam-coated hexamine into their mouths only to gag on the waxy fuel (MacNab 1995:224). 
‘MacNab’, notably, seems to feel no sense of shame at recounting this incident, nor does he 
acknowledge that, if a child had swallowed the hexamine, he or she would have been poisoned 
and fallen ill without immediate access to medical care. 
 
It should be a source of concern for the British Army if my observation is correct that emotivist 
British officers and soldiers have difficulty empathising with peoples of other cultures and 
nations. Our current military doctrine postulates that military operations in the future will be 
conducted ‘among the people’ in a way which makes soldiers’ empathy for the people, down to 
the lowest rank, crucial for mission success (Smith 2007). One of the points made by Butler about 
the COE is that small groups of soldiers under low level leadership will be expected to attain 
strategic effect by the way in which they apply military force. In the Western liberal democracies, 
however, there has been a great deal of debate and opinion expressed about how to apply force 
ethically and exert moral influence at the political and strategic levels in the COE, but 
considerably less on how this might be done practicably at the operational and tactical levels. 
Yet it is precisely at these lower levels that the Army anticipates strategic effect in the ambiguous, 
fluid nature of combat in the COE. Furthermore, as we shall see, Western soldiers often 
unquestioningly assume that an intervention operation abroad is morally justifiable, without 
really questioning this assumption or questioning how the local populace view an intervention 
by Western armed forces, which may be perceived as invasion not salvation. 
 
It is arguable that the COE is not something completely new and unprecedented, but shares 
many features and moral ambiguities of past conflicts in which Western armed forces have been 
engaged, whether in the small wars and policing actions of the imperial era, or in the guerrilla 
operations which accompanied conventional operations in both World Wars and the Napoleonic 
Wars. General Rose, the UN Commander in Bosnia, speaking of peace-keeping and humanitarian 
interventions, stated: “Humans are humans. Battles are battles. The kinds of problems faced, 
particularly by junior commanders, remain the same.” (Rose 2015:lect.). Western military 
theorists used to believe that with the West’s technological superiority it could simply dominate 
and impose its will on other parts of the world (Kaldor 2001:161). The Commandant of France’s 
Joint Defence College, noted, however, that 
War has not changed. It is still, at heart, a political act comprising a struggle 
between two independent free wills. Nevertheless, we are only just getting over 
the idea, which has dominated for over forty years, that war is a technical 
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confrontation between two arsenals and that the more powerful the arsenal, the 
greater the chance of victory. 
(Desportes 2009:175) 
 
Constraints to the Application of Force 
Clausewitz (Vom Kriege 1.1.3) noted that, although in theory there is no logical limit to the 
application of force, in fact, due to several constraining factors, one can never apply unlimited 
force in war simply as one desires.  These constraints include: (1) the fact that force is 
reciprocally applied by both contending parties and one is, thus, never in total control of one’s 
own application of force; (2) fluctuating human emotion and will to apply force: and (3) simple 
random chance are all unquantifiable factors which have an impact on how far one can apply 
force in war. The idea of the unconstrained application of extreme force is, therefore, “an 
abstraction” without effect in the real world, because the reciprocal use of force in war is 
practicably constrained by a number of inherent factors over which the contending military 
forces have little or no control. Subsequently he used the term “friction” to describe the 
constraining effect of these factors (Vom Kriege 1.7). The fact that war is an instrument of policy 
is yet another factor constraining the conduct of war and the application of force, as these must 
be related to the political end for which the war is being fought, and military commanders must 
constrain politicians, as we have noted. In effect, Clausewitz argued that the application of 
military force is constrained by a number of practical, political, emotional, moral, legal and, also, 
utterly random factors. We shall examine the moral constraints in our discussion of Just War 
doctrine, but first must briefly look at the legal constraints to the application of military force. 
 
In the last hundred years there has been an increasing effort to set legal limits to the recourse 
to and conduct of armed conflicts. This is seen in the articulation of International Law, Law of 
Armed Conflict, and Rules of Engagement, which are based on a legal understanding of justice 
with which it becomes possible to justify military operations regardless of the morality of the 
casus belli. Both Anscombe (1958) and Geach (1956) pointed out that such sophistry was likely 
when relying on casuistry and utilitarian consequentialist theories of ethics. In addition, current 
debates within International Law about just war provide an example of the interminable 
philosophical debate described by MacIntyre (1985), and largely ignore how the virtue of justice, 
conceived as ‘fairness’, has shaped traditional Just War doctrine. The premiss underlying LOAC 
and ROE is the problematic one that war is a legally definable activity, despite the difficulties of 
such an approach (Paskins & Dockrill 1979:102f.). 
 
One example of these difficulties is the concept of the Right to Self-Defence which is usually 
emphasised in British Army training on the ROE as a justification for a soldier to apply lethal 
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force when deployed on a military operation. It would seem axiomatic that an aggressor cannot 
claim to have acted in self-defence when attacking someone in his own home, only the person 
defending himself against an aggressor can do so. As almost all British military deployments this 
century have been interventions outside the borders of the United Kingdom, the emphasis in 
the ROE on self-defence ignores the question of whether in fact Britain is not actually the 
aggressor in the conflict. From the perspective of an Afghan peasant farmer whose livelihood is 
destroyed by British troops burning his cash crop of poppies, it is the British who are the 
aggressors. If that peasant farmer, therefore, joins with his neighbours and decides to ambush 
the next British troops on his lands - thereby becoming an “accidental guerrilla” fighting on the 
side of the Taliban (Kilcullen 2009) – it is arguable that he is the one who is acting in self-defence, 
not the British troops who, in response to his small arms ambush, can reply with overwhelming 
firepower from a variety of Offensive Support weapons systems74, none of which is within range 
of the small arms being used by the ambushers. This example raises a number of questions 
relevant to Just War doctrine. One is whether British recourse to Offensive Support in response 
to a small arms ambush is a discriminating or proportionate use of force. Another is whether a 
legalistic emphasis on British soldiers’ right to self-defence, without reference to the morality 
(as opposed to the legality) of the mission, inevitably makes the British Army’s conduct of 
operations seem dishonourable to a populace which has a high regard for honour and, thus, a 
heightened consciousness of shameful conduct, but may not think in terms of the legal 
culpability of the contending parties according to International Law. It is necessary, therefore, 
to examine the traditional Western doctrine of Just War with its implicit assumptions of virtue 
and honour. 
 
Traditional Just War Doctrine75 
Traditional Western Just War doctrine is that doctrine of just war developed in Europe over the 
last 2500 years, and, in its medieval expression, is essentially a Christian doctrine. I prefer to talk 
of Just War ‘doctrine’, rather than ‘theory’ or ‘convention’, as the Just War criteria were part of 
Christian teaching about the practicable Christian life and were not, thus, understood to be an 
abstract theoretical or legal debate, which is how much current discussion of Just War seems to 
be carried out. It is noteworthy that implicit in all ancient and medieval articulations of Just War 
                                                          
74 Offensive Support is the term for weapons such as mortars, artillery, 227-mm GPS-guided rockets 
(which have a range of over 30 km), and the weapons of attack helicopters and ground-attack aircraft. 
75 In the discussion of Just War, I have collated several sources (Bellamy 2006; Biggar 2013; Burke 2015; 
Coates 1997; Elshtain 2003; Frowe 2016; Gastinaeu 2015; Guthrie & Quinlan 2007; Lee 2012; Lucas 2016; 
Moseley 2006; Paskins & Dockrill 1979; Primoratz 2015; Reed 2004; Walzer 2006). In my discussion of Just 
War I have tried to articulate the criteria as they are generally expressed in current discussions, but have 
explained where I differ from current interpretations of them. 
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doctrine is the traditional concept of virtue. It is equally noteworthy, however, that very few of 
the studies of Just War written in recent years approach the subject with reference to virtue76. 
 
As we have noted, military force is applied in war in a controlled and deliberate manner because 
it is constrained, in part, by the moral conditions necessary to wage a just war. According to the 
classic Western formulation of just war, these moral conditions are concerned with two main 
aspects of warfare: ius ad bellum – the recourse to war must be just; and ius in bello – the 
conduct of military operations in the war must be just. In this context the word ‘just’ (ius) refers 
to the basic idea of ‘fairness’ or ‘rightness’, not exclusively to ‘just’ as a concept in law (lex). ‘Just’ 
here means that which is morally binding, not only that which is legally binding. The idea of ius 
as ‘rightness’ can, however, lead to confusion with the idea of ‘righteousness’ or ‘holiness’ and, 
so, to the idea that Just War is equivalent to righteous or holy war (Draper 1979:136). They are 
not the same. It is outside the scope of this chapter to discuss righteous or holy war, although 
where relevant, I shall refer to the Biblical conception of holy war. As Biggar (2013:3) notes: 
By ‘just war’ I do not refer to war that is simply or perfectly just; and I certainly do 
not refer to a war that is holy. ‘Just’ here means ‘justified’ – on balance and all 
things considered. No human action or enterprise is pure or unblemished; but that 
is not to say that no human action can ever be right. No war waged by human beings 
will ever be simply just; but that is not to say that no war can ever be justified. 
 
The ius ad bellum criteria seek to ensure that the recourse to war is just or, in other words, that 
the war is waged for just or right reasons. It is worth stressing that the ius ad bellum criteria 
were first articulated for the guidance of the political governors of sovereign states, and it was 
not envisaged that they should be debated by private citizens (Lewis 2000b). They apply, 
therefore, at the political and strategic levels of war, rather than the operational and tactical. 
The ius ad bellum criteria are: 
1. The war must be waged only as a last resort; all other reasonable means of securing the 
objective of the war, such as diplomatic negotiation or international arbitration, must have been 
tried and shown to have failed before war can be legitimately declared (Cicero, Off. 1.11; 
Onasander, Strategicus 4.2). 
2. The war must be officially declared by a legitimate authority (Plato, Leges 955b-c; Cicero, 
Rep. 3.23; Aquinas, ST 2a2ae 40.1). This authority may be either the government of the polity, 
recognised as such by its citizens, or a leader whose authority is based on popular support or 
                                                          
76 Studies of the rôle of virtue in Just War are Davis (1992), Toner (2000), and Webster & Cole (2004). 
Studies of the rôle of virtue in the profession of arms include Olsthoorn (2011), Robinson (2006), and 
Sherman (2005). My approach is rather different from these. I have addressed the limitations of a Stoic 
approach to military virtue, as advocated by Sherman, elsewhere (Steele 2015). 
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acclaim. In either case, war ought not to be declared for the private good of any individual or 
party, but in the common interest of all members of the polity. 
 
3. The war must be waged for a just cause, such as self-defence, defence of the defenceless, 
the redress of past or current injustices, or the pre-emption of an attack by hostile forces (Cicero, 
Rep. 3.23; Onasander, Strategicus 4.1; Ambrose, Off. 1.27.129; Aquinas, ST 2a2ae 40.1 & 40.4). 
 
4. The war must have a reasonable prospect of ultimate success in securing the objective (cf. 
Luke 14:31-32). This is not the mercenary idea that one only fights if one is sure to win. It requires 
the prudential calculation that the available means are sufficient to secure the objective of the 
war, and also that the benefits to the polity gained from attaining the war’s objective are greater 
than the inevitable evils experienced by the polity consequent to the waging of the war. 
 
5. The recourse to war must be proportionate to the provocation received from the enemy. 
This criterion is subordinate to the criteria of last resort, just cause, and reasonable prospect of 
ultimate success, as it stipulates that a polity, accepting that war will bring inevitable evils in its 
train, does not go to war against another polity over minor disagreements and grievances, but 
only when recourse to military force is the most appropriate or only option available. 
 
6. The war must be waged for a just objective. The end of the war must be limited and 
primarily aimed at bringing about a just peace; not at totally destroying, ruining, or humiliating 
the enemy (Plato, Respublica 471a-c; Aristotle, EN 1177b; Politica 1334a; Cicero, Off. 1.11; 
Onasander, Strategicus 4.3; Aquinas, ST IIaIIae 40.1). This criterion is sometimes referred to as 
that of right intention and may be confused with that of right intent, which deals with one’s 
attitude towards the prosecution of the war, while right intention deals with the end for which 
one is waging war. Hence, I prefer the term ‘just objective’ rather than ‘right intention’. It will 
be apparent that this criterion addresses the same concerns as the ius ex bello and ius post 
bellum considerations of how one achieves a just cessation of hostilities and a just peace once 
hostilities have ended. Some academics claim that these considerations have been ignored in 
the past (Baker 2015:128), and propose, therefore, that we need to create a new list of ius ex 
bello and ius post bellum criteria (Mileham 2016).  I agree with Biggar (2013:3) “that these are 
already implicit in the ad bellum requirement of right intention, [so] I do not accept the proposal.”  
7. The war must be waged with right intent. The motives for waging war must be consonant 
with the just cause, just objective and just means. The desire for revenge, power, or to inflict 
harm, etc. are not right intent (Aristotle, EN 1177b; Politica 1334a; Cicero, Off. 1.12; Ambrose, 
Off. 1.28.138). 
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The ius in bello criteria seek to ensure that the conduct of military operations in the war is just 
or, in other words, that the war is waged by just or right means. 
1. The force used to wage war must be discriminate. When armed force is applied the soldier 
must draw a distinction between military and non-military targets. Only military targets, i.e. the 
enemy’s armed forces, military equipment, and trade or industry supporting their war effort 
may be legitimately attacked or targeted. This means that none of the following may be targeted 
or attacked: neutral nationals, non-combatants, the enemy nation’s natural resources, culture, 
social structures, trade or economy, except where these are clearly crucial to sustaining the 
enemy’s ability to wage war. Plato (Respublica 468a-471c) in discussing justice in his ideal state 
has a digression on the discriminating use of military force. He says that, as his state’s citizens 
will be Greeks, they will be both “good and tractable”77 (Plato, Respublica 470e), i.e. that in 
implicit contrast to the non-Greek barbarians, they will have that nobility of character summed 
up in the Greek ideal of καλοκἀγαθία. We shall return to this ideal when we discuss moral 
education. In war between Greeks, therefore, there should be firstly, no enslavement of the 
defeated, as this may weaken the Greek states when facing a barbarian foe. Second, the victors 
in battle should not plunder the dead, except to take their armour, as some men use this as an 
excuse to avoid combat. Third, no arms taken from defeated Greeks should be offered as 
trophies in the temples as this may prolong ill-feeling between previously antagonistic Greek 
states. Plato (Respublica 471a-c) affirms of the citizens of his state, 
being Greeks they will not devastate Greece, nor burn homesteads, nor agree that 
the whole populace of any city, men, women, and children, are all their enemies, 
but that only a few are ever their enemies, those who are blameworthy for the 
conflict. And for all of these reasons they will be unwilling to lay waste the land, 
as many are their friends, or to demolish their homesteads; but will prosecute the 
conflict only until the blameworthy are compelled by the suffering of the 
blameless to do right… our citizens ought to behave towards their [Greek] 
opponents in this way; and towards barbarians as the Greeks now behave towards 
one another.78 
 
This last sentence is a tacit acknowledgement that Plato’s delineation of humane discrimination 
in war between Greeks is entirely hypothetical and, also, that even hypothetically he does not 
extend such discrimination to barbarian foes. In reality, the various Greek states did to each 
other all the things which Plato would forbid, and there is no evidence that Plato’s ideal was 
                                                          
77 ἀγαθοί τε καὶ ἥμεροι 
78 οὐδ᾽ ἄρα τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ἕλληνες ὄντες κεροῦσιν, οὐδὲ οἰκήσεις ἐμπρήσουσιν, οὐδὲ ὁμολογήσουσιν ἐν 
ἑκάστῃ πόλει πάντας ἐχθροὺς αὑτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας, ἀλλ᾽ ὀλίγους ἀεὶ ἐχθροὺς 
τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς διαφορᾶς. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πάντα οὔτε τὴν γῆν ἐθελήσουσιν κείρειν αὐτῶν, ὡς φίλων τῶν 
πολλῶν, οὔτε οἰκίας ἀνατρέπειν, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τούτου ποιήσονται τὴν διαφοράν, μέχρι οὗ ἂν οἱ αἴτιοι 
ἀναγκασθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναιτίων ἀλγούντων δοῦναι δίκην… οὕτω δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους τοὺς ἡμετέρους 
πολίτας προσφέρεσθαι: πρὸς δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ὡς νῦν οἱ Ἕλληνες πρὸς ἀλλήλους. 
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ever practised by any Greek state. Nonetheless, Plato is describing how Greek combatants with 
nobility (καλοκἀγαθία) and virtue (ἀρετή) ought to behave. 
 
2. The force used to wage war must be proportionate to the objective. The political objective, 
which is to bring about a just peace, cannot justify any means; the military means, therefore, 
must be in concordance with the just objective. This criterion is usually interpreted to mean that 
the military force used should be the minimum necessary to successfully achieve the objective 
as quickly and with the least amount of damage and fewest casualties as possible to all 
belligerents. St. Ambrose (339-397) discusses proportionality in war, although he does not use 
this term, using illustrations drawn from the Old Testament. In his discussion he indicates that, 
in certain circumstances, it might be proportionate to annihilate the enemy, as Moses did to the 
Midianites, “since on more ferocious enemies and on the faithless and on those who greatly 
offend, fiercer retribution is returned.”79 (Ambrose, Off. 1.29.139). This calls to mind, not only 
the Old Testament injunctions to utterly destroy the various Canaanite communities which 
practised abominable religious rites, including child sacrifice (Deuteronomy 20:10-18; 1 Samuel 
15), but also the constant refrain used by the Elder Cato (234–149 BC) in speeches he made 
before the Roman Senate: “Carthage must be destroyed.”80 Before concluding that these are 
actually examples of a disproportionate use of military force, it is worth recalling that Carthage 
was a colony established in North Africa by the Canaanites 81 , and that the Romans found 
Carthaginian practices equally as abhorrent as did the Israelites. It is no coincidence that the 
Israelites and Romans both felt similarly about the need to annihilate such an abominable 
culture. This is not to argue that such annihilation was, in fact, just or right, but to remind us that 
the proportionate use of force may, on occasion, actually mean applying the maximum amount 
of force available to destroy a great evil. As Biggar (2013:7) notes: 
This is the dilemma: on the one hand going to war causes terrible evils, but on the 
other hand not going to war permits them. Whichever horn one chooses to sit on, 
the sitting should not be comfortable. Allowing evils to happen is not necessarily 
innocent, any more than actually causing them is necessarily culpable. Omission 
and commission are equally obliged to give an account of themselves. Both stand 
in need of moral justification. 
 
3. Individuals are responsible for their own conduct in military operations. The individual 
combatant is accountable for how he or she personally applies force in war. The argument that 
an individual was merely following orders when he or she applied force indiscriminately or 
disproportionately was emphatically rejected in 1945 by the International Military Tribunal, 
                                                          
79 siquidem vehementioribus hostibus et infidis et his qui amplius laeserint vehementior refertur ultio. 
80 Often quoted as, “Carthago delenda est”, in fact his words are recorded periphrastically rather than 
quoted directly (Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 49; Pliny, Historia Naturalis 15.23; Plutarch, Cato Maior 26-27). 
81 The Canaanites were known as the Phoenicians by the Greeks, whence the Roman term ‘Punic’ for the 
inhabitants of Carthage. 
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which was established by the Allies to try German political and military leaders for crimes 
committed during the Second World War (Levinson 1974, Russell 1954, Wasserstrom 1974). The 
criterion of personal responsibility acknowledges that soldiers, whether regular or irregular, are 
part of a hierarchical fighting force, in which they may be subordinate to or in command of 
others, but expects that, as part of such a fighting force which is subject to the customary rules 
of war, now articulated as LOAC, individuals remain responsible for their own actions, and are 
required to reject unlawful orders. Personal responsibility relates to proportionality and 
discrimination in terms of the choice of types of weapons systems employed in combat, and 
some weapons, such as toxic chemicals or land mines, are banned under various international 
conventions as being too indiscriminate, while the use of others, such as biological weapons, is 
considered disproportionate as well. While the principle of personal responsibility was first 
legally articulated by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in 1945 (Wasserstrom 
1974:135-137), it is implicit in Aquinas’s discussion of whether or not it is permissible for clergy 
to fight in war, or for combatants to deceive their enemies by stratagems, or to fight on holy 
feast days (ST IIaIIae 40.2-4). The use of stratagems and ruses du guerre may also be considered 
under the three criteria of personal responsibility, proportionality and discrimination. It is 
considered irresponsible, for example, to fight in civilian clothing as a franc tireur, in part 
because to do so hinders the enemy’s ability to discriminate between combatants and non-
combatants, but in part, too, because it is considered dishonourable to do so. According to 
Aquinas (ST IIaIIae 40.3), however, it is not dishonourable to deceive one’s enemy by masking 
one’s intentions or to take them by surprise, such as in an ambush, but it would be reprehensible 
to deliberately mislead the enemy by an active lie, such as drawing an enemy into an ambush 
by raising a white flag and pretending to surrender.  
 
It will be seen that to exercise the criteria of discrimination, proportionality and personal 
responsibility under the pressure of combat is no simple matter. In antiquity and the Middle 
Ages these ius in bello criteria were not articulated as distinctly they are now are, but were 
assumed because they were implicit in the intellectual virtue of prudence and the moral virtues 
of courage and temperance. These virtues enabled the realisation of the just conduct of war by 
equipping the individual warrior to fight justly in combat. 
 
 
Prudence 
In the first chapter I mentioned that the virtue of prudence provides the necessary and essential 
liaison between the truth ascertained by the intellect, the good desired by the will, and the moral 
acts of the human moral agent exemplified in justice, courage and temperance. Prudence is, 
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however, not simply applicable to an individual, but also to the family household and to the 
state: 
Prudence is correct reasoning about things to be done and aims at the good of the 
agent as such, taken either singly (ethical prudence), as a member of a domestic 
community (economic prudence), or as a member of a polity (political prudence). 
(McInerny 1997:97) 
Prudence in military policy, strategy and doctrine is one aspect of political prudence. When the 
government decides to deploy the nation’s armed forces on a military operation, therefore, 
military prudence may be said to provide the necessary and essential liaison between the (true) 
understanding of the operational context ascertained by the nation’s intelligence agencies, the 
(good) political outcome of the military deployment desired by the government, and the (moral) 
actions of the deployed armed forces, (exemplified in justice, courage and temperance). I have 
argued that sophistry clouds prudence; i.e. moral discernment, deliberation and decision-
making.  Prudence also can be deliberately denied by the various forms of imprudence discussed 
in the first chapter. The bracketed terms in the sentence above indicate, therefore, those 
aspects where political - and, hence, military - prudence can be vitiated, either through the 
deliberate immoral choice of policy-makers or through the clouding of their prudential 
judgement by sophistry.  
 
Hence, if the understanding of the context in the theatre of operations is false, whether because 
the government policy-makers and military strategists ignore, deliberately distort or 
misunderstand the intelligence reports they receive, then the casus belli justifying the 
deployment of a military force will be false and, hence, unjust. Arguably, this was the case when 
the Blair government decided to invade Iraq in 2003. If the outcome desired by either the 
government policy-makers or military strategists is bad, whether because the desired end is 
incorrectly judged to be a real good or is knowingly falsely portrayed as a good, but actually 
effects real harm in the theatre of operations, or is for the ultimate benefit of only a few of the 
parties involved, then the deployment of armed forces will be wrong and unjust. In these ways, 
therefore, prudential political and military judgement are intimately related to the ius ad bellum 
criteria of traditional Western Just War doctrine. If political and military moral discernment, 
deliberation and decision-making are vitiated in any of these ways or the ends of policy and 
strategy are thus wrongful, it will become very difficult, if not impossible, for the deployed 
military personnel to act at the operational, tactical or personal level in a way that can be 
unambiguously recognised as honourable or virtuous. Implicit in this discussion about 
imprudent and, thus, unjust use of military force, however, is the recognition that there are 
occasions when prudence and justice indicate that the recourse to armed conflict or war is 
justified, and that the deployment of military force can, therefore, be virtuous and honourable. 
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It is precisely because prudence is an intellectual virtue which gives understanding and directs 
moral decision-making in contingent situations that it cannot be reduced to a set of rules and 
principles or be made prescriptive according to a person’s office, rank or responsibility. 
Therefore, the question, “What does prudence look like for a Brigadier, and how does it differ 
from prudence for a Private soldier?” (Totten 2016: pers. com.) reveals a misconception of what 
prudence actually is. As Pieper (1960:22) says, 
Prudence, however, is not only cognition, not only knowing what is what. The prime 
thing is that this knowledge of reality must be transformed into the prudent 
decision which takes effect directly in its execution. Prudence is immediately 
directed toward concrete realisation; hence the difference between knowledge as 
viewed by moral science, including ‘casuistic’ moral science, and knowledge as 
viewed by prudence. It is important not to mistake these two forms of ethical 
knowledge for one another. 
 
This distinction is important and Pieper discusses it at some length. It is especially important in 
the Army where the approach to moral decision-making is heavily rule-based. The Army adopts 
this approach because it desires certainty in decision-making and security for the decision-
makers (Mileham 2008:50). Yet this craving for security and certainty is based on a false, indeed 
imprudent, understanding of the reality of contingent situations: 
At this point the element of uncertainty and risk in every moral decision comes to 
light. In the decisions of prudence, which by the very nature of prudence are 
concerned with things concrete, contingent, and future (singularia, contingentia, 
futura), there cannot be that certainty which is possible in a theoretical 
conclusion…… Man, then, when he comes to a decision, cannot ever be sufficiently 
prescient nor can he wait until logic affords him absolute certainty… The prudent 
man does not expect certainty where it cannot exist, nor on the other hand does 
he deceive himself by false certainties. 
(Pieper 1960:30-31) 
 
Courage82 
In the first chapter we noted that the virtue of courage equips a person to withstand danger, 
fear and evil, through patient endurance or persistent opposition, in order to preserve or to 
realise the true, the good, and the just. We also noted, however, that according to the traditional 
Western moral philosophy of virtue, courage is subordinate to both prudence and justice, and 
that the display of courage in an imprudent or unjust conflict may be vicious. As Ambrose said, 
“Courage without justice is a means of evil,”83 (Off. 1.35.176), and Aquinas affirmed that the 
praise of courage depends upon justice (ST IIaIIae 123.12). The implication of this is that a soldier 
                                                          
82 My discussion of courage in the context of Just War is based on my essay found at Steele (2014). 
83 fortitudo sine iustitia iniquitatis materia est. 
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can only truly display courage if engaged in a Just War and that acts of bravery in an unjust war 
are not, in fact, courageous at all. 
 
This implication is contested by contemporary persons for several reasons. The first objection is, 
as we have noted in discussing the ius ad bellum criteria, that the justice or injustice of deploying 
military force is a political decision in which the rank and file soldier and, indeed, most officers, 
have no say at all. Military personnel, thus, are not directly involved in the decision to engage in 
armed conflict, and should not, therefore, be held accountable for it. Due to this consideration 
Walzer (2006:34f.) postulated the concept of the ‘moral equality’ of combatants, in which, 
soldiers are not morally blameworthy if their conduct in war is in accordance with the ius in bello 
criteria of proportionality, discrimination and responsibility. By implication, then, there is no 
reason to question their ability to display true courage or any other virtue, even if they are 
fighting in an unjust war, contrary to the traditional opinion expressed by Aristotle, Cicero, 
Ambrose and Aquinas. The unanswerable reply to Walzer’s concept of ‘moral equality’ of 
combatants is given by Manfred Rommel, the son of Field-Marshal Erwin Rommel, the German 
commander who was put to death by the Nazis after he was implicated in the plot to assassinate 
Hitler in July 1944, 
all secondary virtues such as bravery, discipline, loyalty and perseverance only have 
validity so long as they are used in a good cause. When a positive cause becomes 
negative, these virtues become questionable. The German army had to experience 
this bitter truth during Hitler’s régime. 
(Rommel 1990:viii). 
A similar refutation of Walzer’s concept is given by McMahan (2009:6), who denies the ‘moral 
equality’ of combatants, arguing that it is simply impossible for soldiers to fulfil the ius in bello 
criteria if they fight in an unjust war, because they 
cannot satisfy the constraints of jus in bello, even in principle, when those 
constraints are properly understood… it is morally wrong to fight in a war that is 
unjust because it lacks a just cause. 
 
A third objection to the concept that courage is dependent on justice is based on the emotivist 
idea, made popular by the mass media, that all British soldiers who have deployed on military 
operations are ‘heroes’, so that the word now means much the same as ‘veteran’ (Steele 2014). 
This ‘sentimentalisation’ of moral terms is, in fact, a symptom of emotivism; an example of the 
sophistic manipulation of language and the ‘Nietzschean’ devaluation of moral virtue. For 
example, in current English usage there is a wide variety of terms which are used, more or less, 
as synonyms for courage, such as bravery, gallantry, fortitude, valour, daring, etc. Formerly, 
however, these terms had rather distinct connotations; courage meant to be emboldened in 
heart, bravery meant ostentatiousness, gallantry was gaudy display, and so on. The ‘Nietzschean’ 
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devaluation of the idea of courage is seen when, by conflating the meaning of all these words, 
they end up with the same basic connotation and persons lose the “ability in common parlance 
to make, for example, a clear, succinct distinction between the man who has true fortitude and 
the one who is all bravado,” (Steele 2014:249). 
 
There is no easy resolution to this conundrum. The courageous man, according to Aristotle (EN 
1115b17), is “the one who endures or fears the right things for the right purpose in the right 
manner at the right time, and who shows confidence in a similar way. For the courageous man 
feels and acts as the circumstances merit, and as principle may dictate.”84 In other words, “The 
courageous man is the one who, in the face of any specific danger, fears - and loves - ordinately 
because, through prudence, he understands the reality of the immediate circumstances, and, 
through justice, knows how to respond appropriately, despite the danger, to secure the good in 
those particular circumstances…… In short, only the morally virtuous can be truly courageous, 
because only they can respond ordinately in the face of evil, danger and injustice.” (Steele 
2014:255).  
 
This may seem a stern doctrine, but it has the support of Lord Moran, who served as a 
Regimental Medical Officer during the First World War. Noticing that some soldiers were better 
able than others to endure the demands of trench warfare, Moran made a study of courage in 
war and concluded: 
I contend that fortitude in war has its roots in morality; that [military] selection is a 
search for character, and that war itself is but one more test – the supreme and 
final test if you will – of character. Courage can be judged from danger only if the 
social significance and meaning of courage is known to us, namely that a man of 
character in peace becomes a man of courage in war. He cannot be selfish in peace 
and yet be unselfish in war. Character as Aristotle taught is a habit, the daily choice 
of right instead of wrong; it is a moral quality which grows to maturity in peace and 
is not suddenly developed on the outbreak of war. For war, in spite of much that 
we have heard to the contrary, has no power to transform, it merely exaggerates 
the good and evil that are in us, till it is plain for all to read; it cannot change, it 
exposes. Man’s fate in battle is worked out before war begins. For his acts in war 
are dictated not by courage, nor by fear, but by conscience, of which war is the final 
test. 
(Moran 1945:170) 
It is noteworthy that Moran refers back to Aristotle’s teaching on the importance of habit in 
forming virtue. He explains Aristotle’s view by weaving habit, moral agency and moral rectitude 
together when he says that “Character… is a habit, the daily choice of right instead of wrong.” 
He, thus, explicitly links moral rectitude to courage, which most contemporary soldiers would 
                                                          
84 ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ ϕοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, 
ἀνδρεῖος (κατ’ ἀξίαν γάρ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος). 
 
 
80 
 
think are unrelated to each other. We shall return to this topic when we consider moral 
education in the next chapter. 
 
Temperance 
Temperance is the cardinal virtue which is aimed exclusively at the moral agent himself (Pieper 
1955:55). It will be recalled that temperance is self-disciplined moderation in the enjoyment of 
legitimate goods in order that one does not become the slave of self-destructive behaviour and 
attitudes. It might seem that such self-discipline is only tangentially relevant to the soldier 
deployed on military operations. It is helpful to recall, therefore, that the concepts of honour 
and shame occupy a place in the traditional Western understanding of the virtue of temperance. 
These concepts are difficult for contemporary persons to understand because modern moral 
ideas are often framed in terms of the psychological language of ‘self-actualisation’ and 
‘repression’, and the legal language of ‘guilt’ and ‘innocence’. The traditional concept of honour, 
however, remains very important for military personnel. Not only because the profession of 
arms is one which is thought by its practitioners to be an honourable one, nor because it is one 
of the areas of public service which is still given actual symbols of honour in medals and through 
the national system of honours and awards. Honour is important for Western soldiers because 
it is a concept which still has relevance for the people of many polities and ethnic groups around 
the world and it is precisely amongst these people that the British Army is likely to be deployed 
on military operations in the COE. The honourable conduct of soldiers, therefore, becomes vital 
to achieving the operational or tactical mission, and to achieving the political and strategic 
objective for which the government decided to deploy the armed forces in the first place. 
 
Furthermore, a consideration of the subordinate parts of temperance shows that many of them 
facilitate the soldier in justly conducting ‘war amongst the people’. Studiositas enables a person 
to learn to truly understand others and to know their customs and worldview. Honestum makes 
one frank, open, credible, impartial and trustworthy in the face of conflicting opinions and when 
endowed with authority or power over others. The qualities of a merciful person: gentleness 
(clementia); mildness (mansuetudo); modesty (modestia); and humility (humilitas) enable the 
soldier to retain that quies animi in the face of turmoil, provocation, aggression, faction and 
discord, which Aquinas says is the especial characteristic of the temperate person (ST IIaIIae 141.2 
ad 2). 
It may be wondered how this relates to the soldier deployed on demanding military operations 
or in the midst of combat. The opinion of Field-Marshal Sir William Slim (1957:51-53), describing 
the qualities of the good soldier, may help give an answer: 
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Any soldier who has courage, endurance, skill at arms, adaptability and discipline, 
will be a very efficient soldier but he will not be the British soldier, for he has 
something more. It may seem strange to talk of gentleness as a soldierly quality, 
but it is – and he has it. Time and again the British soldier has combined real 
toughness in hardship and battle with gentleness to the weak, the defeated, the 
unhappy… The British soldier is, bless him, a grim fighter but a bad hater…… Many 
countries produce fine soldiers, whose achievements rival those of our own. It is in 
character that the British soldier shows beyond others the marks of greatness. 
Courage, endurance, skill, adaptability, discipline they may have, but none blends 
these qualities together as he does with this leaven of gentleness and humour. 
 
Sir John Fortescue in his monumental study, A History of the British Army, makes the same claim: 
“The British Army will be remembered best not for its countless deeds of daring and invincible 
stubbornness in battle, but for its lenience in conquest and its gentleness in domination,” (cited 
in Hutchinson 1945:16). These are apt descriptions of the place and importance for the 
contemporary soldier of the quies animi which arises from the virtue of temperantia, with its 
subordinate virtues of honestum, clementia, mansuetudo, humilitas and modestia.  For this reason, 
therefore, I must disagree with the argument that “a certain kind of callousness is a military 
virtue” in officers (Biggar 2013:148; cf. pp. 116-119). This may be no more than a semantic 
disagreement, however, if by ‘callousness’ Biggar means that an officer, in ordering his men to 
fight knowing that some casualties will occur, is directed more by his prudential judgement and 
determined will than by his natural emotions at the thought of losing men under his command. 
Biggar’s discussion on love in war (2013:61f.) indicates that this might be the case and balances 
his statements regarding the necessity for callousness. 
 
Honour85 
I have already mentioned the importance of honour and its contrary, shame, in the 
contemporary military operations amongst peoples which retain a sense of honour and shame. 
In the contemporary Western worldview, however, death is widely viewed as the greatest evil 
which can befall a person. This is not surprising if one has a purely materialist understanding of 
human nature, and is sceptical about truth and reality, and, therefore, about ultimate meaning 
and purpose. As war is an activity which involves the killing of humans, it is often perceived as 
the greatest social evil that can occur. Very many modern studies of war, therefore, stress the 
horrors and evils of war, while only a few, such as Marlantes (2012), acknowledge that there is 
another side to war and combat. What is paradoxical about combat is that, in addition to being 
frightening, confusing, lonely and loud (even in ancient times, cf. Xenophon, Agesilaus 2.12.14), 
it is also the opposite: it can be exhilarating, as the enemy or fear are overcome; ordered, as the 
                                                          
85 In this section I have used some observations I made about honour and shame in 2011 on an internet-
based course on Greek Mythology offered by Oxford University Department of Continuing Education. 
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disorientation and confusion are mastered and the plan or manoeuvre comes together and 'runs 
like clockwork'; bonding, as the combatant shares this unique experience with his comrades in 
arms, and comes to love them in an unconditional way, despite their weaknesses and character 
flaws (Biggar 2013:61f.). Battle shows some men at their best, and they are, therefore, justly 
honoured; hence the dictum: “Man’s fate in battle is worked out before war begins. For his acts 
in war are dictated not by courage, nor by fear, but by conscience, of which war is the final test.” 
(Moran 1945:170). 
 
I believe, therefore, that it is a skewed understanding of the nature of both war and death which 
leads Robinson (2006) to denigrate the importance and rôle of honour in ennobling war and the 
warlike character. At the end of his study of honour and the conduct of war he states: 
The only possible conclusion one can draw from these facts is that… war is a 
ridiculous activity. The main reason why it continues to happen in the Western 
world is that many continue to believe that their honour is linked to their 
willingness to fight. 
(Robinson 2006:191) 
This is a damning conclusion, but one which, I believe, cannot be supported. In the context of 
the contemporary Western emotivist worldview it is culturally comfortable to make 
generalisations about the horrors of war and also to assert that men go to war simply for honour 
– a denigrated concept nowadays - and, therefore, that “they are in effect fighting for the sake 
of fighting” (Robinson 2006:190). Men go to war, not only for honour, but for a variety of reasons, 
and, while it may be true that some enjoy fighting for its own sake, there is no evidence that this 
is what motivates the majority of combatants. In fact, it is extremely difficult to understand what 
motivates individuals to volunteer to go to war and, even more, what motivates them in combat, 
as the motivations of soldiers' hearts are obscure even to the soldiers themselves (von Schell 
1933:9). I think, therefore, that Robinson’s conclusion more accurately reflects the denigration 
of the concept of honour and nobility in the contemporary West than a true judgement of what 
motivates men to fight. General Hackett (1962:46) makes the interesting observation that: 
War does not ennoble. Kant’s view that war has made more bad people than it has 
destroyed is probably nearer the mark. But the interesting thing is that although 
war most certainly does not ennoble, the preparation of men to fight in it almost 
certainly can and very often does. 
 
This is a topic to which we shall return when we discuss character formation in the next chapter. 
Honour is not a straightforward concept, even for those who believe in it. The ancient Greek 
poet, Ibycus (fl. 550 BC), composed verse on Homeric themes and characters. In one poem he 
says, "I fear that I shall earn honour from men by some sin against the gods."86 The reverse side 
                                                          
86 δέδοικα μή τι πὰρ θεοῖς ἀμβλακὼν τιμὰν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀμείψω  (cited in Plutarch, Quaestionum 
Convivialum 748c, 9.15.2) 
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of honour (τιμή) for the Greeks, therefore, was an equally developed sense of shame (αἰδώς), 
which prevented them from falling into the sin of overweening arrogance (ὕβρις). Αἰδώς was 
the regard the Homeric man had for others’ opinion of his excellence or virtue (ἀρετή), which 
was expressed in his respect for justice (δίκη) as prescribed by customary norms (θέμις) and law 
(νόμος), his reverence (σέβας) for the gods, the nation, the elders, and his parents, and the 
consequent sense of shame and remorse he felt if he violated any of these. Intimately connected 
with αἰδώς was νέμεσις, the righteous indignation that one man felt at another’s wrong-doing 
(Murray 1934:83f.). It is this idea of honour and shame, combined with a belief in objective truth 
and goodness and beauty, which allowed a man to honour one who fell in combat: 
When a Roman father told his son that it was a sweet and seemly thing to die for 
his country, he believed what he said. He was communicating to the son an emotion 
which he himself shared and which he believed to be in accord with the value which 
his judgement discerned in noble death. He was giving the boy the best he had, 
giving of his spirit to humanize him as he had given of his body to beget him. 
(Lewis 1946:19) 
 
Conclusion 
All of the virtues are important for the soldier involved with military operations, whether 
advising the government on policy, or at the strategic, operational or tactical levels; and whether 
engaged in combat, or in a humanitarian intervention, or in peace-keeping, or in all three at once 
in some form of Krulak’s ‘three-block war’: 
It is quite clear, then, that these and all the other virtues are closely related to one 
another. For courage, the virtue which leads people to protect their country from 
barbarians in time of war, or which in peacetime makes them defend the weak or 
protect their friends from robbers, is also full of justice. Then again, in order to 
know how best to defend people and help them, and to be able to seize the right 
opportunities of time and place, prudence and moderation are called for. And 
temperance, for its part, would never know what due measure was were it not for 
prudence; and it is only thanks to justice that we are able to identify an opportunity, 
or to repay someone with the appropriate measure. And in every one of these 
things, greatness of spirit is necessary too, as is a certain mental, not to say physical, 
courage, to enable a person to carry out his wishes.87 
(Ambrose, Off. 1.27.129. trans. Davidson) 
Moral virtue is distorted through disordered and undisciplined sustentative and affective 
appetites. Emotivism, i.e. disordered and incongruous sentiment, is shown in the human agent 
being either inappropriately sentimental (the vice of excess) or unfeeling (the vice of deficiency). 
I have argued in Chapter Two that sophistry opposes the prudential realisation of the moral 
                                                          
87 Liquet igitur et has et reliquas cognatas sibi esse virtutes siquidem et fortitudo, quae vel in bello tuetur 
a barbaris patriam vel domi defendit infirmos vel a latronibus socios plena iustitiae sit; et scire quo consilio 
defendat atque adiuvet, captare etiam temporum et locorum opportunitates, prudentiae ac modestiae sit; 
et temperantia ipsa sine prudentia modum scire non possit; opportunitatem noscere et secundum mensuram 
reddere, sit iustitiae; et in omnibus istis magnanimitas necessaria sit et quaedam fortitudo mentis 
plerumque et corporis, ut quis quod velit implere possit. 
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virtues. In the profession of arms this opposition specifically applies to justice - i.e. the willed 
intent which accords to each individual person their rightful due, and to temperance – i.e. the 
self-control and self-knowledge which leads to gentleness and kindliness, qualities not unrelated 
to nobility of soul. This injustice and intemperance are often realised in practice at the personal 
and tactical levels as a lack of appropriate empathy for others. This lack of appropriate empathy 
becomes important in the context of British military doctrine regarding the COE, the ‘strategic 
corporal’, and ‘war among the people’, as it hinders the Army’s operational effectiveness. As 
Hackett (1962:45-46) noted: 
The military virtues are not in a class apart; ‘they are virtues which are virtues in 
every walk of life… none the less virtues for being… set in blood and iron.’ They 
include such qualities as courage, fortitude and loyalty. What is important about 
such qualities as these… is that they acquire in the military context, in addition to 
their moral significance, a functional significance as well. The essential function of 
an armed force is to fight in battle. Given equally advanced military techniques a 
force in which the qualities I have mentioned are more highly developed will usually 
defeat a stronger force in which they are less. Thus while you may indeed hope to 
meet these virtues in every walk of life and a good deal of educational effort is spent 
on developing them as being generally desirable, in the profession of arms they are 
functionally indispensable. The training, group organisations, the whole pattern of 
the professional man at arms is designed in a deliberate effort to foster them, not 
just because they are morally desirable in themselves, but because they contribute 
to military efficiency. 
 
In effect, Hackett is saying that the British Army ought not to strive to develop virtue in its 
soldiers because this will make them more excellent soldiers, but because they become more 
excellent soldiers by being more excellent persons in their own right. This is the rôle of moral 
education, to which we now turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORAL EDUCATION 
 
And I would let it be known to you that very often it has come to my mind what learnèd men 
there were formerly throughout the English nation… and what glad times there were then 
throughout the English nation…… and how they prospered both in warfare and in wisdom…… 
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and how men from abroad sought wisdom and learning here in this land…… Think what 
punishments came upon us in this world when we neither loved learning ourselves nor allowed 
it to other men. We all loved the reputation for being Christian, but very few the moral virtues.88 
Ælfred the Great (c. AD 880) ‘Preface’ to the translation of Gregory the Great’s Pastoralia. 
 
Introduction 
In antiquity it was believed that the purpose of education (παιδεία, disciplina) was the formation 
of good character by teaching the young to live well as complete persons (Jaeger 1945:xxii-xxiii), 
i.e. its purpose was moral and aimed at equipping the young to lead fully flourishing lives. 
Nowadays it is often claimed that the purpose of education is to train the young to work within 
‘useful’ sectors such as the natural sciences and the economy. Educational theory in the past 
recognised a distinction between the artes liberales, which, as knowledge worthy of free and 
rational persons, were pursued simply for their own sakes, and the artes serviles, which were 
pursued for the sake of something other than themselves, as, for example, knowledge of 
medicine is pursued for the sake of health89 (Pieper 1952:44), as Aquinas noted, “only those arts 
which are ordered to knowing are called liberal arts, those which are certainly ordered to some 
utility attained by action are called mechanical or servile.”90 (Sen. Met. 1.3.8).  
 
In this chapter I suggest that moral education is peculiarly vulnerable to sophistic corruption 
precisely because it is primarily delivered by means of words and requires pupils to be receptive 
to their teachers. To support this claim, I shall describe the traditional Western approach to 
moral education, based on the idea of the formation of virtuous character, in part through 
education in the artes liberales. I shall argue that sophistic corruption of education in the 
contemporary Western liberal democracies is seen in the change in emphasis in curricula from 
teaching the artes liberales to teaching the artes serviles; a change which, in part, has led to 
confusion and ignorance amongst teachers regarding specifically moral education. Finally, I shall 
explore how this traditional approach might yet be practicably applicable to the contemporary 
British Army. 
Traditional Western Moral Education 
During the crisis of the Second World War, when British policy-makers were much exercised by 
educational reform in order to create ‘a land fit for heroes’ after the war’s end (Lester Smith 
                                                          
88 ⁊ þe cyðan hate þæt me com sƿiðe oft on ʓemynd, hƿelce ƿiotan ʓio ƿæron ʓeond Anʓelcynn… ⁊ hu 
ʓesæliʓlica tida þa ƿæron ʓeond Anʓelcynn…… ⁊ hu him þa speoƿ æʓðer ʓe mid ƿiʓe ʓe mid ƿisdome…… 
⁊ hu man utanbordes ƿisdom ⁊ lare hieder on lond sohte…… Ʒeðenc hƿelc ƿitu us þa becomon for þisse 
ƿorulde, þa þa ƿe hit nohƿæðer ne selfe ne lufedon ne eac oðrum monnum ne lifdon lærdan: þone naman 
anne ƿe hæfdon lufedon þætte ƿe Cristene ƿæron, ⁊ sƿiðe feaƿe þa þeaƿas.      (adp. Sweet 1871:2-4) 
89 See, for example, Xenophon, Oeconomicus 3.4.2f. and Aristotle, Politica 1278a8. 
90 illae solae artes liberales dicuntur, quae ad sciendum ordinantur: illae vero quae ordinantur ad aliquam 
utilitatem per actionem habendam, dicuntur mechanicae sive serviles. 
 
 
86 
 
1949:122f.), Sir Richard Livingstone stressed the importance of the ancient Greek conception of 
a liberal education. His argument is worth quoting at some length: 
To understand [liberal education], we must imagine ourselves in the Greek world 
where the great distinction was between free men and slaves, and a liberal 
education was the education fitted to a free citizen… But though slavery has gone, 
the ideal of the free man’s education is not antiquated. Here, as so often, the 
Greeks saw to the heart of the matter and put their fingers on an essential 
distinction…… they held that the free man, the real man, the complete man, must 
be something more than a mere breadwinner, and must have something besides 
the knowledge necessary to earn his living. He must have also the education which 
will give him the chance of developing the gifts and faculties of human nature and 
becoming a full human being. They saw clearly… that a man might be a doctor or a 
lawyer or a shopkeeper or an artisan or a clerk, but that he was also a man, and 
that education should recognise this and help each individual to become, so far as 
his capacities allowed, what a man ought to be. That was the meaning of a liberal 
education, and that was its aim – the making of men; and clearly it is different from 
a technical education which simply enables us to earn our bread, but does not make 
us complete human beings. 
 And what is a complete human being? Again I shall take the Greek answer to this 
question. Human beings have bodies, minds and characters. Each of these is 
capable of what the Greeks called ‘virtue’ (ἀρετή) or what we might call ‘excellence’. 
The virtue or excellence of the body is health and fitness and strength…; the 
excellence of the mind is to know and to understand and to think…; the excellence 
of the character lies in the great virtues. This unity of the body, mind and character 
is man: man’s aim, besides earning his living, is to make the most of all three, to 
have as good a mind, body and character as possible; and a liberal education, a free 
man’s education, is to help him to this. 
(Livingstone 1941:68-69) 
 
As Livingstone makes clear, knowledge of various practical matters was incorporated in a liberal 
education, partly because it was recognised that it was an important aid in inculcating those 
habits of diligence which contributed to virtuous character: 
Moreover, certain other habits of the soul are, as it were, ‘mulched’ and prepared 
for virtue by the right studies and practical arts, such as, in personal affairs, the 
study of literature, or harmonics and sound [in music], or geometry, or astronomy, 
or riding, or hunting, or weapon-handling; and, in public affairs, the more willing 
study of some other kinds of virtue, especially religious observance or service in the 
affairs of the gods, or being especially and notably diligent about parents or friends 
or hospitality. And this indeed [sums up] the virtues.91 
(Cicero, Par. Or. 23.80) 
The Greeks, too, argued that a liberal education consisted of μουσική, ‘the liberal arts’, γυμνασία, 
‘bodily training’, and practical knowledge (Plato, Respublica 376ef.; Aristotle, Politica 1336bf.; 
Xenophon, Oeconomicus). It was the combination of these which helped to form nobility of 
                                                          
91 Sunt autem alii quidam animi habitus ad virtutem quasi praeculti et praeperati rectis studiis et artibus, 
ut in suis rebus studia litterarum, ut numerorum ac sonorum, ut mensurae, ut siderum, ut equorum, ut 
venandi, ut armorum; in communibus propensiora studia in aliquo genere virtutis praecipue colendo aut 
divinis rebus deserviendo aut parentibus, amicis, hospitibus praecipue atque insigniter diligendis. Atque 
haec quidem virtutum. 
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character (καλοκἀγαθία) by developing virtue (ἀρετή). The word καλοκἀγαθία, literally means 
being both ‘admirable’ (καλός) and ‘good’ (ἀγαθός), which was achieved by educating the young 
person to feel ordinate love for that which is truly admirable and good, and ordinate loathing 
for that which is truly execrable and bad (Lewis 1946:15-16; Livingstone 1943:91). For the 
ancients, therefore, liberal education aimed at the formation of virtuous and noble character in 
the young person. Its purpose, as Cicero (Off. 2.5.18) claimed, was to form the requisite virtues 
which would discipline the sustentative appetites and inspire love of goodness in the affective 
sentiments, while directing the intellect to truth and the will to right action (Steele 2015). 
Granting that this view of moral education is correct, the key question then becomes how one 
achieves this purpose. In traditional Western education this was done by a threefold method 
(Bassham 2008:249): (1) instructing the mind in objective truth by rational knowledge of first 
principles and material reality which lays the foundation for recognising the Natural Moral Law 
and spiritual reality; (2) inculcating habits of excellence by the repetition of functionally good 
acts which, practised in everyday activities, lays the foundation for developing virtuous habits 
by the repetition of morally good acts; and (3) inspiring love of goodness by the remembrance 
and imitation of good examples which lay the foundation of personal virtuous action. 
 
Aquinas (Ver. 11.1 ad 6) stressed that the teacher does not simply transfer knowledge to the 
pupil. The pupil needs to receive the knowledge and make it his own. Hence, Aquinas - himself 
an experienced teacher (Kenny 1980:3f.) - stated that all pupils must start learning by simply 
believing what they are taught by the teacher (ST IIaIIae 2.3), i.e. by trusting his auctoritas. All 
education, therefore, requires co-operation between teacher and pupil, and this is implicit in 
the threefold method. The teacher explains the subject and exemplifies it in person, while the 
pupil initially imitates the teacher and aspires to live up to his example, growing to moral 
maturity by habitual practice and increasing knowledge till good and noble character becomes 
realised in him.92 
Plato (Meno 82bf.) argued that moral education is founded in part upon teaching arithmetical 
subjects in which personal opinion is of no consequence in arriving at the correct answer to a 
calculation. Meilaender (1984:57) has suggested that Plato insisted that all who entered the 
                                                          
92 In addition, Aquinas (Sent. Eth. 6, lect. 7) points out that all education, including moral education, must 
be grounded in a knowledge of the trivium, the basic “tools of learning” (Sayers 1948). The trivium consists 
of: Grammar, the study of language, by which one learns how to use words correctly to express one’s 
thoughts and, by enabling one to read, makes the artes liberales accessible; Dialectic, the study of thinking, 
by which one learns how to reason correctly and make valid arguments; and Rhetoric, the study of 
communication, by which one learns how to speak well and present arguments persuasively in order to 
communicate one’s thoughts to others (Joseph & McGlinn 2002:3). All subsequent education in the artes 
liberales is predicated on the assumption that the pupil has mastered these basic tools of learning. Due 
to constraints of space, I shall not discuss them in any detail in this dissertation. 
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Academy should have a knowledge of geometry93 precisely because the proofs of geometry 
taught the pupil that there are certain fields of knowledge in which there are objective truths; 
that two plus two will always equal four, no matter what the pupil’s opinion may be, thereby 
fostering in the pupil the disinterested desire for truth. Arithmetical studies, along with dialectic, 
constituted the foundations of educating the intellect and reason in rational thought. Another 
effect of instructing pupils in objective truth, however, is that it prepares them to recognise 
that certain objective moral values and fundamental moral principles are evident 
to every rational creature… On this view, instruction plays a crucial role in moral 
education by helping to bring latent moral principles to full consciousness in young 
minds, by reminding… people of important ethical truths, by correcting false moral 
opinions that can arise from corrupting social influences or wilful moral blindness, 
and by helping us to correctly apply general moral principles to complex concrete 
situations. 
(Bassham 2008:251) 
 
Both Plato (Leges 792e) and Aristotle (EE 1220a39) asserted that the inculcation of habitual 
practice is fundamental to the formation of virtuous character. Aquinas agreed that habitual 
practice brought incipient virtue to its perfection: 
Habits of virtue, before their completion, pre-exist in us in certain natural 
inclinations which are the beginnings of virtue, but afterwards, by the practice of 
works they are brought to their proper completion. Likewise, the same is said of 
the acquisition of rational knowledge; that certain seeds of rational knowledge pre-
exist in us, that is to say, the first conceptions of the intellect. 94 
(Ver. 11.1 resp.) 
For the ancient Greeks one key method of inculcating habitual good practice was through bodily 
training (γυμνασία), which was considered a basic part of education (Aristotle, Politica 1337bf.) 
and focussed on training the body for both athletic contests and war (Plato, Respublica 403-412; 
Lucian, Anacharsis 15.30)95. This training entailed both bodily exercise and a controlled diet 
(Aristotle, Politica 1339a; Philostratus, Gymnasticus 54). The bodily exercise, especially for 
wrestling, “was taught progressively as a sort of drill. First boys were taught to perform the 
separate movements or figures (σχήματα), then to combine them.” (Gardiner 1967:91). In other 
words, the boys were drilled in basic skills and then repeated them till they became automatic. 
The inculcation of good habits requires, therefore, the imposition of discipline by the teacher in 
which the pupils are drilled in the basics of “the right studies and practical arts”, mentioned by 
                                                          
93 A late tradition states that inscribed above the entrance to the Academy were the words, ἀγεωμέτρητος 
μηδεὶς εἰσίτω - ‘None ignorant of geometry shall enter.’ (LSJ9:8b). 
94  virtutum habitus ante earum consummationem  praeexistunt in nobis in quibusdam naturalibus 
inclinationibus, quae sunt quaedam virtutum inchoationes, sed postea per exercitium operum adducuntur 
in debitam consummationem. Similiter etiam dicendum est de scientiae acquisitione; qoud praeexistunt in 
nobis quaedam scientiarum semina, scilicet primae conceptiones intellectus. 
95 See also Plato, Leges 795d, 830c-d, 833a-b and Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.12.1-5. 
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Cicero, and are taught thereby the importance of doing the small things consistently well. 
Bassham (2008:252) explains the relevance of this to moral education: 
Virtues play a crucial role in the moral life. In early moral education, they enable 
children to do what is right long before they understand why it is right. As we 
become older, we acquire, through consistent performance or practice, virtues 
that… enable us to do what we ought to do easily, readily and largely unthinkingly. 
 
As Aquinas observed, “from the multiplication of its acts, the habit grows”96 (ST IaIIae 52.3). The 
repetition of drills necessary to acquire good habits, however, may be off-putting to the young. 
Moreover, the imposition of discipline is not sufficient in itself to inspire the young to embrace 
the tedium of regular repetition in order to acquire those habits which are the seedbed of 
virtuous character.  The pupils, therefore, require an imaginative engagement with the repeated 
drill which helps to impart deeper meaning to those daily disciplines of learning to live well, to 
which subject we now turn. 
 
The ancient Greeks recognised that each part of the human soul - sustentative, affective, and 
intellectual – contributes to our moral judgement and decision-making and, thus, each needs to 
be subject to moral education, but they particularly stressed the importance of educating the 
affective part of the soul. Both Plato (Leges 653; Respublica 402a; Meno) and Aristotle (EN 1104a) 
argued that our sentiments or emotions can be either congruent or incongruent with the 
objective reality of the world around us as revealed by our senses, and that our feelings of desire 
and irritation, therefore, need to be educated to respond appropriately to the various stimuli in 
the environment (Lewis 1946:15f.). This idea underlies the ancient and medieval approach to 
moral education and character formation. Commenting on Augustine’s definition of virtue as 
“the ordering of love,”97 Aquinas said, “virtue is called the order or ordering of love, as it is to 
that end that virtue exists; for love is ordered in us by virtue.”98 (ST IaIIae 55.1 ad 4). If one’s loves 
and emotions, however, are not ordered properly then one’s moral life will also become 
disordered. “Moral virtue prevents disordered emotion from leading to inappropriate action” 
(Kenny 1980:21). 99 
We have already noted that, for the Greeks, the key method by which the emotions were 
morally educated was through μουσική. Μουσική was so called because it constituted the 
province of the nine Muses, the daughters of the goddess Mnemosyne (Μνημοσύνη), whose 
                                                          
96 multiplicatis actibus, crescit habitus 
97 ordo amoris (Civ. Dei 15.22). 
98 virtus dicitur ordo vel ordinatio amoris, sicut id ad quod est virtus: per virtutem enim ordinatur amor in 
nobis. 
99 virtus passiones inordinatas superat; moderatas autem producit… passiones inordinatae inducunt ad 
peccandum; non autem si sint moderatae. “virtue overcomes inordinate emotions; indeed, it produces 
regulated ones… inordinate emotions lead to sin; not, however, if they have been regulated.” (Aquinas, 
ST IaIIae 59.5 ad 1-2). 
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name, significantly, means ‘remembrance’ (Pieper 1990:59). Μουσική comprised, not only 
music, but all those subjects which later came to be called the artes liberales. It entailed, 
however, not simply studying the artes liberales, the province of the Muses, but also being 
inspired by these goddesses, through the remembrance of ancient wisdom and of past great 
and noble deeds and words, to develop a truly free and noble character. In antiquity the truth 
that μουσική was central to moral education was recognised by all those societies influenced by 
Hellenism, especially the Romans,100 but perhaps the best evidence for this recognition is the 
fact that the idea was endorsed by Jewish writers, even though the Jews opposed much of 
Hellenistic culture and resisted attempts to Hellenize them. Hence, Philo, a Jewish philosopher 
of the First Century AD, stated, that the soul is trained “through literature, arithmetic, geometry, 
and the liberal arts (μουσική), and philosophy as a whole.”101 (Philo, Spec. Leg. 2.229-230). 
 
A.N. Whitehead observed, “Moral education is impossible without the habitual vision of 
greatness,” (cited in Livingstone 1943:50). This habitual vision of greatness is presented to pupils 
through μουσική in two ways: by inculcating reverence for the community’s traditional customs 
and ancient laws; and by bringing to remembrance (μνημοσύνη102) its traditional stories and 
myths, its past history and achievements, its famous heroes and infamous villains. Moral 
education, therefore, entails two kinds of instruction: rational (λόγος, ratio), which is aimed at 
imparting a vision of truth, i.e. it educates the reason so that one’s ideas about reality conform 
to it as it actually is; and imaginative (μῦθος, fabula), which is aimed at imparting a vision of 
goodness, i.e. it educates the sentiments and imagination so that one desires the good and 
aspires to it. It imparts a vision of one’s community which is based on the community’s stories 
passed down by long tradition. This vision is to be realised in one’s own attitudes and actions. 
“Myth and heroic poetry are the nation’s inexhaustible treasure of great examples: from them 
it derives its ideals and its standards for daily life,” (Jaeger 1945:41). The way in which this is 
done is through the integration of one’s personal story with that of the community, so that one’s 
sentiments are educated through a multi-layered, imaginatively engaging story which allows one 
to find meaning in one’s own life by situating it in the larger, equally meaningful, life of one’s 
family, one’s community, and one’s nation. This vision of past greatness inspires the young to 
imitate the example of their forebears: “As Plato notes in the Symposium, good ethical role 
models not only provide patterns of embodied excellence for us to emulate, but also inspire, 
encourage and sometimes shame us into virtuous behaviour.” (Bassham 2008:251). The moral 
                                                          
100 See, for example, Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 1.10 for the argument that history provides moral instruction. 
101 διά τε γραμμάτων καὶ ἀριθμῶν γεωμετρίας τε καὶ μουσικῆς καὶ τῆς συμπάσης ϕιλοσοϕίας. 
102 Remember that Μνημοσύνη was the mother of the Muses. 
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dangers to a community or nation of the sophistic creation of pseudo-realities, which corrupt 
the imagination of its people, should now become more apparent. 
 
I have claimed that inculcating reverence (σέβας, veneratio) for the community’s traditional 
norms is one means of educating the affective part of the soul to desire the good and strive for 
it. Norms (ἤθεα, mores), in the sense in which I am using the word, consist of the community’s 
customary usage (θέμις, consuetudo) and day-to-day practice (ἔθος, habitudo). Pietas, or piety, 
is dutiful conduct carried out in conformity with the customary norms and laws of one’s 
community due to the feelings of reverence one has for them and for the community itself (L&S 
1980:1374c-1375a). Its nearest Greek equivalent is εὐσέβεια. It is worth noting that ἤθεα, which 
I have translated ‘norms’, is the plural of ἦθος, which may be translated into English as ‘character’ 
(e.g. Plato, Phaedrus 243c), but can also mean ‘norm’ or ‘custom’ (LSJ9:766b), as can its cognate 
ἔθος, which can also mean ‘habit’. In translating from the Greek philosophers it is not always 
easy to determine which connotation is to be preferred. Likewise, Aquinas sometimes uses the 
three Latin terms (mos, consuetudo, habitudo) synonymously (Deferrari 1960). In the very words 
used to describe moral character, therefore, there is already implicit an indissoluble connection 
between customary norms, normative morality and normal or habitual practice.103 
 
As we have noted, one of the ways in which reverence for tradition can be inculcated is through 
the telling of the community’s old stories or ‘myths’. MacIntyre (1985:216) argued that  
Mythology, in its original sense, is at the heart of things… And so too of course is 
that moral tradition from heroic society to its medieval heirs according to which the 
telling of stories has a key part in educating us into the virtues. 
 
This is because humans are story-telling animals, so persons derive their sense of how they 
should act in any given situation by correctly identifying, firstly, the kind of story in which they 
are caught up, and, second, the particular rôle they are playing in that particular story. This is 
done through hearing and learning the community’s stories, in which the different situations, 
and the appropriate responses to those situations by the different characters of the community, 
are recounted (MacIntyre 1985:216). It is through hearing “the myths we live by” that we learn 
how to interpret the imaginative symbols by which we explain and give meaning to the world 
around us and describe how we should live rightly in it (Midgley 2004). It is worth stressing that 
by ‘myth’ we do not imply that the story is untrue, we mean a story which conveys a deep truth, 
but one which cannot always be adequately expressed in a less imaginatively inspiring way. 
when I use myth… I refer to the universal instinct of any human group, large or small, 
to invest, almost always unconsciously, certain stories or events or places or 
                                                          
103 ἡ δ᾽ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. – “‘morals’ 
arise from customary ‘mores’, hence the name has but a small deviation from ‘mores’.” (Aristotle, EN 
1103a17) 
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persons, real or fictional, with an uncommon significance; to turn them into 
instinctive centres of reference… the story becomes a communal possession, the 
agreed and classic embodiment of some way of thinking or feeling. 
(Tillyard 1961:10) 
 
It might be wondered how the pagan idea of immersing the pupil in history and myth relates to 
the moral philosophy of Aquinas described in my first chapter. One answer is that Christians 
inherited a moral tradition, not only from Classical culture, but also from the Hebrew Bible, 
which gives a vision of a universal history under God’s overarching moral governance for the 
whole of humanity, not just for a single nation, from Creation through to its final consummation 
at the Day of Doom (Butterfield 1949; Pieper 1969; Meeks 1993). The stories of past heroes and 
of one’s community or nation are given greater moral depth by being fitted into this universal 
history, which confirms both the Natural Moral Law and God’s Divine Law, as well as teaching 
that obedience and conformity to God’s moral laws are not simply one’s duty, but one’s delight. 
 
Josef Pieper (1969:40f.) explains that theologians with this universal understanding of history 
challenge two different forms of historicism; the first is the belief that human history is a record 
of the ineluctable march of human ‘progress’ from worse to better. The second is “the despairing 
concept of historical absurdity… which asserts the absolute meaninglessness of the historical 
process.” Pieper notes that one’s conception of human nature, of how it is integral to the whole 
natural order and what this indicates about both the ultimate meaning of everyday human acts 
and the ultimate future of humanity itself, can either lead one to ennobling hope or nihilistic 
despair. If one believes that human existence and, therefore, life itself are ultimately 
meaningless, then it is impossible to have any true hope in the face of present suffering and 
sorrow or in a future which inevitably culminates in non-existence. Hope, however, gives one 
the ennobling vision that what one does in the everyday world of the here-and-now, does 
ultimately matter, and this vision inspires one to strive to do well, to be better, to achieve the 
fullest potential of which one is capable,104 because every individual thing within the created 
order, from bread and wine to wood and stone, not to mention each individual human person, 
made in God’s Own image, becomes charged with profound meaning, even if one cannot fully 
grasp that meaning in the contingent workaday world of the present. Merely living in such a 
world as, according to the universal conception of history, this one is, requires a person to act 
and be in a way that is concordant with its majesty and mystery; and when he sees this ‘vision 
of greatness’, he cannot do otherwise than be ennobled in character and live in the hope of the 
fulfilment of his own redeemed nature (Tolkien 1946:61-63). 
                                                          
104 Recall that this is Aquinas’s definition of virtue (Virt. Comm. 9.15). 
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It is noteworthy that the traditional method of moral education does not entail the intellectual 
study of moral philosophy, but emphasizes imaginative immersion in stories of the community. 
Mere instruction in morality is not sufficient to nurture the virtues. It might even 
backfire, especially when the presentation is heavily exhortative and the pupil’s will 
is coerced. Instead, a compelling vision of the goodness of goodness itself needs to 
be presented in a way that is attractive and stirs the imagination. A good moral 
education addresses both the cognitive and affective dimensions of human nature. 
Stories are an irreplaceable medium for this kind of moral education – that is, the 
education of character. 
(Guroian 1998:20)  
Responding to recommendations that schools should approach moral education by lessons in 
moral philosophy, Mary Warnock (1979:79) remarked that such lessons would not change the 
moral behaviour of school pupils, because a “man (or a child) may be knowledgeable, rational, 
logical and astute, yet not morally good. For to be morally good is to have a certain sort of 
character, not a certain sort of ability, nor a certain sort of knowledge.” Warnock stressed that 
the formation of character entailed presenting pupils with a vision of goodness which inspired 
them to emulate those who exemplify goodness themselves. “In the end, though these are harsh 
words, a child develops a good character largely by following a good example. This is the only 
way that virtue can be ‘taught’,” (Warnock 1979:83). Moral education is practical, not 
theoretical. In fact, theoretical teaching of moral philosophy is rightly viewed with some 
misgiving, especially as it is peculiarly vulnerable to sophistic corruption. 
 
Sophistic Corruption of Education 
in his March 2016 Budget speech, George Osborne, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, said he 
wanted mathematics to become a compulsory subject for all school pupils till the age of eighteen, 
in order “to boost the country’s productivity” (O’Grady & Law 2016b:23). According to Ball 
(2008:1), 
Education has become a major political issue, a major focus of media attention and 
the recipient of a constant stream of initiatives and interventions from 
government... Education is now seen as a crucial factor in ensuring economic 
productivity and competitiveness in the context of ‘informational capitalism’. In 
other words, education policy is increasingly thought about and made within the 
context of the ‘pressures’ and requirements of globalisation. 
 
Such proposals to increase the proportion of the school curriculum given over to the artes 
serviles are not new in British politics. In 1916 in a parliamentary speech regarding educational 
reform, Viscount Haldane advocated the introduction of more training in the natural sciences 
and technology on the grounds that it was “necessary to train the future generation of industrial 
experts to retain the position of this country in the markets and factories of the world” (Haldane 
1916:20), and “to preserve our great industrial and commercial position.” (Haldane 1916:17). 
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He did not deny the importance of the artes liberales in the school curriculum, but the 
educational reform he proposed was focussed exclusively on the artes serviles. Haldane 
(1916:74-75) concluded his speech by stating, 
If money is spent on these things it will come back, not ten times or a hundred times, 
but a thousand times. It is all vital to us. The old order is passing away, and we are 
face to face with a new order. Our old methods will not avail us any longer. That is 
why one hopes that the Government will take the field in preparing the nation for 
the struggle which lies before us as soon as this war is over – a struggle not less 
deadly and not less terrible, because, as I have said, it will not be obvious and it will 
be slow. 
 
Since 1916 Parliament has passed 36 Education Acts and published a host of policy Papers and 
proposals (Gillard 2011). Yet it is remarkable that, despite repeated educational reform along 
the lines Haldane suggested, in the last hundred years Britain has notably failed to retain her 
pre-eminent position in the world. There are very many reasons for this failure and some have 
no connection whatsoever with education (Halsey 1981:123-124). It could be argued, however, 
that educational reform over the last century, with its increased emphasis on utilitarian subjects 
and the concomitant rejection of the traditional Western understanding of the fundamentally 
moral purpose of education, has materially contributed to the UK’s loss of stature in the world. 
When policy-makers primarily see pupils as a means of national economic production, they 
necessarily no longer see them as human persons, each with a unique character to be nurtured. 
Policy-makers no longer perceive the purpose of education to be teaching the young to live a 
fully flourishing life by means of the artes liberales, but, instead, see it as teaching the artes 
serviles so that the young can fulfil utilitarian rôles which support national economic goals. 
Political statements about improving education for the young, thus, seem to be no more than 
sophistry. Discussing the language of government educational policy, Ball (2008:5) notes: 
policy discourses work to privilege certain ideas and topics and speakers and 
exclude others. Policy discourses also organise their own specific rationalities, 
making particular sets of ideas obvious, common sense and ‘true’. Discourses 
mobilise truth claims and constitute rather than simply reflect social reality…… 
Policies are very specific and practical regimes of truth and value and the ways in 
which policies are spoken and spoken about, their vocabularies, are part of the 
creation of their conditions of acceptance and enactment. They construct the 
inevitable and the necessary. 
 
Ball’s meaning is clear: contemporary British educational policy-makers manipulate pupils and 
parents and deny them contact with reality by the sophistic abuse of language and power. 
 
In his advocacy of the artes serviles Haldane does not seem to have wondered whether or not 
they really ought to be emphasized over the artes liberales as he proposed, given that Britain 
had actually reached its pre-eminent position in industry, trade, and empire with an educational 
system which focussed almost exclusively on the artes liberales, and which emphasized the 
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moral worth of this type of education, while retaining an aristocratic disregard for utilitarian 
training (Lester Smith 1949:87ff.). In his speech, Haldane (1916:65-66), made only one short 
comment on moral education, in which, notably, he confused it with religious education. His 
neglect of moral education appears to arise from a lack of recognition that it provided the 
unifying purpose of traditional Western liberal education and that preservation of national 
economic productivity could never be an adequate substitute as a unifying purpose for modern 
education. 
 
The educational problem facing the United Kingdom in 1916 was very like that facing Athens in 
the Fifth Century BC: How to make the change from aristocracy to democracy with minimal 
internal disruption to the state while retaining pre-eminence amongst other nations. As we have 
seen, the Athenian solution to this educational problem was to idealise καλοκἀγαθία, the 
traditional virtues of the aristocrat (Aristotle, EE 1248b10), and to seek to impart this ideal of 
nobility of character to the citizenry at large (Jaeger 1945:417-418). The solution adopted in 
Britain appears to have been the opposite: it has been to disenchant and dishonour the ideal of 
the gentleman (Scruton 2000) and to promote egalitarianism and uniformity. The Athenians 
appealed to καλοκἀγαθία and aimed to raise the aspirations of the citizens to that of achieving 
their highest ideal. They based their moral education on a national narrative which offered 
heartening exemplars, fired the imagination, and imparted meaning to the young, e.g. Pericles’ 
Funeral Oration (Thucydides, Historiae 2.35ff.) Contemporary Britons appeal to ‘fairness’ and 
‘inclusion’ and strive to keep all equal so that none should feel excluded or disadvantaged 
(Marwick 1990:236). Arguably, the predominant current national narrative is one of debunking 
past achievements and heroes and disenchanting past ideals, so that it is doubtful whether 
modern British youths have any coherent national vision of moral goodness to which to aspire.105 
Roger Scruton (2000:245-246) observed: 
Pondering… the history of modern Europe since the French Revolution, I find myself 
confirmed in the desire to praise the English for the virtues they once displayed… 
This does not alter the fact that these virtues are rapidly disappearing. Having been 
famous for their stoicism, their decorum, their honesty, their gentleness and their 
sexual puritanism, the English now subsist in a society in which these qualities are 
no longer honoured… England is no longer a gentle country, and the old courtesies 
and decencies are disappearing…… None of that should surprise us. The loss of 
traditional virtue and local identity has occurred throughout Europe and its 
diaspora. England was part of Christendom, one branch of a spiritual tree which 
was struck by enlightenment and died. The global economy, the democratisation 
of taste, the sexual revolution, pop culture and television have worked to erase the 
                                                          
105  Cf. two films released in 2017: Churchill, written by Alex von Tunzelmann, in which Churchill is 
portrayed as vacillating and cowardly and is accused of treachery, and Dunkirk, written by Christopher 
Nolan, in which the context of the battle and the evacuation is never explained and the main British 
soldier-character is portrayed as conniving and cowardly. 
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sense of spiritual identity in every place where piety shored up the old forms of 
knowledge and local custom fortified the moral sense. 
 
Haldane was correct in foretelling that a deadly struggle, slow and hidden, lay ahead of Britain 
in the 20th Century. He was wrong, however, to see it solely in terms of material prosperity. The 
real struggle has been spiritual. It has been over whether the British would remain true to the 
Western tradition of moral virtue and nobility of character or whether they would succumb to 
what I have described as ‘sophistry’. In both states a tremendous and prolonged war against 
totalitarian enemies – the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) for Athens, and the two World Wars 
(AD 1914-1945) for Britain – brought about national exhaustion and loss of empire. Athens, 
however, continued to blossom culturally during the Peloponnesian War, despite sustaining 
more casualties in proportion to population than did Britain in the 20th Century, and recovered 
from the war remarkably quickly (Kagan 2005:486). The moral and cultural resilience of Athens 
is evidenced by her incredible productivity in the liberal arts; architecture, drama, history and 
philosophy, so that she is still regarded as the highest example of Western civilisation over two 
thousand years later (Cartledge 2009:112).  It is notable that Britain has not shown a similar 
resilience, but has manifested, instead, a decline in rationality and morality, which has been 
particularly precipitous since the end of the Second World War. In a BBC broadcast, titled 
Warning to the Western World, Alexander Solzhenitsyn observed: 
Britain – the kernel of the western world as we have already called it – has 
experienced this sapping of its strength and will to an even greater degree, perhaps, 
than any other country… Contemporary society in Britain is living on self-deception 
and illusions both in the world of politics and in the world of ideas…… we have 
become hopelessly enmeshed in our slavish worship of all that is pleasant, all that 
is comfortable, all that is material – we worship things, we worship products. 
(Solzhenitsyn 1976:44). 
 
This decline in rationality and morality is exemplified in the four main objections of 
contemporary educationalists to traditional Western moral education. The first objection is 
“fear of indoctrination, of extreme pressure on children, of arbitrary rules and equally capricious 
punishments” (Warnock 1979:76). The second is that the advocacy of traditional Western ethics 
and moral education is inappropriate in the contemporary pluralist, multicultural, and inclusive 
UK (ibid.). The third objection argues that any history celebrating specifically British 
achievements will entail a return to what has been called “the Whig interpretation of history” 
(Butterfield 1973), and that this approach to historiography is now thoroughly discredited 
because it is predicated on false assumptions about both the present and the past. The fourth 
objection comes from post-modern historians who are deeply sceptical about the possibility of 
discovering any objective historical truth at all and who argue that historiography is simply the 
artificial ‘construction’ of a ‘narrative’ by various vested interests in the present (Jenkins 1991). 
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I shall address each of these objections in turn, except the last. I regard the post-modern attitude 
to historiography as a particularly self-defeating example of sophistic scepticism because, if our 
knowledge of the past is simply an untrue, artificial ‘construct’ by present-day vested interests, 
then the post-modern interpretation of both history and historiography are themselves untrue 
‘constructs’. Both historiography and the study of history, therefore, become meaningless, and, 
to paraphrase what Aquinas said of the Sophists (Sen. Met. 4, lect. 12.9), it is not surprising that 
post-modern historians should be grieved by the fact that, if it is not possible to discover the 
truth, their study is vain.106 
 
The first objection, that the traditional Western approach to moral education is essentially the 
same as indoctrination, is the most serious objection of the four and I shall, therefore, deal with 
it at greater length than the others in order to clearly delineate the difference between 
indoctrination and moral education. In his Riddell Memorial Lectures, delivered at Durham 
University in 1943, C.S. Lewis addressed just this issue, arguing that it was not the traditional 
approach to moral education which was indoctrination, but rather the sophistic manipulation of 
children seen in modern educational practices. As his argument is very closely presented, I shall 
quote it at some length. Lewis argued that, unless educators believed in objective truth and an 
objective Natural Moral Law which was understood to be binding on all persons, there was 
nothing to stop the educators from indoctrinating their pupils and manipulating them in any way 
the educators, or the policy- and opinion-makers in society, saw fit. He contrasted this with the 
ancient idea of moral education: 
Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be 
such that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous or 
incongruous to it – believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but could 
merit, our approval or disapproval, our reverence, or our contempt… believed 
inanimate nature to be such that certain responses could be more ‘just’ or ‘ordinate’ 
or ‘appropriate’ to it than others…… St. Augustine defines virtue as ordo amoris, the 
ordinate condition of the affections in which every object is accorded that kind and 
degree of love which is appropriate to it. Aristotle says that the aim of education is 
to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought. When the age for reflective 
thought comes, the pupil who has been thus trained in ‘ordinate affections’ or ‘just 
sentiments’ will easily find the first principles in Ethics: but to the corrupt man they 
will never be visible at all and he can make no progress in that science. Plato before 
him had said the same. 
(Lewis 1946:15-16) 
 
It will be seen that Lewis’s description of the traditional approach to moral education as being 
the transmission of ordinate sentiments regarding the objective truth of reality accords with an 
Aristotelian or Thomist account of reality, truth, and human nature, but that it is opposed to the 
                                                          
106 Cf., also, the refutation of modernist and post-modernist historiography in Clark 2004. 
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views of the Sophists and their modern successors. Lewis argued that traditional moral 
education was based on the concept that objective truth about reality is knowable by humans 
and that our emotional responses to what we thus know of reality can either be in accordance 
with its objective truth or discordant with it. In this regard our emotions 
can be in harmony with reason (when we feel liking for what ought to be approved) 
or out of harmony with reason (when we perceive that liking is due but cannot feel 
it). No emotion is, in itself, a judgement: in that sense all emotions and sentiments 
are alogical. But they can be reasonable or unreasonable as they conform to Reason 
or fail to conform. 
(Lewis 1946:18) 
 
Sophistic scepticism about the possibility of objective knowledge of reality, if true, would mean 
that there is no truth with which our emotions can ever be in accordance. “On this view, the 
world of facts, without one trace of value, and the world of feelings without one trace of truth 
or falsehood, justice or injustice, confront one another, and no rapprochement is possible.” 
(Lewis 1946:18). Lewis argued that the effect on moral education of such sophistic scepticism is 
that those who advocate it, 
if they are logical, must regard all sentiments as equally non-rational, as mere mists 
between us and the real objects. As a result, they must either decide to remove all 
sentiments, as far as possible, from the pupil’s mind: or else to encourage some 
sentiments for reasons that have nothing to do with their intrinsic ‘justness’ or 
‘ordinancy’. The latter course involves them in the questionable process of creating 
in others by ‘suggestion’ or incantation a mirage which their own reason has 
successfully dissipated…… If they embark on this course the difference between the 
old and the new education will be an important one. Where the old initiated, the 
new merely ‘conditions’. The old dealt with its pupils as grown birds deal with young 
birds when they teach them to fly: the new deals with them more as the poultry-
keeper deals with young birds – making them thus or thus for purposes of which 
the birds know nothing. In a word, the old was a kind of propagation – men 
transmitting manhood to men: the new is merely propaganda. 
(Lewis 1946:18-20) 
 
Unlike propaganda, moral education is deeply concerned with the truth and goodness of both 
its message and means of delivery. St Augustine, in discussing the artes liberales, affirmed that 
“we have deduced that education, unless it teaches truth, cannot be education.”107 (Soliloquia 
2.11.20). For Plato, too, μουσική was predicated on imparting truth. Hence his much debated 
insistence that the poets, the story-tellers who recount the human knowledge and wisdom 
learned in the past, should be censored and, if they teach falsehood or a debased morality, 
should be banished from his ideal state (Plato, Respublica 603b-608b).108 All this may seem rather 
remote from the moral education of contemporary officers and soldiers in the British Army, but 
it is, in fact, very pertinent. The Army is increasingly adopting an educational approach of trying 
                                                          
107 conlegimus disciplinam, nisi vera doceat, disciplinam esse non posse. 
108 For a fuller explanation of Plato’s case against the poets and artists see Nettleship (1935), Jaeger (1945), 
& Murdoch (1999). 
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to “improve behaviours” by enforcing “attitudes” that are considered “appropriate” by “wider 
society”, although there is no clear definition of what is meant by any of these terms, and no 
thought about who determines what is or is not “appropriate”.109 Such an approach is very 
different from that of inspiring persons with that ennobling ‘vision of greatness’ which enables 
them to fully develop their own individual potential and grow in moral maturity. 
 
The second objection to traditional Western moral education is that it is inappropriate in the 
contemporary pluralist and relativist UK. In the mid-2000s the John Templeton Foundation 
sponsored Learning for Life, a study in the UK which, through a survey of just over 73,000 
persons, assessed (1) the moral values of young Britons aged 3 to 25 and how these changed as 
persons aged; (2) different approaches to moral education; and (3) the rôle of family, schooling, 
religion, society, and government in developing an individual’s sense of morality. In 2010 James 
Arthur, the principal researcher, published an ‘executive summary’ of the conclusions reached 
in the study. Arthur (2010:21) noted, “All reports suggest that young people are interested in 
their own character, and are concerned with enhancing the good aspects of their characters.” 
He also noted, however, that in the contemporary UK this concern of young people with the 
development of their own moral character is no longer nurtured and guided by teachers or 
others in positions of influence in society. 
 
Arthur (2010:2-7) discusses several reasons for the hesitancy many British educationalists feel 
in providing unambiguous guidance in moral education: Firstly, teaching moral education is 
hindered by the fact, already noted, that the language and terms of contemporary moral 
philosophy are themselves confused and ambiguous. Second, teachers “often themselves 
appear to lack any clear conception of what values are, which values are to be promoted, as well 
as any knowledge of how.” (Arthur 2010:4). Third, the belief that in the modern UK, a pluralist, 
multicultural society with relative values and varying accounts of morality, it is wrong to teach 
traditional Western moral values to children and that they should be allowed to develop their 
own, what in the US is sometimes called “values clarification” (Sandin 1992:56f.). Fourth, the 
concomitant belief that “anyone who expresses moral approval or disapproval is in fact 
expressing only his own personal taste, but expressing it in a bogus, misleadingly authoritative 
                                                          
109 I cannot provide a written reference for this assertion, but it is based on my experience of working in 
Army Headquarters throughout 2017 and sitting on numerous working groups aimed at “improving 
behaviours” or enforcing “appropriate behaviours” which are Diversity and Inclusion (D&I) compliant. For 
example, it is now a mandatory part of all officers’ and soldiers’ annual reports, that a comment must be 
made by their superior regarding how far they have “furthered D&I” in the Army, even though some 
protected characteristics under D&I regulations are likely to be in opposition to each other, e.g. religious 
belief and questions of sexuality. The fact that behaviour has become a plural noun – “behaviours” – is 
itself telling of the mechanistic model of human nature underlying this approach. 
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form.” (Warnock 1979:85). Fifth, the idea that in a pluralist liberal democracy, the government 
has no place in drafting a moral education syllabus which will, thereby, promote a particular 
view of morality. Finally, “a growing ‘moral correctness’ mind-set in education, insofar as 
teachers will often refuse to pronounce things to be ‘immoral’ for fear of being branded 
judgemental or discriminatory.” (Arthur 2010:7). 
 
There are, however, a number of counter-arguments to this prevailing relativist approach to 
moral education. The first is that it is false to assert that any society or any individual can simply 
choose their own moral values ex nihilo, as if there were no pre-existing, socially recognised 
normative morality (Lewis 1946:31-35). Warnock (1979:84) has trenchantly stated that the 
“notion that there are no shared values, no basis for a common morality, is totally misconceived, 
and extremely damaging.” She then goes on to rebut the concomitant idea that expressions of 
moral approbation or disapprobation are no more than expressions of personal, idiosyncratic 
opinion, as morality only ever occurs in the context of a community of persons living together. 
“It is an attempt to ensure that people living alongside one another are better off as a whole 
than they would be if no moral constraints existed. To act in the consciousness of such 
constraints is to act morally.” (Warnock 1979:85). Her rebuttal of the idea that morality is simply 
based on personal opinion reinforces the point made by Aquinas and MacIntyre (1985), on 
different grounds, that there can never be such a thing as private morality. Thirdly, the idea that 
Government has no place in promoting morality in schools ignores “the fact that government 
action, and in fact all public policy, is ultimately concerned with, and informed by, questions of 
how we should live our lives and of the type of citizens we should be,” (Arthur 2010:4). Finally, 
the fear teachers have of appearing judgemental and intolerant if they express moral views 
ignores that fact that students encounter real moral issues in their everyday lives and that 
“Teachers are perceived to be moral authorities by their pupils, whatever they themselves may 
think about their teaching,” (Arthur 2010:7). Even refusing to make a moral judgement entails 
taking a stand on a moral issue which will be communicated to the student, albeit without formal 
instruction. It was precisely this covert moral education which C.S. Lewis challenged in his 1943 
Riddell Lectures at Durham. 
 
The third objection to traditional Western moral education, and particularly to immersing the 
young in the stories of their community’s past, is that such a retelling of past events is likely to 
be false and biased. In 1931 Herbert Butterfield published a seminal text on historiography titled, 
The Whig Interpretation of History, in which he criticised any philosophy of history which was 
expressly teleological, such as Marxist historicism or, in England, the form of historicism which 
interpreted the past as an inevitable forward march of progress toward modern liberalism and 
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which, therefore, judged the acts and persons of the past with continual reference to the 
present, in which they were categorised in terms of how far they were progressive or 
obscurantist (Butterfield 1973:16-17). It was this English historicism which he labelled ‘the whig 
interpretation of history’ and proceeded to demonstrate that it was, in fact, based on flawed 
historical reasoning, which tended 
to emphasise certain principles of progress in the past and to produce a story which 
is the ratification if not the glorification of the present. This whig version of the 
course of history is …… not… a problem in the philosophy of history, but rather… an 
aspect of the psychology of historians. 
(Butterfield 1973:9) 
 
Butterfield stressed that the flawed reasoning which he was criticising was particularly likely to 
occur in any attempt to abridge history, partly because such abridgement necessitates the 
selection of persons or ideas of the past from the perspective of those which are salient in the 
present, combined with an interpretation of past events which seeks to explain the present, so 
that it becomes almost natural for the historian to validate the faits accompli of the present by 
a skewed interpretation of past events as being the result of an inevitable historical process and 
of the fixed purpose of past persons, as if they had anticipated the present. Butterfield (1973:20-
22) argued that a better historical method is simply to study the past for its own sake and 
inherent interest, i.e. as one of the artes liberales, and to acknowledge that there is no 
overarching plan of inevitable progress towards modern liberalism in history, which is actually 
the confused and unpredictable process of changeable and clashing human wills, imperfect 
knowledge at the time, and happenstance. The historicism criticised by Butterfield is prone to 
make historical interpretations which are narrowly ideological or jingoistic. It is obvious that 
military history is peculiarly vulnerable to such a jingoistic bias. Butterfield was right to criticise 
‘the whig interpretation of history’, but, in his critique he also inadvertently undermined the fact 
that, on the whole, Britain has indeed been a bastion of liberty in modern times. 
 
Butterfield’s criticism of this peculiarly British form of historicism potentially undermines the 
case for a moral education in the UK based on presenting an inspiring vision of goodness rooted 
in the great persons and deeds of British history. He also, however, provides us with the answer 
to his criticism that the whig interpretation of history entails an abridgement of British history 
which illegitimately emphasises the part and rôle of liberalism in British history. Different from, 
but closely attached to the idea of Britain as the bearer of the liberal ideal, is the idea of Britain 
as a bastion of liberty. This idea is perhaps best summarised in the words of William Pitt the 
Younger, uttered at the height of the Napoleonic Wars, “England has saved herself by her 
exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example” (Coupland 1915:351). The idea of 
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Britain as a bulwark of freedom was implicitly attacked by Butterfield in 1931 in The Whig 
Interpretation of History. It is, however, one of the foundational ‘myths we live by’ in the UK 
(Tillyard 1961:108f.), and it is one which has inspired generations of British soldiers on active 
service. During the Second World War when British liberal democracy and ideals were under 
grave threat, Butterfield wrote another short book titled, The Englishman and his History, in 
which he recanted of his earlier critique of whig historiography: 
Those who, perhaps in the misguided austerity of youth, wish to drive out that whig 
interpretation, (that particular thesis which controls our abridgment of English 
history,) are sweeping a room which humanly speaking cannot long remain empty… 
We, on the other hand, will not dream of wishing it away, but will rejoice in an 
interpretation of the past which has grown up with us, has grown up with the 
history itself, and has helped to make the history…… Therefore… we will celebrate 
this whig history of ours with a robust but regulated pride; observing the part which 
an interpretation of history has played in building up the centuries and creating the 
England that we know. 
(Butterfield 1944:3-4). 
 
The strength of the whig interpretation of history, which Butterfield belatedly recognised, was 
that it made the traditions of the nation accessible to the present generation. Butterfield 
acknowledged that, while the method of ‘whiggish’ historical interpretation is flawed, that does 
not make the story of the nation which the whig historians recounted false. Their understanding 
of the process of historical change may be wrong, but their understanding of what it is important 
to bring to constant remembrance in the face of that historical change is right. It is this right 
remembrance of “the habitual vision of greatness” of our own national past which is of use in 
moral education. There has, however, been a reaction to the telling of this vision of greatness 
amongst contemporary educationalists, for whom it smacks of jingoistic ‘patriotism’, which is 
seen as being wholly negative. But jingoism and patriotism are not the same thing, and 
patriotism – love of one’s homeland – is both natural and just. 
 
C.S. Lewis has described how patriotism contributes to the moral education of the individual. It 
is rooted, firstly, in piety; a love of home and of the way of life lived there, but it is also rooted 
in: 
a particular attitude to our country’s past. I mean that past as it lives in popular 
imagination; the great deeds of our ancestors… This past is felt both to impose an 
obligation and to hold out an assurance; we must not fall below the standards our 
fathers set us, and because we are their sons there is good hope we shall not. This 
feeling has not quite such good credentials as the sheer love of home. The actual 
history of every country is full of shabby and even shameful things… But who can 
condemn what clearly makes many people, at many important moments, behave 
so much better than they could have done without its help? I think it is possible to 
be strengthened by the image of the past without being either deceived or puffed 
up. The image becomes dangerous in the precise degree to which it is mistaken, or 
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substituted, for serious and systematic historical study. The stories are best when 
they are handed on and accepted as stories. I do not mean by this that they should 
be handed on as mere fictions (some of them are after all true). But the emphasis 
should be on the tale as such, on the picture which fires the imagination, the 
example which strengthens the will. 
(Lewis 1960b:35-36) 
 
This brings us back to the traditional Western approach to moral education and character 
formation, based on instructing in objective truth and, thus, the Natural Moral Law, inculcating 
virtuous habits, and inspiring love of goodness through remembrance and emulation of past 
exemplars. None of these can happen, however, where teachers do not themselves know what 
truth or goodness or virtue are, which is arguably the current position in British education. As 
mentioned in the first chapter, Aquinas added depth to the Graeco-Roman understanding of 
moral psychology by demonstrating how the seven capital vices (pride, envy, wrath, sloth, 
avarice, gluttony, and lust) specifically oppose the cardinal virtues and deform moral character. 
Consideration of the seven capital vices will reveal that they are essentially disordered 
expressions of our appetites for the good. Further consideration will reveal how frequently and 
extensively the capital vices are appealed to or stimulated in the contemporary UK through 
advertising, films, television, the internet and other media, something which was alluded to in 
the second chapter. Contemporary British society has inverted the traditional understanding of 
virtues as good habits and positively advocates the seven capital vices as essential to the good 
life. Indeed, some modern psychologists even argue that ‘a little bit of sin’ is good for one (Laham 
2012), which reveals a basic misunderstanding of the traditional view of sins as enslaving bad 
habits which destroy the freedom and well-being of the person who is so enslaved. It is, however, 
important to note that, contrary to this contemporary inversion of traditional morality and the 
concomitant loss of virtue in modern British society, the British armed forces have, until recently, 
retained the traditional approach to moral education predicated on the idea of virtuous 
character formation (Robinson 2008:5-7). 
 
British Army Ethics Training 
On 3rd April 2000, the British Army first formally articulated its ‘core values’ (Evans 2000), issuing 
two different pamphlets, one for soldiers and one for commanders, but both titled Values and 
Standards of the British Army. In his foreword to the commanders’ edition, General Sir Roger 
Wheeler, Chief of the General Staff, wrote that the pamphlet was “a simple statement of the 
values that have traditionally sustained us, and the standards of conduct expected of us.” (AC-
63813, 2000:i). Interestingly, he reframed this idea of traditional values in his foreword to the 
soldiers’ edition; “The values and standards that are set out in this booklet are those which 
experience has shown are vital for success on operations,” (AC-63812, 2000:1). One reason, 
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perhaps, why General Sir Roger’s foreword in the soldiers’ edition did not refer to the Army’s 
newly articulated values as “traditional” is expressed in the claim that 
The breakdown of traditional values and respect for authority among potential 
recruits has forced the Army to produce its first moral code… Army chiefs no longer 
feel that they can take for granted that young men and women coming into the 
forces from different parts of a rapidly changing society will understand the ethos 
that governs the Service on and off duty. 
(Evans 2000) 
 
Stephen Deakin, who teaches at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, has addressed this issue 
in a discussion of the British Army’s approach to officer training through the 20th-Century. He 
noted that the emphasis is “on individual good character… The ideal is that of the gentleman… 
who has a sure, but unarticulated, grasp of decent behaviour and right and wrong.” (Deakin 
2008:19). According to Deakin, when faced with the changes in British society’s moral 
understanding brought about by secularisation and pluralism in the late 20th-Century, the Army 
focussed on articulating its ‘ethos’ rather than on trying to teach ‘ethics’. 
This appeal to ethos is both clever and revealing. The study of ethics often involves 
abstract and applied thought about complex problems informed by the world’s 
great thinkers. The appeal to ethos neatly sidesteps this. It promotes and reinforces 
an ideal British Army way of life and in so doing seems to avoid much ethical 
discussion. It is not prescriptive in a legalistic sense and this appeal to the spirit of 
its community fits the pragmatic British military culture with its shared implicit 
understandings. Ethos appears at first glance to be neutral, yet it carries within it 
all the characteristics of the British Army. It is a strong socialising device. It 
communicates that this is the way that the British Army military community does 
things. It says to all soldiers: accept the principles of our military community…… it 
is clear that the term captures the practice of hundreds of years. Soldiers have 
always been educated in the British military ethos… The educational model used 
has been a time-honoured, ‘hear, see, do’ one, where one military generation 
passes on its ethics to the next. 
(Deakin 2008:20-21) 
 
In effect, what Deakin has described is the traditional Western approach to moral education as 
applied in practice by the British Army in the last two centuries: The development of latent 
virtues and nobility of character in Officer Cadets by instruction in military doctrine and norms, 
inculcation of basic drills and discipline, and inspiration by immersing them in the military 
community, providing exemplars of good practice in their instructors, and remembering the 
histories and heroes who have gone before. But it was not just the officers who displayed a 
gentlemanly nobility of character. As we have seen above, Field-Marshal Slim and Sir John 
Fortescue claimed that the British soldier also displayed a gentleness of character which set him 
apart amongst the martial races of the world. Having had personal experience of both the British 
Army and other nation’s military forces, I would claim that a residue of this quality of gentleness 
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still resides in the British soldier. Deakin acknowledges, however, that the traditional approach 
to moral education which fostered this gentility of character has been undermined in the 
contemporary UK because British policy-makers now promote moral relativism, with its 
emphasis on egalitarianism and pluralist inclusion, and deprecate the idea of forming excellent 
moral character. He concludes: 
The need to write formal codes of ethics as in the Values and Standards booklet is 
the sign of the passing of an age when people knew what a British officer stood for. 
He was a gentleman; a Christian English gentleman, who… could be relied upon to 
do the right thing and to know what ordinary decent correct behaviour was without 
even thinking about it very much. 
(Deakin 2008:26) 
 
In addition to its past efforts to develop virtuous character in its personnel, as described by 
Deakin, the British Army has also relied on a deontological approach by trying to ensure correct 
moral and legal conduct from soldiers through the sanction of Military Law, Standing Orders, 
and Rules of Engagement. Likewise, the Service Test applies a utilitarian consequentialist 
approach to moral behaviour (Todd 2015:pers. comm.). Deontological and consequentialist 
approaches are necessary, but they offer the British Army only partial answers to developing 
mature moral character: “The Service Test is utilitarian and the utilitarianism ethic often does 
not work in a military community. It is not the ethic of a virtuous person desiring to do good in 
every circumstance.” (Deakin 2008:24). It is also important to distinguish between everyday 
regulations necessary for the smooth running of an institution, such as the correct way to wear 
a uniform, and specifically moral rules. Making this distinction clear is especially important if 
soldiers are being disciplined for a breach of regulations, so that they do not confuse adherence 
to the regulations with being morally virtuous (Warnock 1979:81). 
 
Rather paradoxically, and largely because of the confusion and ambiguity of contemporary 
Western moral vocabulary and understanding, the assumption is that good moral behaviour can 
be taught simply by rational exposition; that one need only instruct the intellect with an 
understanding of moral philosophy and the person will behave well. Currently in the British Army 
this is attempted through one mandatory 40-minute session a year, in which the soldiers’ 
understanding of the Army’s Values is validated by completing a short questionnaire. In a 
perceptive article titled, ‘Values are not learnt through teaching’, Roger Scruton discussed this 
very question when, in 2006, the Government announced plans to teach British core values in 
schools to help combat Islamism in the UK. Scruton (2006) stated,  
The Government conceives of values as a kind of knowledge, to be put up on the 
blackboard and discussed by the class. But values are matters of practice, not of 
theory. They are not so much taught as imparted. You learn them by immersion, by 
joining with your contemporaries in team spirit, competition, and adventure. 
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In fact, as already stressed, moral education needs to focus on imaginative inspiration, not 
simply rational instruction, because 
no [intellectual] justification of virtue will enable a man to be virtuous. Without the 
aid of trained emotions the intellect is powerless against the animal organism… In 
battle it is not syllogisms that will keep the reluctant nerves and muscles to their 
post in the third hour of the bombardment. The crudest sentimentalism… about a 
flag or a country or a regiment will be of more use. We were told it all long ago by 
Plato… Reason in man must rule the mere appetites by means of… emotions 
organised by trained habit into stable sentiments. [They] are the indispensable 
liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral man. 
(Lewis 1946:20-21) 
 
The aim of moral education in the military, therefore, is to aid soldiers in realising their full 
potential as rational moral agents, not creatures driven by their appetites and desires, both as 
individual persons and as members of the community of those called to bear arms, through the 
threefold method of traditional character formation. Firstly, by instruction, by teaching that 
there are objective truths in certain fields of knowledge, irrespective of personal opinion. In the 
British Army this is done through instruction in military doctrine and the art of war, in which the 
application may vary but the underlying principles remain the same and are changeless: 
These common-sense precepts, or principles [of war], are easy enough to learn and 
grasp: but they are [not] a complete set of rules for success in war… Sometimes 
even they are divergent, in that one can only be fully observed at the expense of 
another. Their application to the situations and problems of the battle-field, which 
are never twice the same, needs constant practice and study. 
(Wavell 1948:154) 
 
Second, by inculcation, by teaching drills and Standard Operating Procedures, such as marching, 
weapon-handling, or infantry section drills. Field-Marshal Wavell (1945:45f.) has described this 
well: 
To say that a good soldier must have discipline is no more than to say he must have 
learnt his trade well... Discipline is teaching which makes a man do something which 
he would not, unless he had learned it was the right, the proper, and the expedient 
thing to do. At its best, it is instilled and maintained by pride in oneself, in one’s 
unit, in one’s profession; only at its worst by a fear of punishment. The military 
manifestations of discipline are many and various...... the mechanical side of 
discipline [entails] learning by practice to do something so automatically that it 
becomes natural even in moments of stress. It is essential both to warfare and to 
orderly efficient civil life. 
But in the British Army these “mechanical” drills are also imbued with meaning by the 
inculcation of reverence for traditional norms: one ‘bulls’ one’s boots so as to parade the 
Regimental Colours with due piety and to march well to the music of the Regimental Marches, 
just as one’s predecessors did under Wellington and Marlborough centuries ago. It is through 
this consistent practice, imbued with profound meaning by the imagination, that imposed 
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discipline becomes daily habit and daily habit becomes a fixed disposition of character. This 
disposition of character is, as Wavell said, “essential to warfare”. 
 
Third, by inspiration, by presenting worthy rôle models in the soldier’s instructors and chain of 
command, and by bringing to constant remembrance the Army’s history and its past heroes. The 
British Army used to be very good at such inspiration: through the immersion of the soldier in 
his regiment; the assertion that the regiment is second to none; and the re-telling of stories from 
regimental history, till the regimental ethos was thoroughly imbued. An understanding of the 
nation’s history, of which military history is but a part, and of the traditions of the Army as part 
of the venerable traditions of the nation, are fundamental to presenting “the habitual vision of 
greatness” described by Whitehead. A vision which inspires the love of goodness and the desire 
to emulate one’s forebears. Roger Scruton (2006), remembering his own schooling, noted: 
History was our history. It recounted battles that we had fought or lost; it dwelt on 
our achievements and our shortcomings (though the latter were strictly rationed). 
Literature was our literature, and all our activities were marked by the same 
proprietary feeling: we were being brought up as British, by authority figures 
infused with a love of the country that we shared. 
 
The British Army has several different types of history: of its campaigns around the Empire 
against a very diverse range of foes; of its individual regiments and corps; of its part in major 
European conflicts; of its relationship with wider British society; and in the memoirs of individual 
officers and soldiers. Each of these types of history is also a rich store of ‘myth’, as are the novels, 
the verse, the films, the regimental bands and marches, the village war memorials and the fading 
regimental Colours hanging in cathedrals and churches across the country. All tell the story of 
the British soldier, albeit in very different ways, and all contribute to the myths by which, in the 
past, the British Army has lived and fought, and by which, I suggest, it should once again be 
morally educated in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
It is a moot point whether or not it is possible, even in an institution as traditional and venerable 
as the British Army, to reinstate an approach to moral education which is predicated on 
celebrating the noble, the good, the pre-eminent in its history, in a nation in which the 
celebration of its past glories has been challenged by a sceptical post-modern and pluralist 
historiography; an interpretation which denigrates, debunks or dismisses past excellences of 
British character, achievement and endeavour. It is my belief, however, that if the Army does 
not return to the traditional Western method of character formation by inculcation, instruction, 
imitation, and inspiration, then the nation will become defenceless against all manner of 
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enemies, because “war”, as Thucydides (Historiae 3.82) tells us, “is a violent teacher,”110 and 
only those who are immersed in the nation’s traditions of the honourable Vocation of bearing 
Arms will be able to endure the harsh education given in the stern school of war: 
War is a special activity, different and separate from any other pursued by man… 
An army’s military qualities are based on the individual who is steeped in the spirit 
and essence of this activity; who trains the capacities it demands, rouses them, and 
makes them his own; who applies his intelligence in every detail; who gains ease 
and confidence through practice, and who completely immerses his personality in 
the appointed task. 
(Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 3.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation I have made several connected arguments: Firstly, that modern Western 
moral philosophy is impoverished and this impoverishment derives from the philosophical 
                                                          
110 ὁ δὲ πόλεμος… βίαιος διδάσκαλος. 
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scepticism about knowledge, truth, and reality traditionally known as ‘sophistry’. In modern 
times the inevitable effects of sophistic scepticism in contemporary Western societies have been 
variously described as ‘subjectivism’ (Lewis 1967), ‘consequentialism’ (Anscombe 1958), and 
‘emotivism’ (MacIntyre 1985). British military personnel are recruited from societies which are 
permeated by such sophistry, so it is not surprising that in recent times both the articulation of 
British military ethics and the conduct of British officers and soldiers have been shaped by 
emotivist, subjectivist and consequentialist ideas.  
 
Anscombe (1958) identified that the sceptical impoverishment of modern moral philosophy 
mentioned above is seen in its inability to give a coherent account of human nature, action, 
flourishing, and virtue. My second argument, therefore, is that a coherent account of these 
things is precisely what is given by the traditional Western moral philosophy of virtue, especially 
as articulated by Thomas Aquinas. Not only is a Thomist account coherent, but it also provides 
a comprehensive and convincing account of the practicably lived moral life, which, because it is 
based on a common sense understanding of human nature and human flourishing, is 
understandable by and applicable to officers and soldiers currently serving in the British Army. 
The Army, however, relies predominantly on deontological and consequentialist approaches to 
ethics which, while necessary, are inadequate because they are based on an impoverished 
understanding of human nature and human moral agency. In fact, the British Army’s reliance on 
consequentialism and deontology as the main approaches to moral judgement and decision-
making in its moral education may even keep its officers and soldiers in a state of moral 
immaturity. 
 
My third argument, therefore, is that the Army’s ethics should be re-grounded in the traditional 
Western understanding of virtue and that the Army’s moral education should, thus, return to 
the traditional focus on the formation of virtuous character in which, as Cicero (Off. 2.5.18) said, 
the student grows to moral maturity by developing the habits of virtue which discipline the 
sustentative appetites, inspire love of goodness in the affective sentiments, and direct the 
intellect to truth and the will to right action. Virtuous character is formed through the threefold 
method of: (1) Informing the reason and intellect of officers and soldiers by rational discourse 
and instruction in the indemonstrable first principles of ethics and Natural Law; (2) Transforming 
the affective sentiments and firing the imagination of officers and soldiers with an inspiring 
vision of what it means to serve in the British Army and to be an excellent soldier by imaginative 
discourse which immerses the officers and soldiers in the traditions – the stories and customs - 
of the regiment to which they belong and by offering past and present rôle models worthy of 
imitation; and (3) Reforming and disciplining the sustentative faculties and appetites by the  
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inculcation of habits of virtue, so that officers and soldiers can realise their innate potential to 
become the most excellent persons they can be, both as soldiers and as human beings. 
 
This last argument may sound impracticable, but the British Army already has most of the means 
for this type of moral education in place.  All that is required is a slight readjustment in emphasis 
of some of its already extant training. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the key element to 
the traditional Western approach to moral education is to inspire in persons the love of truth 
and goodness for their own sakes, to inspire them to want to do what is right, and thereby to 
help them to grow to moral maturity as free moral agents. The desire to do what is right and to 
will the good can be encouraged and facilitated by the Army, but it is ultimately up to the 
individual officer or soldier to cultivate the habits of preferring the good and choosing the right, 
till they become innate, so that under pressure in the midst of combat he or she can instantly 
discern and decide what is the morally right course of action to take.  
 
In the late 1600s in the aftermath of the British Civil Wars between Parliamentarians and 
Royalists, a professional Army was first introduced into Britain, but was used as a means of 
political and religious oppression under the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell. It was a time not 
unlike today; when the old established certainties of many folk were overthrown and traditional 
moral understanding was challenged by the first stirrings of the Enlightenment. In this dark 
period Sir Thomas Browne gave some sage advice, which is still pertinent today: 
Live by old Ethicks and the classical Rules of Honesty. Put no new names or notions 
upon Authentic Virtues and Vices. Think not that Morality is Ambulatory; that Vices 
in one age are not Vices in another; or that Virtues, which are under the everlasting 
Seal of right Reason, may be Stamped by Opinion. And therefore, though vicious 
times invert the opinion of things, and set up new Ethicks against Virtue, yet hold 
thou unto old Morality; and rather than follow a multitude to do evil, stand like 
Pompey’s Pillar conspicuous by thyself, and single in Integrity. And since the worst 
of times afford imitable Examples of Virtue; since no Deluge of Vice is like to be so 
general, but more than eight will escape; Eye well those Heroes who have held their 
Heads above Water, who have touched Pitch, and not been defiled, and in the 
common Contagion have remained uncorrupted. 
(Christian Morals, Part 1, §12) 
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